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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation analyses the concept of freedom in the 
thought of Paulo Freire, a Brazilian philosopher. The six chapters of 
this work is divided in three major parts: 
First part: I will discuss the method to be applied throughout 
this dissertation and the circumstances which have influenced Paulo 
Freire's philosophical principles as a Latin American philosopher. The 
above elements constitute my starting-point, my terminus a quo. 
Second part: I will analyse Freire's thought as a philosophical 
system, a philosophy of education, and a philosophy of freedom. It is 
necessary to begin with Freire's philosophical principles in order to 
have an adequate understanding of his concept of freedom. The analysis 
of Freire's thought is the via ad, the method leading to my final affir-
mations. 
Third part: I will discuss critically Freire's philosophy of 
freedom as a political approach by which the concept of freedom has 
to be understood. This discussion is, according to the method applied, 
the terminus ad quem of the work as a whole. 
1 
PART ONE 
THE METHOD AND THE LATIN AMERICAN CIRCUMSTANCES 
The first part has two chapters which discuss two necessary as-
pects: the method applied throughout this dissertation and the Latin 
American circumstances that have affected Freire's thought. 
The method applied is dialectical. However, there are three 
different contexts in which this method is discussed: European philosophy 
which discusses the dialectical method in Aristotle, Hegel, Kierkegaard, 
and Marx; Latin American philosophy which discusses the method in 
Leopolda Zea and Enrique Dussel; and the dialectical method as used in 
this work. 
The second chapter discusses the historical, socio-economic, 
educational, and ideological context of Latin American countries, as a 
broader context of Freire, and of Brazil, as a more restricted context. 
This chapter also introduces Freire's life and works in the context of 
his Brazilian experience, his Chilean experience, and his international 
experience. 
According to my method, these two chapters are the terminus a 
quo of the whole work, i.e. the starting-point of the discussion of 
freedom. 
2 
CHAPTER I 
THE LATIN AMERICAN DIALECTICAL METHOD 
La filosofia no se hace solo desde 
los libros, sino desde la realidad 
de un pueblo oprimido.l Dussel 
When one writes a philosophical work from a Latin American per-
spective, a dialectical method is a natural approach. I intend to use 
this method because I have chosen Paulo Freire as the subject of my 
study. He is both a Latin American and· a dialectical thinker. 
But what does dialectical method means? Dialectic is a way 
2 
and, at the same time, a movement. There are different kinds of dia-
lectic. However, they can be differentiated by two characteristics: 
the similar, but not the same, starting-point (terminus a quo), and the 
different place of arriving (terminus ad quem). For instance, the pre-
Socratic dialectic started in a physical terminus a quo (the contra-
ries such as cold-warm, hidden-uncovered, and high-short) and arrived at 
1 
"Philosophy grows not only from books, but from the reality 
of an oppressed people." Enrique Dussel, "Periodizacion de las Rela-
ciones de Iglesia y Estado en America Latina." (Bogota: Edit. en 
CEHILA, 1977. Bolet{n n. 10-11), p. 89. Quoted by German Marquinez 
Argote in his Preliminary Essay ("Enrique Dussel: Filosofo de la Libe-
racio'n Latinoamericana") in Filosof!a de la Liberacion by Enrique 
Dussel (Bogota: Editorial Nueva America, 1979), p. 28. 
2 
The word "method" comes from ~="according to" and hodos= 
"way." 
3 
4 
3 
being; however, Descartes started with "the great book of the world" 
4 
and arrived at the ~ogito ergo sum. As we will see, dialectic is the 
way between the terminus a quo and the terminus ad quem. But, at the 
same time, it is also the movement of reasoning which goes from the 
terminus a quo to the terminus ad quem. 
Given this criteria, my first chapter will discuss the dialecti-
cal method from three perspectives: from some European philosophers 
who have exerted a powerful influence in Latin America, from some dia-
lectical philosophers of Latin America who have looked for a Latin Amer-
ican method, and from my own position which will posit a dialectical 
method for the present work. 
1. THE INHERITANCE OF EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY 
Latin American philosophy has inherited, from European 
philosophy, a dialectical method which will be necessary to discuss in 
order to understand the Latin American dialectical method. My selection 
of some of the principal dialectical philosophers of Europe stems from 
the importance they have to Freire as well as to our study. What I 
want to discuss is the way in which the European dialectical method 
is applied by Aristotle, Hegel, Kierkegaard, and Marx, and how they 
clarify that method. As we see, Aristotle started with the 
3 
For instance Heraclitus and Parmenides. 
4 
Rene Descartes, A Discourse on Method (London: J.M. Dent & 
Sons., 1965), p.8. 
5 
generally admitted and arrived at the hidden; Hegel started in the iso-
lated and contradictory aspects of the absolute and arrived at the ab-
solute spirit, Kierkegaard started with existence and arrived at the 
religious stage, and Marx started in "sensuous human activity" and 
arrived at the transformation of the world. Dialectical philosophers 
of Europe have argued dram a terminus a quo, which is remarkably similar, 
to a terminus ad quem which frequently differs. 
My discussion begins with Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) who makes 
an important distinction as follows: 
(a) It [reasoning] is a "demonstration" when the premises from 
which the reasoning starts are true and primary, or are such that 
our knowledge of them has originally come through premises which 
are primary and true: (b) reasining, on the other hand, is "dia-
lectical", if it reasons from opinions that are generally ac-
cepted ••• Those opinions are "generally accepted" which are 5 
accepted by every one or by the majority of by the philosophers •.• 
If Aristotle wants scientific reasoning what he needs are true 
premises, but if he wants dialectical reasoning, what he needs are facts, 
even if they are from experiences or ordinary people. The Aristotelian 
dialectic starts with the "generally accepted," the endoxa, the uncov-
ering of the hidden. Dialectic starts in the experiences of ordinary 
life (the Aristotelian terminus a quo) and moves toward the first prin-
ciple (his terminus ad quem). 
Aristotle placed the dialecrical method before the scientific 
stage of reasoning. The dialectical method precedes all science and 
philosophy as a science. Sciences and philosophy start with their 
5 
Aristotle, Topica, I, lOOa-lOOb. The Works of Aristotle, v.I 
trans. and ed. W. D. Ross (London: Oxford University Press, 1966). 
6 
principles; the dialectic uncovers those principles but does not start 
with them. Dialectic is at the beginning of all scientific knowledge. 
It is not a result of, but a precondition for, a scientific theory or a 
6 
philosophical formulation. 
Therefore, dialectical movement of thought is not a deduction, 
demonstration, universal abstraction, or general idea. Dialectical move-
ment starts in the world as a radical questioning of the whole. By seeing 
the oppositions between various doxai, the philosopher comes to deny the 
day-to-day and common sense knowing of things. Consequently, dialectic 
is negative, penetrative, and perforative in its attempt to uncover the 
truth. Its examination leads from the obvious to the hidden, from the 
naivete of appearances to a critical interrogation of them. Dialectic is 
a critical method, a testing and discrimination of everything, because, 
as ordinary people understand the world, truth is covered by doxa, i.e. 
7 
opinions. This analysis is confirmed by Joseph Owens who concludes: 
Dialectical procedure, then, has a role of primary importance for 
Aristotle. It is the discussion that brings to light the indemon-
strable first principles of scientific demonstration. Of itself it 
does not yield knowledge, yet it is a necessary step in the quest 
of knowledge. It shows how deeply for Aristotle the scientific 
starting points were engaged in the complexities of experience. 8 
6 
Cf. Aristotle, Topica, I and VIII, and De Sophisticis Elenchis, 
op. cit. v. II. Also W. D. Ross, Aristotle (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 
1949), pp. 56-59. 
7 
Cf. Enrique Dussel, Metoda para una Filosof1a de la Liberacion. 
Superacion Analectica de la Dialectica Hegeliana (Salamanca: Ediciones 
S1gueme, 1974), p. 15. 
8 
Joseph Owens, A History of Ancient Western Philosophy (New York: 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1959), p. 305. 
7 
Hegel (1770-1831), one of the most important philosophers of 
German Idealism, is also one of the most important dialectical philoso-
phers of Europe. I will not review all of Hegel. What I want to do 
is to focus on a very important aspect of Hegel's philosophy which 
has to do with dialectical movement of thought. This dialectical move-
ment is explained, as a whole method, in two steps: the first step which 
is described in The Phenomenology of Mind (1807), and the second step 
which is described in The Science of Logic (1816). 
In the first step, The Phenomenology starts in the terminus a 
quo of experience, the doxai of human spirit. Related with this 
starting point, Hegel says: 
The knowledge, which is at the start or immediately our object, can 
be nothing else than just that which is immediate knowledge, knowl-
edge, of the immediate, of what is. We have, in dealing with it, to 
proceed, too, in an immediate waY: to accept what is given, not 
altering anything in it as it is presented before us, and keeping 
mere apprehension (Auffassen) free from conceptual comprehension 
(Begreifen). The concrete content, which sensuous certainty fur-
nishes, makes this prima facie appear to be the richest kind of 
knowledge ••• 9 
Dialectical method, here, starts in this primitive stage of "sense 
certainty," and runs through different stages up to the highest level. 
~he highest level is the self-comprehension of the spirit (the absolute 
spirit), absolute knowledge, i.e., the level of philosophy as a science. 
Dialectic is the critical elimination of the daily security that is fur-
nished by either the sensible knowledge and the general understanding 
of the common people or the empirical knowledge of scientific people. 
9 
Georg Wilhelm Friederich Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, 
trans. J. B. Baillie (London: George Allen & Unwin Lt., 1966), p. 149. 
8 
Dialectic is the upward movement of the human spirit which loses confi-
dence at each stage, only to obtain a progressively higher stage until 
10 
it attains real knowledge (the terminus ad quem). Dialectic occa-
sions a kind of skepticism. This crisis does not arrive at the naught 
or at the empty, but denying the contradictions positively generates 
new and superior forms. Dialectic is the annihilation of all objects 
11 
which do not fulfill the exigencies of absolute knowledge. 
The second step described in The Science of Logic begins in the 
undetermined absolute (terminus a quo) and arrives at the absolute 
knowledge which for Hegel is absolute subjectivity (terminus ad quem). 
In other words, in the second step dialectic moves from knowledge of 
the absolute spirit which is undetermined to the spirit's own transpa-
rency and self-vision. 
In one of the last paragraphs of his Phenomenology, Hegel makes 
a preliminary description of the second moment of his explanation: 
Since its accomplishment consists in Spirit knowing what it 
is, in fully comprehending its substance, this knowledge means 
its concentrating itself on itself (insichgehen), a state in 
which Spirit leaves its eternal existence behind and gives its 
embodiment over to Recollection (Enrinnerung). In thus 
concentrating itself on itself, Spirit is engulfed in the 
night of its own self-consciousness; its vanished existence 
-the previous state, but-born anew from the womb of knowledge-
is the new stage of existence, a new word, and a new embodiment 
or mode of Spirit. Here it has to begin all over again 
10 
Cf. Ibid, pp. 67-145. 
11 
Cf. Ibid., pp. 791-808. 
to Hegel (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
Also G. R. G. Mure, An Introduction 
1976), pp. 114-138. 
9 
at its immediacy .•• as if, for it, all that preceded were lost, and 
as if it had learned nothing from the experience of the spirits that 
preceded.12 
Two elements of this paragraph can help us to see the nature of 
the dialectical method. 
The first element is the term Erinnerung which means memory which 
recollects. This recollection is defined by Hegel as the remembrance of 
the previous moment (the first step), which, according to his Phe-
nomenology~ has come to its end. This movement was at one and the same 
time a necessary "introduction," a distressing search for real knowledge, 
an act of the "love of wisdom" (£ilia and sofia), i.e,, "the recollection 
and the Golgotha of Absolute Spirit, the reality, the truth, the 
certainty of its throne, with6ut which it were lifeless, solitary, and 
13 
alone." The "recolleetion" is the first moment, the remembrance, and, 
for this reason the first step toward the absolute spirit. 
The term "new" refers to the absolute spirit as itself, the 
terminus ad quem for the previous process and the terminus a quo for the 
second moment. The "expression" of the absolute spirit is the "pure 
being," but this expression is confronted by the "other in general" and 
by "itself" which are "negations" of the absolute. In other words, the 
absolute spirit is the being in itself, but its expression is determined 
by the "sum-total of all realities," (the other in general) present in 
12 
G. W. F. Hegel, p. 807. 
13 
Ibid. , p. 808. 
10 
14 
the absolute spirit, and by the self-determination. The sum-total of 
all realities is the recollection of the first moment (first step) of 
the dialectical movement. The self-determination is the reflection of 
the spirit on and in itself which is itself shown into self. The abso-
lute spirit, in addition to "being-in-itself," is also "being-for-it-
15 
self." That is, the "new" step, the internal moment of the absolute 
spirit, the movement between the absolute unity and its differentiations, 
its determinations, its finiteness, and its "negations." 
The crucial element appears when we meet, in the second step, 
the moment of Hegel's philosophy as a science, the self-dialectical 
method. The "natural" way of the movement of the absolute spirit is 
also dialectical in the same sense in which we described the dialectic 
of the first step. Dialectic is not only the method of that pre-
scientific and pre-philosophical step, but is also the method of science 
par excellence, the science of the absolute which is philosophy as a 
science. Philosophy here is the explanation of the absolute in its 
immanent oppositions (e.g., subject-object, being-naught, and finite-
infinite) and the overcoming of them through the superior unity of the 
absolute spirit. Thus, Hegel considers the dialectical method as em-
bracing both the first and the second steps of thinking. 
14 
G. W. F. Hegel, Science of Logic, 2. vols. trans. W. H. 
Johnston & L. G. Struthers (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1929) 2:16. 
15 
Cf. Ibid., 2:20-34. Also Wener Marx, Hegel's Phenomenology of 
Spirit, trans. Peter Heath (London: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1975), 
pp. 42-49. 
11 
The concept of philosophy is truth knowing itself, the idea thinking 
itself, the spirit living its thought. Dialectic, the logic of 
philosophy, is the explication (Ur-Teil) of the Concept in all 
essential shapes of life, in nature, soul, mind, and spirit. The 
movement of these living contents and the movement of dialectic 
thought is one and the same movement. In space and time it shines 
through disappearing appearances, founding, transcending, and 
preserving them in their true meaning.16 
Dialectic in general is the search of the absolute spirit for the 
object which is consciousness in and for itself, consciousness as object 
of consciousness, the self-consciousness. Dialectic is the way in which 
subjectivity moves; it is the mode of life of the absolute spirit. Dia-
lectic is the idea which divides the identical from itself and projects 
itself as something different from itself: the objective from the subjec-
tive, the finite from the infinite. Dialectic is reason, not the under-
standing of Kant; it is both negative and positive. Dialectic moves from 
the first "affirmation" to a "negation" of the affirmation, and from 
that negation to a "negation of the negation." In other words, the 
negative characteristic always will deny an absolute and will thus gener-
ate movement. This movement in turn will generate the next affirmation, 
and thus rise to a higher stage of the absolute. Dialectical movement is 
not an exterior event; it is spirit whose content is itself, as a whole, 
17 
as a universal, as an absolute, and the concept of that content as well. 
to think logically and to be what it is are the same. 
16 
G. W. F. Hegel, Encyclopedia of Philosophy, trans. Gustav Emil 
Mueller (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959), pp. 285, 286. 
17 
Cf. G. W. F. Hegel, Science of Logic, 2:466-486. 
12 
All aspects of whatever is are originally united in the abso-
lute. The first moment begins in "sense certainty," which is essential-
ly a certainty of consciousness and not a certainty about the things 
sensed. The dialectical process shatters the daily security that sensa-
tion provides and ascends to self-consciousness. The second movement 
begins when the absolute spirit is in-itself (ansich), for-itself 
18 (flirsich), and in- and for-itself (an- und flirsich). The dialectical 
process is thought thinking thought. In general terms, thinking is the 
dialectical activity of the spirit (logical level) through its content, 
the objects which it thinks (ontological level). However, both activity 
and content are the same process because all thoughts are products of the 
thinking activity. The objective contents of thinking are thought-ob-
jects; they are objects because the absolute spirit makes its own ob-
jects. For this reason, we find reality only in thought. There is no 
19 
reality unrelated to thought, there is no reality outside of thought. 
All reality is thought and all thought is reality, which is to say, 
20 
"what is rational is real; and what is real is rational." 
The third Europeanphilosopher that I want to discuss is Soren 
Kierkegaard (1813-1855). Kierkegaard posits two theses: "a logical system 
18 
J. N. Findlay, Hegel, a Re-examination (London: George Allen & 
Unwin Ltd., 1970), pp. 58-82. 
19 
Cf. Quentin Lauer, Hegel's Idea of Philosophy (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 1971), pp. 31-43. 
20 
G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. S. W. Dyle (London: 
George Bell and Sons, 1896), p. XXVII. 
13 
21 
is possible" and "an existential system is impossible." A logical 
system approach (like Hegel's) begins "with the immediate," without any 
presuppositions, absolutely. This is logical and coherent, but it is 
also an abstraction from existence. A logical system cannot include any-
thing from the "existence dialectic;" it cannot incorporate even a rela-
tionship with existence. Existence "cannot be a system for any existing 
22 
spirit" because the existence is a "system" created by God. All phil-
osophical systems bring finality to all things, but existence opposes all 
human finality. Kierkegaard does not object to any incoherence in the 
Hegelian system. What Kierkegaard objects to is Hegel's forgetfulness of 
his own existence, the fact that all systems come after existence, 
ex post facto. Therefore, Hegel's absolute is not absolute, his immedi-
ate beginning is not immediate. "The fact that the thinker is an existing 
individual signifies that existence imposes its own requirement upon 
23 
him." All reflection, all understanding, and all thought systems come 
after the fact. Thus, philosophizing does not consist in fantastic 
speculation with fantastic language, valid only to fantastic people. To 
think (in spite of identifying subject-object and thought-being) does 
not necessarily mean to be engaged in existence; to think only means to 
21 
Soren Kierkegaard (Johannes Climacus), Concluding Unscientific 
Postcript to the "Philosophical Fragments," trans. David F. Swenson, 
Lilliam Marvin Swenson, and Walter Lowrie, in A Kierkegaard Anthology, ed. 
by Robert Bretall (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947), p. 196. 
22 
Ibid., p. 201 
23 
Ibid. 
14 
be engaged in thinking. This is the stage of systematic speculation, of 
a mind alienated, confused, inattentive. This is the stage of one's own 
pleasure, an uncommitted movement in relation to the existential move-
ment. This is the aesthetic stage, the first of the three stages of 
Kierkegaard's thought. 
It is from this side, in the first instance, that the objection must 
be made to modern philosophy; not that it has a mistaken presuposi-
tion, but that it has a comical presupposition, occasioned by its 
having forgotten, in a sort of world-historical absent-mindedness, 
what it means to be a human being. Not indeed, what it means to be 
a human being in general; for this is the sort of thing that one 
might even induce, a speculative philosopher to agree to; but what 
it means that you and I and he are human beings, each one for 
itself.24 
According to this paragraph there are two ways of existing: the 
25 
way of those who forget their existence and become "comic," and the way 
of those who confront their existence. Comic existence corresponds to 
the aesthetic stage, but committed existence corresponds to the second 
stage, the ethical stage, that is, to the "ought," to the commands of 
existence. But there is a third stage, the committed existence to the 
"commander," which is the stage of all authentic existence (including 
faith, passions, and reason); this is the religious stage. This commit-
ment to our own existence as a whole involves confronting the totally 
24 
Ibid., p. 203 
25 
All people who forget their existence provoke a smile in 
everybody, because those people are comic. 
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other, who is God, the "wholly Other," as Karl Barth says. The ethical 
stage is beyond the aesthetic stage, and the religious stage is beyond the 
ethical stage, but there is discontinuity of movement between the three 
stages. Nobody can pass from one to another by smooth mediation. The 
transition is through a "leap," a qualitative leap. Since reality is 
not rational, the movement is an existential movement; it involves an 
27 
existential paradox which is characteristic of men. "You clearly can-
not move from doubt to belief by logic, which is a process of linked, 
28 
consistent, continous thinking, step by step." The terminus a quo is 
human existence, which is paradoxical. The terminus ad quem is the 
religious stage, the superior stage, and the dialectical movement is 
29 
through leaps. 
Beginning with Kierkegaard, European philosophy "overcomes" Hegel 
through philosophy of existence or, as it is commonly called, elCJstential-
ism. Some important existentialists are Edmund Husserl with his phenom-
enological method, Martin Heidegger with his dialectical analysis of 
26 
Cf. W. H. Auden, The Living Thoughts of Kierkegaard (New York: 
David McKay Company, Inc., 1952), pp. 56-114. Also E. L. Allen, 
Kierkegaard; his Life and Thought (New York and London: Harper and 
Brothers Publishers, 1935), pp. 121-134. 
27 
Cf. Herbert M. Garalick, The Anti-Christianity of Kierkegaard 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), pp. 28-45. 
28 
Soren Kierkegaard, Johannes Climacus or De Omnibus Dubitandum 
Est and A Sermon, trans. T. H. Croxall (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1958), p. 74. 
29 
Cf. Ibid., pp. 73-83. 
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Dasein, and Jean-Paul Sartre with his Critique of Dialectical Reason. 
The last European philosopher that I want to discuss is Karl 
Marx (1818-1883). Marx is another important reactor to Hegel's dialectic. 
He criticizes Hegel's concept of the subjective reality, a concept of 
reality from itself, in itself, and for itself. One of his clear reac-
tions occurs in his analysis of Feuerbach: 
Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really distinct from conceptual 
objects, but he does not conceive human activity itself as objective 
activity ••• (Thesis 1). The question whether objective truth can be 
attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a 
practical question ••• The dispute over the reality or non-reality 
of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic 
question ••• (Thesis 2). Feuerbach, not satisfied with abstract 
thinking, wants (sensuous) contemplation: but he does not conceive 
sensuousness as practical, human-sensuous activity ••• (Thesis 5). 
The highest point reached by contemplative materialism, that is, 
which does not comprehend sensuousness as practical activity, is 
the contemplation of single individuals and of civil society 
(Thesis 9). The philosopher has only interpreted the world in 
various ways; the point is to change it (Thesis 12). 
Feuerbach had reacted to Hegel's subjectivism by pointing out the 
sensuous object, the empirical thing, as reality. Physical things can be 
verified, examined, interpreted. Marx recognized Feuerbach as "the only 
one who has a serious, critical attitude to the Hegelian dialectic and 
who has made genuine discoveries in this field." From his point of view, 
Feuerbach proves "that philosophy is nothing else but religion rendered 
into thought and expounded by thought," that "true materialism" and "real 
science" are based upon the principle of "the social relationship of man 
to man", and that the "negation of the negation" leads to "the absolute 
30 
Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach" (Original Version) in 
Collected Works by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, v. 5 (London: 
Lawrence & Wishart, 1976), pp. 3-5. 
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positive, the self-supporting positive, positively based on itself." 
Marx adds that Feuerbach "annuls the infinite, and points [out} the ac-
32 
tual, sensuous, real, finite [and) particular." However, Marx says: 
The chief defect of all previous materialism (that of Feuerbach 
included) is that things (Gegenstand), reality, sensuousness, are 
conceived only in the form of the object, or of contemplation, but 
not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectivity. Hence, 
in contradistinction to materialism, the active side was set forth 
abtractly by idealism -which, of course, does not know real, 
sensuous activity as such .•• (Theses 1). 33 
Marx criticizes Feuerbach's concept of reality. The limitation 
of Feuerbach is to see reality as the sensible. His reality is a "con-
templative materialism" and a "intuitive empiricism". But, for Marx, 
philosophy is not a naive and intuitive interpretation; it is not a 
pure contemplation of a "thing-in-itself". Reality is not a subject 
contemplating statically and object which also is static. Reality is 
"sensuous human activity" which is action upon the world, the human 
being as an active agent. Human activity is the terminus a quo of 
Marx's dialectic; it is the process of production, the process of 
working, the dynamic process of "creation." Then, reality is not a 
physical object (a rock, a star, an animal, etc.) void of human con-
tact; reality is the human activity in which the "objective" event 
31 
Cf. Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, 
in op. cit. v. 3. p. 328. 
32 
Ibid., p. 329 
33 
Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," p. 3. 
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34 
bj t f "use-values," produces o ec s o 
35 
its own history. 
the cultural objects, and produces 
The human process of action is the transformation of the world 
{his terminus ad quem). There are two ways of talking about the world: 
as an object of contemplation which only leads to explanations, and as 
an object of transformation. For Marx, transformation always involves 
analysis and interpretation. But idealism, while it involves analysis 
and interpretation, does not includes transformation; it explains the 
world but does not change it. Marx's dialectical method leads to 
practice, which becomes transformation. Marx's philosophy is a philos-
36 
ophy of "praxis". 
In summary, from European philosophy we have inherited a tradi-
tion of dialectical movement: the presocratics started with physical 
reality and arrived at being; Aristotle started with the generally 
admitted and arrived at the hidden; Descartes started with "the great 
book of the world" and arrived at the cogito ergo sum; Hegel started in 
34 
Karl Marx, Capital trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling 
(London: William Glaisher, Limited, 1909), p. 2. 
35 
Cf. Erich Fromm, Marx' Concept of Man {New York: Frederick Ungar 
Publishing Co. 1966), pp. 8-19. 
36 
Cf. Adolfo Sanchez-Vasquez, Filosof{a de la Praxis (Mexico, 
D.F.: Editorial Grijalbo, S.A., 1972), pp. 133-135. 
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the isolated and contradictory aspects of the absolute and arrived at 
the absolute spirit; Kierkegaard started with existence and arrived at 
the religious stage; and Marx started in "sensuous human activity" and 
arrived at the transformation of the world. As we can see, the dialec-
tical method is a way and, at the same time, a movement which has two 
characteristics: similarity in the terminus a quo, the starting-point, 
and differences in the terminus ad quem, the place of arrival. I am 
identifying, and also differentiating, different kinds of dialectic 
precisely on the basis of these criteria. 
2. LATIN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY 
In order to explain the most important philosophical approaches 
in Latin America today, and to point out their own method, it is nece-
ssary to keep in mind the philosophical inheritance which I have already 
summarized. European philosophy is what Dussel calls, "the prehistory 
of Latin American philosophy and the immediate antecedent of our Latin 
37 
American thinking." However, this inheritance is not limited to the 
thinkers disc-ussed above. As we shall see, the influence of European 
philosophy comes from the classic philosophy of Greece, from the Scholas-
ticism of the Middle Ages, from French, German, and English philosophy, 
and presently from the powerful influence of the United States, the 
Soviet Union (Lenin), and China (Mao). All of these represent a broad 
37 
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1La prehistoria de la filosof{a latinoamericana y el antece-
dente inmediato de nuestro pensar latinoamericano." Enrique Dussel, 
Metoda para una Filosof{a de la Liberacion, p. 176. 
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spectrum of thought with a variety of tendencies which, in part, I will 
discuss in another chapter. For my purposes here, let me discuss two of 
of the most important philosophers who represent the new and perhaps 
the most important philosophical point of view in Latin America today: 
Leopolda Zea (1921) from Mexico and Enrique Dussel (1934) from Argen-
38 
tina. 
a) The Latin American Philosophy of Leopolda Zea 
Leopolda Zea, in his book La Filosofia Americana como Filosofia 
39 
sin Mas, discusses Latin American philosophy, distinguishing it from 
European philosophy. Let me summarize the most important concepts of 
his point of view. 
Leopolda Zea begins by pointing out the problem of the human 
40 
being as a crucial point for Latin America philosophy. He says that 
the "word" (logos) is an exclusive tool of human beings to locate them-
selves in the world, to differentiate themselves from other beings, and 
to order all things in the world. In the history of philosophy, no one 
has asked about the right to philosophize by using one's own logos; how-
ever, this unusual question is one of the basic questions in Latin 
38 
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thinkers in Mexico. His works are read with as much respect as the 
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American philosophy. Philosophers in Western Culture never thought 
about this right; they simply thought, ordered, created, and located 
themselves. In the context of this European philosophy, philosophers 
in Latin America are thinking strange thoughts (logos) because they are 
out of tune with the questions European Philosophers are asking; they 
are forced to justify their own logos and to seek "mental emancipa-
41 
tion." 
When Europe expanded its borders overseas, it also exported its 
humanism and demanded from other peoples the justification of their own 
humanness. Thus, on one side were the human beings (the Europeans) and, 
on the other side, the inhumane people, those who aspired to be human 
beings, who were in the process of conforming to the European arche-
type. Consciously or unconsciously, the European denied the fullness 
of being to those who were considered strangers, Indians, ignorants, 
hybrids, and the underdeveloped. Europe imposed its ideal of the human 
being: to be a human being was to be like a European or, at least, to 
be in the process of acquiring the fullness of a Human Being (with 
capital letters) because the people of Latin America had not yet reached 
such perfection. To the Latin Americans, to be a human being was to 
prove their similarity to the European archetype, thereby denying 
their own being and culture, moving away from their own identity, and 
reproducing, copying, and reflecting the European ideal. 
However, "To be a human being [in Latin America} is not to be 
41 
''Emancipacion Men tal." Ibid. , 25. Cf. Leopoldo Zea, 
The Latin-American Mind (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma 
Press), pp. 37-44. 
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a Yankee, a Frenchman, or Englishman. [For a Latin American,) to be a 
human being is to be, simply, that which one is, Latin American; like 
the Yankee is Yankee, the Frenchman is French, and the Englishman is 
42 
h II Englis • A philosophy, authentically Latin American, will appear 
when philosophers find the explanation of their own being in the con-
text of their own culture and not outside of it; a context where they 
discover the right to pronounce their own logos without borrowing it. 
Second, Leopoldo Zea points out the originality of Latin Arne-
43 
ican philosophy. To be original is not to propose a new and exotic 
system or strange solutions, but it is to confront specific human prob-
lems "here and now". Latin American philosophy accepts all previous 
forms of philosophy but goes beyond them. It does not deny, in terms 
of a logic, European or North American philosophy. Instead, it fol-
lows a dialectical method in which the negation of the previous affirma-
tion does not necessarily mean the elimination, but rather the overcoming 
of the affirmation. Latin American philosophers try to understand Euro-
pean and North American philosophy to find adequate starting points or 
appropriate tools; then they try to affirm new solutions but they also 
deny at the same time all philosophy which is not adequate for their own 
situation. Each country, each epoch, each philosopher has been original 
42 
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because each of them has confronted different problems and has brought 
forth different solutions. That has been the history of philosophy. In 
our present case, to be original is to start with that uniquely which is 
Latin American, to start from the Latin American reality (terminus a quo). 
But Latin American philosophers have also been conscious that 
they are part of all humankind. The incorporation of Latin America into 
Western society and culture is a fact which is not possible to ignore. 
What Latin American philosophers point out is how nations which have 
produced such philosophy have used it to support their expansion and 
domination, how they have incorporated other countries and subordinated 
them. European philosophy has created a universal philosophy which 
postulates a certain ideal of a human being but at the same time denies 
Xullness of being to the dominated people. Philosophers have used phi-
losophy as ideology to justify the European domination. We can see this 
tendency among the European philosophers. For instance, Plato used his 
logic and metaphysics to support his ideal Republic; Aquinas to support 
his church; and Hegel to support the French Revolution. What the Latin 
American demands is his right to be human as every other human being in 
Europe, the United States, or in any other part of the world is human. 
Ln this sense, Western values have been incorporated within Latin 
American philosophy which in turn rejects the use of them as an 
ideology of domination. Latin American philosophers claim dignity for 
all in spite of their differences of skin color, thought, society, and 
origin. Once this equality is accepted, the natural result is each 
one's use of his own logos, and each one's right to act as a subject 
and not simply as an object. 
24 
Third, Leopolda Zea points out the scientific nature of Latin 
44 
American philosophy and its own ideological commitment. What all 
philosophy needs to do is to confront rationally the problem arising 
from its own reality and to search £or the most adequate, permanent, 
and total solution tothese problems. 
One of the greatest weakness of all philosophy is to forget 
the origin of all philosophy, i.e., the human being. For instance, 
technology has converted philosophy into a rigorous and precise logic. 
There is nothing wrong with developing logic to improve technology (the 
manipulation of nature to serve human beings); what is wrong is an 
extremism which argues in favor of philosophy as a logic and forgets 
philosophy as ideology --as it has been in the past-- and also as 
ethics. Latin American philosophers do not pretend to deny the impor-
tance of philosophy as a rigorous science, but they ask: why does such 
philosophy not discuss material, efficient, and final causes? Why 
does it not discuss the way of using such technology? Why is this tech-
nology? Why is this technology used to benefit some people who are 
minorities (the rich), and not used to benefit people who are the 
majority? Has not this technology increased the domination of some 
people who have more sophisticated arms to menace and destroy others? 
Why do philosophers not discuss the cultural, economic, social, and 
political factors which produce inhuman life? Why do philosophers not 
see problems arising from workers working with machines which are not 
44 
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their own machines, and producing products which are not their own 
product? Why do they not question a system which produces the "big 
machine" even though it also causes human alienation? What ideology 
is such philosophy serving? 
Latin American philosophers are conscious of the importance of 
technology, the importance of philosophy as a science, and the impor-
45 
tance of a rigorous level of thought. However, a Latin American 
philosophy must have the purpose of analyzing, understanding, and 
changing the subordination, oppression and underdevelopment of Latin 
America. Latin America needs philosophers like Merleau-Ponty, 
Toynbee, Russell, Marcuse, Marx and Sartre, who are scientifically 
rigorous but who feel the need for militancy in a specific cause. 
Philosophy in Latin America means not only the domination of science and 
technology but also the participation of all human beings with equal 
rights in such management. Latin Americans do not need a philosophy of 
curiosity, exhibitionism, sport, and competence, or even philosophy as 
a profession; what Latin America needs is to solve the urgent challenges 
of its own reality, today. If this point is clear, rigorous thought is 
welcome to change what must change in the Latin American situation. 
Fourth, Leopolda Zea points out that Latin American philosophy 
46 
must make constant reference to its own history. Latin Americans are 
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located between two worlds: the European and their own world. The 
European world is from the past, is old, and is not .felt as their 
own by Latin Americans. Their own world is the new, the past which 
must be incorporated into their own experience, and the present which 
is created by their own actions. They must create their own history 
which until recently has not been felt to be their own. Latin American 
philosophers are at the crossroads where a decision becomes urgent. 
As a consequence of the two world wars of our century, Europe 
has acquired the consciousness of the fact that philosophy is not ab-
solute because it is limited and conditioned by the existence of human 
beings. Transcendental rationalism stumbles on the fact of immanent 
reality. Transcendence, universality, absoluteness, to be beyond space 
and time --topics of European philosophy-- cannot be justified without 
taking into account the human being, his historical situation, and his 
Circumstances (Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Marx, Dilthey, and Ortega y 
Gasset). 
This European crisis coincided with the Latin American search 
for its own personality. European perspectivism, sociology of culture, 
existentialism, Marxism, historicism, and other tendencies converted the 
European limitations into a consciousness of the Latin American 
possibilities. Latin American turned to its own concrete reality 
and historical situation in order to find an authentic universality. 
European philosophy recognized its own philosophy as a philosophy 
among philosophies, its view of its own humanity as one among many 
views and therefore not archetypical. Latin American philosophers 
acquired the possibility of building a philosophy from their 
27 
own reality (terminus a quo) because they felt that Latin Americans were 
human beings among human beings. That which was a crisis in Europe, in 
Latin America was a capacity to develop philosophy from its concrete 
situation. When the European crisis shook its classic foundations, this 
shaking justified and even pushed Latin America to look for its own 
foundations. 
There have been many Lat~n American philosophers who have arisen, 
such as Arturo Ardao (from Uruguay), Ernesto Mays Vallenilla (from Vene-
zuela), and Graca Aranha (from Brazil). Ardao affirms that the 
;> 
European crisis was like a certificate of the philosophical independence 
of Latin America. Vallenilla interprets Heidegger's ontological being 
(which is being-in-the world) as equivalent with the Latin American ex-
pectation which creates its own perspective through action. This action 
is-located among the actions of other human beings, in the context of 
the historical process. Aranha affirms that Europe must not be expanded 
or imitated, but Latin America must create its own new perspectives on 
the human being. There is a basic presupposition: to receive the human 
being without discrimination, colonization, subordination, instrumen-
talization, or alienation. 
Fifth, Leopolda Zea says that Western philosophy recognizes its 
47 
own collapse. Western society stumbles on the fact of humanity, he 
says. It does not encounter man; it stumbles over him. Europe was sure 
about its humanness which was the archetype of all humanity. But two 
47 
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historical events have broken this surety: the Second World War and the 
liberation struggles in the Western colonies. 
The Second World War put in crisis the Western idea of the human 
being. Writers like Jean-Paul Sartre, Albert Camus, Arnold Toynbee, and 
others are eloquent. Sartre says that France was hurled to the ground 
after the Second World War, flat on its own back like a broken machine, 
and forced to understand its limitations. There were other eyes whose 
glances made the French people only human beings, not the super-human 
beings they thought they were. That happened because Western society 
had denied with its actions that which it proclaimed with eloquent words: 
its humanism was one thing but how they actually recognized and respected 
other human beings was quite another thing. The non-Western people came 
to know Western society through its own wounds and chains; Western soci-
ety had struck them, martyred them, subdued them, and domesticated them. 
rhe non-Western people were discovering their humanness beyond tortures 
and death. Under oppression, they were turning to their own humanity 
with greater genuineness. They were decolonizing the Western people and 
extirpating in bloody operation the colonist who lived inside of those 
Westerners. As they reviewed their injust relations with the non-
Western people, the Westerns come to see themselves as colonial masters 
and thus discover the beast, the executioner, and the murderer which 
has been hidden in its breast. Albert Camus says that he is ashamed 
because of the violence and crimes of France in Algeria and Indochina. 
Toynbee tells how Western nations have used Latin Americans, Asians, and 
Africans as objects of exploitation, taking them as part of the Western 
flora and fauna. 
29 
There is another event which shatters the Western ideal of the 
human being: the liberation struggles of colonized peoples. There are 
48 
two Perus --Francisco Mird Quesada says-- because in Peru there are 
those who feel as members of Western society, representing its ideals 
and perpetuating injustice; and there are those who, acquiring con-
sciousness about their own humanity, have broken with Western ideals, 
have refused to talk about ideals in the abstract, and have committed 
themselves to talk about the concrete human being. They are people 
49 
~t;"om the "barrio" and slums, Indians and peasants, those who are 
looking for their own humanity, for justice. Reconciliation of "both 
countries" as one is impossible because on one side lies the struggle 
which claims the recognition of its own humanness as always oppressed, 
and on the other side Western people who always deny such humanness. 
These "two nations in one" exist in almost all countries in Latin 
America, Asia and Africa, and they explain the present day national 
struggles of liberation. 
Vietnam is an example of this struggle. On one side was 
Western society (the United States) with all its technology, sophisti-
cated weapons, logistical training to defend Western ideals, and on the 
48 
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other side were the Vietnamese without that technology, those sophisti-
cated weapons, that logic, but with the powerful resistance of their 
own humanness. What the United States could not, or did not want to, 
understand is that it was a struggle between the human being and Western 
technology. 
That Western man is held captive by his own technology is an-
other example of the same struggle. Herbert Marcuse writes about the 
alienation, captivity, and totalitarianism derived from Western technol-
ogy. Technology forms human beings with the same mold and subdues human 
beings with its computers. When Western Democracy represses people, 
justifies a coup d'etat, and puts people in prison for reasons of 
world or national security, no one is responsible, no people are 
guilty, because an absolutely dehumanized system has made the decision. 
Thus, Western youth protest against this technocracy through irrational 
ways, such as drugs, ridiculous cLethes, and violence for the sake of 
violence. Other races, the unemployed, the hungry, and people in mis-
ery are outside of the democratic process. When they walk in the streets 
without weapons and without protection to ask for the most elemental 
rights, they are refusing to play the game of Western society. When 
they walk in the streets consciously confronting the police dogs, 
bombs, jail, and death, they are confronting their own humanity --and 
the humanity of those who are captives of the system-- and Western de-
mocracy which means technocracy. The problems of the United States are 
not in Vietnam, in sidereal space, or in the botton of the sea, but 
inside of its own borders. 
Western society is in a crisis of impotence vis-a-vis free people 
31 
who refuse to be subdued. Some of these people have been Ho Chi Minh in 
Asia, Frantz Fanon and Patricio Lumumba in Africa, and Camilo Torres 
and Ernesto Che Guevara in Latin America. They cry for the construe-
tion of a more just and humane world; they do not talk about the con-
cept of a human being but about the kind of action which makes a human 
being a real human being. Latin America philosophy asks for dis-alien-
ation, freedom, and change to create a new world. The crucial question 
is how to act, how to change. 
Pierre Tratignon from France, a disciple of Sartre, says that 
violence is the only way to bring about change because Western society 
does not want to change or to disturb its vested interests. This vio-
lence is ·an external and internal response to Western violence. A 
historical and coherent philosophical project must be to kill Western 
society in order t-o find freedom. "The way of freedom passes through 
50 
our death," he says. Tratignon also says that Western society has 
lost its capacity to make history. History is made by underdeveloped 
people. The task of Western intellectuals is two-fold: to infect 
Western civilization with a mortal illness and to criticize radically 
and subversively in the name of the absolute necessity of justice 
a principle many times proclaimed. To philosophize is not to construct 
a philosophy of terrorism; to philosophize is to terrorize. To be 
philosophers of Western society is to be a mortal poison of their own 
society. 
-50 
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Sixth, Leopolda Zea says that Latin America philosophy is a 
51 
philosophy of change. There is an inversion of terms: non-Western 
society shows the West its limitations and alienation. Sartre was sur-
prised when Frantz Fanon did not ignore Europe. Fanon talks about 
African humanness, but he talks also about the humanness of all peoples, 
including the humanness of inhumane Western society. Non-Western phi-
losophy tries to establish its own humanness without meaning to deny 
the humanism of other people. However, such humanness also means the 
destruction of all inhumanity, all humanness which pretends to be the 
archetype of all humankind but impedes the creation of the new human 
being. Non-Western people want to be human, not more but not less. 
They are looking for a new human being, a new society. 
There is no Latin American philosophy if there is not a philos-
ophy of change. Philosophy is not the reflection prior to act, but the 
reflection from action. Action comes first, philosophy follows it. It 
is true that Western Society as well ·as non-Western Society are alien-
ated, but both search for their own dis-alienation in different ways. 
Western people were subordinated by their own instruments, but the non-
Western people were subordinated by the instruments and ideals of 
strangers. Western people see in their crisis the diminution of their 
own ideal of humanity, but non-Western people see that crisis as the 
opportunity to recover their own humanness. Western people need to 
destroy their own creation, but non-Western people need to construct a 
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ld Western people look for a zero point of starting, forgetting new wor • 
the past like-Descartes, but non-Western people look for their own his-
tory in order to improve their struggle of liberation and creation. The 
important thing is to recognize their own history of alienation, their 
own questions which make no sense to Western people, questions about 
their own humane quality, their own capacity to be full human beings, 
their own action against their own alienation, colonization, and instru-
mentalization (terminus a quo). The most important thing is to create 
a new world without the Western limitations, without Vietnams, without 
internal discriminations. The new human being must not subdue other 
human beings but must prevent that possibility forever. 
b) The Latin American Method of Enrique Dussel 
Enrique Dussel is the other Latin American philosopher whose 
work I want to analyse. Like Zea, in his works Dussel makes continuous 
references to, and does an analysis of, European and North American phi-
losophy. For my purpose, I have chosen two of his most important books: 
Filosof{a de la Liberacion and Metodo para una Filosof{a de la Libera-
52 
cion in which he explains what the characteristics of Latin American 
philosophy are; ·and, in a more.explicit way, what the method is. 
First, Dussel says that Latin American philosophy starts from 
53 
a philosophy of history of philosophy which he calls "Historica". 
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Both books have been quoted before. 
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Cf. Enrique Dussel, Filosof{a de la Liberacion, op. cit. pp. 
109-115. The term "Historica" corresponds to the objective "historic" or 
"hi storical" but means in Dussel "an interpretation of the world history." 
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Philosophical history can be interpreted from two perspectives: the 
"center" and the "periphery" which display geographical and philosophical 
senses. The geographical "center" refers to those countries which have 
dominated other people such as the European countries, the United States, 
and Japan. The geographical "periphery" refers to those countries which 
have been dominated such as the Latin American countries, Black Africa, 
the Arab World, India, Southeast Asia, and, until recently, China. 
The "center" of the empire has generated an ontological philos-
ophy. Its interpretation of what it is to be human has tended to be 
absolute, unique, total. An example could be the concept of "being" in 
the Greece of Aristotle's time. A human being was one who exercised 
reason, one who could think ethically and politically. This human being 
was a citizen, a male. He was a man who was a unique and free member 
of the polis, the only Zoon Politikon. Women did not have the capacity 
to be citizens, male children were citizens "potentially", and slaves 
and barbarians were non-beings. Aristotelian ontology justified not 
only this definition of human being but justified the invasion of 
Alexander the Great (from Macedonia). Because Aristotle supported the 
conquests of his former pupil, he died in exile after the death of 
Alexander. That ontological conception was imposed as the ideal of a 
human being; it was a total ·conception which, in illuminating all the 
world, actually condemned all those peoples who were not included in 
its conception of what it is to be fully human. Platonic, Kantian, 
and Hegelian, conceptions of human beings functioned in similar ways. 
Those conceptions were a philosophy of the center and an ideological 
ontology. They justified the domination of the colonial countries. 
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"The problem", Dussel says, "is just that the center has believed it-
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self to be unique, that to be a human being is to be European." 
The "center" comprehends the totality of being. The "periph-
ery," outside the center, is the realm of non-being. "Center" and 
"periphery" are part of one system. The center has all the character-
istics of the invader. The periphery has all the characteristics of 
the invaded. 
The "periphery" of the empire has generated a philosophy from 
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outside of the center, i.e., from outside the ideological ontology. 
The philosophy constructed by those living in the periphery is made 
from the experiences of ordinary life lived in the "barrio," in one's 
own town, in one's own world (Dussel's terminus a quo). This philos-
ophy is made in a concrete place which is part of the totality which 
includes more than the center and which has its explanation in the con-
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text of the general project generated and fulfilled by the center. 
Latin America has suffered from the invasion by the center project 
which has absorbed the people in the periphery and alienated them from 
their foundations. People in the periphery who have been turned into 
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"La cuesti6n esta justamente en que este centro se ha cre:ldo 
tinico y ha cre:ldo que ser hombre es ser europeo." Enrique Dussel, op. 
cit. p. 115. Also Enrique Dussel, Caminos de Liberacion Latinoamerica-
~' v. 2. Caminos de Liberacion y Etica (Buenos Aires: Latinoamerica 
Libros SRL, 1974), pp. 16-21. 
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The word "project" is used to refer any kind of social organ-
ization with clear ideological principles. 
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colonials by action from the center can only think from within a con-
text of domination and oppression. For this reason, philosophy has 
not had the same meaning for the center as for the periphery. The 
center looks for a justification of its domination, while Latin Amer-
ica suffers that domination and looks for liberation. 
Latin America makes a philosophy of the history of philosophy 
from the perspective of the periphery. The periphery is located inside 
of the project of oppression generated by the center; all people and 
all things acquire their value with the project of the center; they 
have no individual value. Latin American philosophy has to cross 
(dia) this horizon of oppression, which is the logos of the center, in 
order to overcome it (dia-lectic), in order to create its own horizon, 
its own logos. 
This interpretation of what it is to be a human being is made 
from the perspective of the periphery against the classic, modern and 
contemporary ontology of the center in opposition to it. The ontolog-
ical perspective of the center is a result of an experience of dom-
inating. Before "I think" (ego cogito), "I conquer" (ego conquiro). 
Conquest is the practical foundation of "I think".. It not only justi-
fies the use of the other people as tools of the project, but it also 
provides the conditions for the birth of new ideologies of domination. 
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tn this sense, ontology is the ideology of ideologies. 
Dussel interprets world history (prehistory, protohistory, and 
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Enrique Dussel, Para una Etica de la Liberaci6n Latinoamerica-
~, v. 1 (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI Argentina Editores, S.A., 1973), pp. 
33-95. 
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European expansion) and especially Latin American history (the age of 
Spain's colonies, the struggles for independence from Spain, English 
neocolonialism, and now North American neocolonialism), from the 
• f h II • h II perspect1ve o t e per1p ery • Latin American history is the history 
of domination and dependence. Such domination is not only economic; 
it is also political, religious, cultural, and anthropological ; it is 
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a domination of every level of the Latin American being. 
Second, Dussel says that Latin American philosophy is metaphysics 
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of the other (alteri~e), from those outside the center. It is a 
metaphysics of "alterity" because it. !?.Oes beyond ontology, the project 
of the center and beyond the presumption that the totality is co-existen-
60 
sive with the center. There is another reality, the reality of the 
other. Metaphysics is the movement from ontology to trans-ontology. 
Ontology always reflects its own ideal being; the project of the center 
always subdues people of the periphery; the totality always is the 
same. But when the "totally other" appears, 61 the submerged become 
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Cf. Ibid. pp. 79-138. Also Enrique Dussel, Parauna Etica de 
la Liberacion Latinoamericana, v. 1. pp. 97-156. 
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I will use the term "alterity" which means the quality or 
state of being other: otherness. 
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There are different uses of the term "totally other." Dussel 
is not using it in the way that Barth uses it to refer only to God. He 
simple uses it to refer to someone who is completed alienated from the 
center. 
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visible, they acquire face. When the totally other appears, horizon, 
substance, freedom, and responsibility of the other appear also; the 
alterity becomes reality. That is the meta-ontology. The other can be 
the other thing, and also it can also be the other human being, the 
other social class, the other ethnic group, the other cultural group, 
or the absolute other who is God. However, in all cases, the other 
appears beyond the ontology of the center, putting in question the 
ontological way of seeing all things. Ontology, the center, "totali-
tt', all become relativized. 
In the case of human beings, all people are born facing others, 
recognizing others, trying to communicate with others. Communication 
is revelation through the word, its own logos and the logos of the 
other. The other is an epiphany (manifestation), through its own word, 
of its own mystery. If the other does not talk, there is no possibili-
ty of knowing who the other is. Even if the other reveals itself, there 
is an incomprehensible reality beyond logos because through logos some-
thing is communicated but not the totality. Since this is so, beyond 
logos and beyond the revelation of the other is the unthinkable. The 
only way to have communication with the other is to accept (by faith) 
the other human being who is beyond reason, to love the other human 
being who is not known, to respect the other human being who is not 
part of the totality. 
In other words, ethics comes first and all philosophical disci-
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plines follow it. This is the opposite of the traditional understand-
ing about philosophy. Then, on the basis of this ethical starting-
point, we interpret the other by analogy. An "ana-lectic" method means 
a new attitude: it is to think from the other, from the existence of 
that which is not yet observed in the other ; it i.s the growing of the 
totality from the other in order to serve the other in a creative way. 
In the case of the other as a social class, there are those 
who have remained on the periphery in terms of social stratification. 
When ontologists established being as the starting-point of all philos-
ophy, such being was not good or bad. It was undetermined, undiffer-
entiated, absolute. But when they discovered that the universe of its 
being was not the whole world, but only a part of it, .then, they also 
discovered the other people of the periphery. Ontology discovers its 
limitations and its good and bad through the other. But when ontology 
does not discover its limitations but, on the contrary, expands its own 
totality, then it eliminates others or subdues them. That is the 
immorality of totalization. Totalization is assassination of the other. 
When there is totalitarianism, the totalized people are cut off from the 
economic benefits they need; they are denied social participation and 
political action. Again, philosophy begins with an ethical option: 
either recognizing the right of the other or affirming its own totality 
by denying the other being. Metaphysicians of alterity know how to 
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think about the world from the perspective of the other, i.e., from the 
negation of all ontology and all laws which protect the center; they 
know how to act to liberate the oppressed classes, how to create a new 
human being and a new society. 
To think about the world from the point of view of the other is 
not to adjust the other to the inertia of the center but rather td assume 
a critical attitude. It is to recognize the dominator (the center) and 
the dominated (the periphery) and·to provoke a dialectical movement to 
the new, overcoming the contradiction. Again the starting-point is an 
ethical commitment for political action in favor of the oppressed. 
Metaphysical alterity is when totality hears the voice (logos) of the 
other and makes a commitment to him or her. It is an act of love, faith, 
and hope, a historical event. 
Third, Dussel says that Latin American philosophy is a "praxis 
de la alteridad" ("praxis of alterity") which means a praxis from the 
other who is beyond the center; it is the praxis of the periphery. He 
distinguishes two kinds of relationships: praxis and poiesis. Praxis 
(action, transformation) is the relationship of human being to human 
being; poiesis is the relationship of human being to nature. Con-
cerning praxis, there is a praxis which consolidates the center of 
domination, and there is a praxis which .in questioning the system both 
theoretical and real is a praxis of liberation. There are four kinds of 
human relationships: the male-female which is the erotic relationship; 
the parent-child which is the pedagogical relationship; the brother-
brother which is the political relationship; and, the human being-
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absolute which is the "archaeological" relationship. Let me discuss 
briefly each of these relationships as moments of the metaphysical 
praxis, which is the praxis beyond all ontology; it is the praxis of 
the meta-ontology. 
a. The erotic is the relationship between male and female, the 
first moment of the metaphysical praxis. Unfortunately, erotic rela-
tions are susceptible to many deformations; for example, the dualism 
of body-soul and aggressive-passive. Starting with a dualism of body-
soul, Latin American people have considered sexual relations as evil. 
Another deformation has been the conception of the aggressive male and 
the passive female. The "machismo" dominates woman as a sexual object. 
A woman's liberation should annihilate "machismo." It is the alterity 
--the other who is the woman-- who in denying the self-sufficiency of 
the male, constructs the liberation of the couple. This is the birth 
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of the new family and of humane sexual relations. 
b. The pedagogical is the relationship of parents to children 
and teachers to students at all levels. This is the second moment of 
the metaphysical praxis. Pedagogy is a problem of culture, but at the 
same time, it is a problem of family and society. Ontological pedagogy 
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adopts, colonizes, domesticates, and incorporates the new --who are 
children and students-- inside of the project of the center. A pedagogy 
of alterity considers children and students --who are the other-- as the 
new, the epiphany of the novelty. The pedagogy of alterity is a pedagogy 
of liberation which raises consciousness about its own location and the 
real possibilities of its own liberation. Raising consciousness is the 
work of waking people up to their own situation. Their own situation 
is part of a dominating culture which always forces them to repeat 
"the same" from the center. Their own situation is poverty and oppres-
sion, as people of the periphery. But to raise consciousness about 
their own situation is to attempt to overcome such a situation. They 
must refuse to be part of the culture which is not their own culture. 
If they wish to be a human being in the pedagogical process, they 
must refuse the totality of the being of the center with its culture of 
oppression, adaptation, and domestication, in order to be free from the 
center. 
c. The political relationship is the brotherly dimension of 
people. This is the third moment of the metaphysical praxis. This 
means to be benevolent and just to the other, to desire the good for 
the poor, who are the other. Liberation for the poor is based on 
relationships of justice between governors and citizens, among dif-
ferent social groups, and among nations. Unfortunately, at the 
international level, there are powers which support the exploitation of 
the nations who are in the center. At the national level, oligarchy 
exploits the rest of the people. The center (the national oligarchy 
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which is a minority) dominates the periphery (workers and peasants who 
are the majority). Real brotherly relationships will come only when 
such a system breaks and a new order arises. 
d. Archaeology is the relationship of the human being with the 
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absolute, i.e., the philosophy of religion. This is the last moment 
of the metaphysical praxis. The absolute is the origin and the end of 
all metaphysics. The arche archaeology can be fetishism, the absoluti-
zation or deification of something: a rock, a race, a system, a 
"civilization", "machismo", matter, and so on. But archaeology also 
can be an antifetishism, i.e., it can be against the deification of 
anything. To be antifetishist is to return all things to their place 
and truth. But we cannot deny gods without some points of reference 
that will not turn out to be new fetishes. However, if we put the 
point of reference outside of the world, outside of all things and all 
people, we can escape this dilemma and be truly radical. This is the 
reason why God, the totally other, the absolute exteriority, the 
radical alterity can bring an adequate perspective to a real anti-
fetishism. From this point of view, to be antifetishist is to be 
atheist about the deification of anything, any people, or any system. 
A philosophy of liberation has its ultimate origin (arche) a meta-
action, i.e. the creation. In the light of creation nobody is absolute. 
If all are created, nothing is divine, except God who is outside crea-
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Archaeology comes from arche and means the first principle, 
the unprincipled, the origin of all things. 
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tion. Creation is the atheism of all the cosmos, all things within the 
world, and all human beings. For instance, if Descartes and Hegel had 
deified (absolutized) the "I", which was the European "I", atheism would 
be the necessary condition of all Latin American philosophy. 
Fourth, Dussel says that Latin American philosophy is also a 
poiesis of alterity (from poiein= to make or to do). It is the philos-
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ophy of the relationship between human beings and nature. Poiesis 
of alterity is the philosophy of natural things and cultural things. 
Nature is the matter of human work, the physical reality which is 
transformed by the work of the human being. Hum~n work is action upon 
nature to create artifacts. The poiesis of alterity refers to the 
other in these two senses: the other as a thing in itself, but also 
the other as the object of. human action. Dussel distinguishes praxis from 
poiesis by saying that praxis is action at the social level, and poiesis 
is the action upon physical things. The world of culture includes 
human action, tools of production, natural resources, signs, production, 
all things which are necessary to human life. Poiesis of alterity is a 
philosophy of natural aspects of things and things as they are trans-
formed by economy and technology. 
Fifth, Dussel says that Latin American philosophy has an 
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Superacion o del Inicio Originario del Filosofar (Mendoza: Ser y 
Tiempo, 1972), p. 117. 
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"analectic" method. Analyzing the factic or ontic methods of the 
natural sciences and the dialectical method of the ontological philos-
ophies, Dussel proposes a new way·to'think, the analectical method. 
Dialectical method crosses (dia) the ontic horizon and can go from 
horizon to horizon looking for the foundation of the central horizon. 
The logos of the other is distinct because the other expresses its 
own life, its own history, its own exteriority. The logos of the 
other is beyond the comprehension of the center. The basic point of 
the analectic method is that the logos of the other arises from the 
other and not from the center; it arises from the freedom of the other 
totally unknown by the center. In order to respond to the other and 
live with it, the center has to believe all that the other says, to 
think and accept the other as different, to commit itself to the other. 
In other words, the analectical method is intrinsically ethical, be-
cause it demands acceptance'of the other; it demands making a moral 
commitment. 
This method permits the making of a new philosophy, a different 
philosophy, because its terminus a quo is the peripheral exteriority, 
the non-being of those oppressed by the system. This method opens new 
dimensions outside of the horizon of the center, gives capacity to 
create a different theoretical framework, and provides the most 
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adequate themes for its own situation. 
Thus, a principle of Latin American philosophy is not to repeat 
books, to study systems of the center, to maintain the status-quo. It 
is to put in radical crisis the ordinary and common life, to eliminate 
this oppressive and dependent life, to be committed to the struggle for 
a liberated human being; otherwise, the new human being will not arise 
and, of course, Latin American philosophy will be only a repetition of 
the center philosophy. 
In summary, Leopolda Zea as well as Enrique Dussel, two of the 
most representative philosophers in Latin America today, point out the 
following characteristics: 
a. Latin American philosophy sees, as its central problem, the 
Latin American himself. "Mental emancipation" from the European or 
North American logos is crucial, i.e., the emancipation from the logos 
of the center, the horizon of the totality, and the explanation of its 
own being in the center of its own history, culture, tradition, and 
problems. The terminus a quo is the peripheral reality, which has been 
alienated, colonized, and instrumentalized. 
b. Latin American philosophy includes, as two of its more impor-
tant .characteristics, rigorousness and rationality in confronting its own 
reality. In other words, philosophy is a science. However, that in-
cludes the foundations of such rationality which are understood as 
anthropological, historical, ideological, and ethical: anthropological 
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because since all philosophy is an expression of the human being, its 
origin lies in man himself; historical because all philosophy is located 
in a concrete historical process and is a result of it; ideological 
because all philosophy has been used to justify or deny an economic, 
social and political order; and ethical because,in those conditions, a 
moral option must come before all philosophy. 
c. Latin American philosophy is necessarily the destruction 
of the Western conception of human being, the ontological philosophy 
of the center. That destruction began with the Second World War, but 
it has been accelerated hy the struggles of liberation in Latin 
America and all of the Third World countries. The European human being 
is an abstract idea which has constructed beautiful theories but has 
served as a cover for many inhumane actions in the name of an ideal. 
The peripheral human being is a concrete one who wants to see real 
humanness for all people. Philosophy from people of the slums, Indians, 
peasants, all people who are oppressed, will not repeat --as a carbon 
copy-- the ideals of the center, but neither will it impose its own 
ideal of its own human being. However, there is an inevitable confron-
tation between an abstract, ideal, and imposed human being (ontology 
of the center), and a concrete, real, and liberated human being (the 
rising peripheral logos). Negation of alienation and affirmation of 
liberation will be key terms; creation of a new human being and a 
new world will be the terminus ad quem. 
d. Latin American philosophy is a metaphysics of alterity, 
which goes beyond the totality of the center and discovers the other 
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(human being, social class, ethnic groups, cultural groups, or the abso-
lute). To think from the place of the other is to deny all ontology; 
it is to act, to change, to be in struggle, to assume a critical attitude, 
to provoke a dialectical movement toward the new. In other words, a 
philosophy of alterity is that which discovers a way of overcoming the 
ontological philosophy through the other, a trans-ontology or meta-
physics. That means, at least, two principal consequences for the Latin 
American philosophy: first, a previous commitment to the poor, to the 
concrete situation of the oppressed, and to the history and the cause 
of the periphery; second, the adoption of a new method, the analectical 
method, beyond the horizon of the logos of the center. 
3. THE DIALECTICAL METHOD 
Leopolda Zea talks about a Latin American dialectical methodand 
Enrique Dussel about a Latin American analectical method. Dussel re-
fuses to employ a "dia-lectical" method because it corresponds to an 
ontological philosophy. The analectical method will arise in the midst 
of the peripheral reality and will be against all ontological philos-
ophy. The questions are: are there real differences between Zea and 
Dussel? What is the real method of Latin American philosophy? 
European philosophy has been an ontological philosophy, a 
theory of being. For instance, the Greek being is that which exists 
(Parmenides and Aristotle); non-being does not exist. It is not the case 
that being and non-being can exist at the same time (the principle of 
non-contradiction). Such philosophy justified the Greek domination: the 
being which existed was the Greek citizen. The slave and the barbarians, 
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even the Greek women and children, were non-beings. It was the domination 
of the citizen, the male. Descartes' ontology was the concealment of the 
French domination: "I think, therefore I exist" was the clear and evident 
truth of Descartes, the "I think" isolated from the colonization of 
France, the cogito ~ excellence, ignoring the conquiro and thus cov-
ering over the domination. Pure and practical reason was the axis of 
Kant's philosophy: pure reason (the "I think") and practical reason 
(the moral action), but both of them are reason. In consequence, all 
things are identified in absolute thought as Hegel affirmed. The 
movement of being suppresses opposition and deifies absolute thinking 
(the deification of German being). In all cases, dialectic has served 
ontological philosophy to demonstrate how the being of the center col-
lects and integrates the totally othe~ even its own contradictions. 
There is a European effort to overcome ontological philos-
ophy. Many philosophers deny the identification of being and thought 
and point out that there is an unthinkable beyond thought. It was 
recognized by Descartes when he could not relate the res cogitans and 
res extensa. Kant also points out the impossibility of knowing the 
so-called noumena. Kierkegaard denies the logical system of existence 
because existence is beyond all rational systems. Kierkegaard asserts 
the existence of God, who is beyond the aesthetical and ethical stages. 
Feuerbach reacts against Hegel's subjectivism pointing to the sensible 
or empirical thing. Marx recognizes this reality but points out 
" sensuous human activity", the historical matter as the basic 
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reality. Dialectic here helps to overcome the European ontology, to 
demonstrate how the philosophy of the center has forgotten the 
"unthinkable" (Schelling), the "existence" (Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and 
Sartre), the physical thing (Feuerbach) and, overall, the human being 
(Marx). However, this overcoming is still European. That which I shall 
try to point out is the Latin American dialectical method. 
Leopolda Zea says that Latin American philosophy has, as a 
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crucial point, an anthropological problem. Dussel, helped by Levinas, 
locates this problem in the peripheral context. This location is 
obviously explicit in Zea but not developed as such. The peripheral 
human being is the other in relation to the center, the other beyond 
the "I think" of the philosophers of Europe and the United States, 
beyond the comprehension and light of the absolute logos of the center. 
Given that the other cannot be seen by the center, the only ~'lay to 
know the other, such as it is, is through the logos of the other, 
through the word which reveals the unknown. 
The analectical method rejects the dialectical method because 
it (the dialectical) is a tool to develop an ontological philosophy. 
However, some European philosophers have shown also that it is possible 
to use the dialectical method as a tool to overcome such ontology. An 
incorrect use of the dialectical method is to develop a solitary 
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thought in which the only way to relate the others is to invade and op-
press them. The correct use of the dialectical method is to take, as 
a cornerstone, an analectical perspective. Dussel suggests five roo-
ments in the correct use of a dialectical method. First, to begin with 
the ontic reality (his terminus a quo, i.e., the common experience of 
everyday existence) and go towards its foundation (dia-lectic). Sec-
ond, to explain scientifically the existential possibilities of all 
beings, i.e. a necessary ontology. Third, the confrontation of the 
existential human being (among all beings) to the face of the other, 
i,e., the appearance of the alterity, the otherness (ana-lectic). 
Fourth, the self-revelation of the other, i.e., its right to use its 
own logos, involves the questioning of all ontology and the birth of a 
new perspective. Fifth, the new foundation is established; it is an 
analectic praxis which is beyond all ontology, which is service in 
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behalf of justice, i.e., the terminus ad quem. According to Dussel, 
these are the principal moments in the correct use of a dialectical 
method, which he then calls the analectical method. So, there are not 
divergencies between Leopolda Zea and Enrique Dussel. Both of them are 
in agreement that a Latin American dialectical method is possible. 
But, for the purpose of the present work and in the context of 
a Latin American philosophy, I will say that a Latin American dialec-
tical method consists, at least, of three moments: 
!he first moment is the analysis of the Latin American social 
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reality as the starting-point (the terminus a quo), the reality which 
is the day-to-day experience of Latin American people. This moment lo-
cates our analysis in the most philosophical tradition of the dialec-
tical method from Aristotle to Hegel. Latin American common experience 
is, in relation to the center (Europe, the United States and their fol-
lowers in the midst of the Latin American countries), the reality of 
being the stranger, discriminated against, conquered, dominated, colo-
nized, instrumentalized, exploited, and oppressed. Latin Americans 
have submitted themselves to these acts of oppression; they have become 
alienated and underdeveloped. They are t_:eated as if they were not 
human beings economically, socially, politically, culturally, sexually, 
and educationally. People like the Indians, the peasants, the workers, 
the unemployed, and those who live hungry and miserable lives in 
"barrios" and slums are described by Hugo Assman, a Latin American 
thinker, as: 
the 800 millions of individuals who live in the world .•• caught 
in conditions of absolute poverty, and existence so limited by 
malnutrition, illiteracy, illnesses, high rate of child mortal-
ity, and short hope of life, situations which do not correspond 
to any rational definition of human dignity.71 
The second moment is the reconceptualization of a world-view, 
71 
'
1800 millones de individuos que viven en el mundo .•• atrapa-
dos en condiciones de pobreza absoluta, una existencia tan limitada 
POr la desnutricion, el analfabetismo, las enfermedades, la elevada 
mortalidad infantil y la corta esperanza de vida, que no responde a 
~inguna definicion racional de la dignidad humana." Hugo Assman, 
'El JProgresismo Conservador' del Banco Mundial" In El Banco Mundial: 
un caso de "progresismo Conservador" ed. Hugo Assman, (San Jose: 
Departamento Ecumenico de Investigaciones, 1980), p. 27. 
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and all man in the context of this world, in the light of the social re-
ality (the first moment) and the anthropological analysis (the second 
moment). This is the via ad, the method to be follow. 
The third moment overcomes an individual, egoistic, and abso~ 
lute ontology through the appearance of the other, the "totally other." 
The other is beyond an individual human being, beyond a national hori-
zon, beyond a Latin American horizon. Beyond an individual human being 
there are another human beings, beyond a national horizon there are 
other countries, beyond Latin America there are other continents. The 
other is that which is not reducible to a particular deduction, demon-
stration, or system. Latin American anthropology moves from the expla-
nation of its own being, its own horizon which is not absolute, to the 
recognition of the other. 
To recognize the Latin American reality, as a reality of oppres-
sion, is to negate the inhuman action by those people who are loyal to 
an ontology of the ideal absolute human being. To recover the real 
Latin America presupposes not only an explanation of the oppression 
which is suffered but also an action of liberation to change such 
oppression. A Latin American philosophy cannot be a theoretical one 
which formulates concepts; it must be a practical philosophy which can 
eradicate the inhuman consequences of an absolute ontology. A Latin 
American philosophy is a philosophy of praxis. That is the reason why 
a Latin American philosophy must begin with a commitment or a moral 
option in favor of the struggles of liberation of Latin Americans. 
No one can construct a Latin American philosophy without this commit-
54 
ment. The negation of an ontology of oppression is a necessary part 
in overcoming that ontology; the overcoming of such ontology is a 
necessary step in bringing about liberation. That is the terminus ad 
3uem of the Latin American method which responds most deeply to the 
Latin American ethos. 
The dialectical method is a way, and at the same time, a move-
ment which in any philosophical version is similar in the terminus a 
3uo (the starting-point), but frequently has different terminus ad 
.9...uems (the place of arrival). In my method of "dialectical" analysis 
the starting-point (terminus a quo) is the factum, what is really hap-
pening right now in Latin America, but its place of arriving (terminus 
ad quem) is liberation, the liberation which is the ethos of Latin 
72 
America today. 
72 
Cf. Enrique Dussel, Caminos de Liberacion Latinoamericana, 
v. 1, pp. 54-56; v. 2, pp. 55-57. 
CHAPTER II 
PAULO FREIRE, A LATIN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHER 
Hay quienes dicen en Estados Unidos que 
Paulo Freire es un educador liberal. Yo 
no soy un educador liberal; lo que yo 
pretendo ser es un educador revoluciona-
rio, que es distinto.l Freire 
~aula Freire is a Latin American philosopher and educator, not 
only because he was born in Brazil, but because his thought and educa-
tional practice are located in the historical and cultural tradition of 
Latin America. He thinks, writes, and talks as a Latin American. 
Freire has been accused of idealism, communism, and extremism. 
rhe most serious accusations have been that of promoting hate and subver-
2 
sion. His books, his thought, and his voice have been considered to be 
so forceful and critical that they raise suspicion as well as strong 
reactions against him. There are countries which have prohibited the 
selling of his writings and places where he has become persona non grata. 
1 
"There are those who say, in the United States, that Paulo 
Freire is a liberal educator. I am not a liberal educator; what I claim 
to be is a revolutionary educator, which is different." These words were 
pronounced by Freire in the Auditorioum of the Costa Rica University. 
"Paulo Freire en la Universidad." Universidad 29 de Noviembre 1971, p.6. 
2 
Cf. Interview with Justo Gonzalez Carrasco and Luisa Garcia de 
Gonzalez, "Alfabetizacion Tradicional que Revoluciona al Hombre," La 
Nacion, 25 de Noviembre 1971, pp. 6,81. 
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However, his books and ideas are read, studied, and discussed 
throughout all Latin America, inside and outside of universities. His 
thought and his method are applied in many ways. His prophetic style 
is awakening a new hope in a philosophy of education and educational 
3 
practice that has more relationship to Latin American needs. Thus, 
our study of Freire involves one of the most controversial thinkers in 
Latin America. 
In order to read Freire with comprehension, to make a careful 
analysis of his thought, a correct interpretation of his principles, 
and an understanding of his real implications, it seems that it is 
necessary to describe, in general terms, the reality which gives context 
to his philosophy and educational practice. Thus, I will begin by de-
scribing the Latin American reality as a whole, as the "periphery" of 
the so-called First World. My second point will be the Brazilian 
reality which has in its borders both the First and the Third Worlds 
at the same time. My description will be made from the "peripheral" 
point of view which reflects the larger part of Brazil. My third point 
will be the life and works of Freire as a part of this contradictory 
reality and his commitment with the "peripheral" people. 
1. THE LATIN AMERICAN CONTEXT 
Given the elements which influence Freire's philosophy and 
3 
Cf. Fausto Franco. El Hombre: Construccion Progresiva. La 
!area Educativa de Paulo Freire (Madrid: Editorial Marsiega, S.A., 
1973), p. 15. 
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the limitations imposed by this work, it is possible to call attention 
to only four aspects of the Latin American reality: the historical, 
socio-economic, educational, and ideological contexts. These aspects 
are discussed with the decade of the nineteen sixties in mind, the 
period during which Freire acquired national and international impor-
tance. 
a) The Historical Context 
Spain and Portugal promoted the expansion that arose from the 
European commercial revolution of the 16th century. Latin America is 
a consequence of that expansion. The disadvantage was that Spain and 
Portugal were not developed economically to a point where they could 
provide permanent conditions for later development in their colonies. 
That explains why Latin America was, in its three hundred years as a 
colony, a place of exploitation of natural resources without any kind 
4 
of economic improvement. 
Latin America is also a consequence of the Roman Catholic 
Counter Reformation. At the moment of the discovery, conquest, and 
colonization of Latin America, the Iberian peninsula was a bastian 
against the European Reformation initiated by Martin Luther in Germany. 
The Catholic kings were particularly active and combative against all 
4 
Cf. Jose Claudio Williman, "Analisis de la Realidad Latinoa-
mericana," in Realidad Social de America Latina ed. Luis E. Odell 
(Montevideo: Iglesia y Sociedad en America Latina, 1965), pp. 11, 12. 
Also Antonio Dominguez Ort{z, Historia de Espana Alfaguara 8 vols. 
El Antigua Regimen: Los Reyes Cat6licos y las Asturias (Madrid: Alian-
za Editorial, S.A., 1974), 3:9-36, 121-151. 
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5 
heresy. That explains why Latin American Catholicism has been ac-
tive and combative. That explains also why the Latin American coun-
tries have been confessionally homogeneous up to the coming of Protes-
6 
tantism at the last part of the 19th century. 
Dussel, trying to evaluate Latin American Catholicism, up to 
1962, says that there were three major types of catholics: the popular 
Christians who were baptized in the Church and who later were married 
by the Church; the Christian practitioners who tried to practice 
Christian principles; and the Christian elite who were a minority but 
who had a high level of Christian responsibility. Colonial Christianity 
generated a general acceptance of Christian faith as part of Latin Amer-
7 
:lean life. 
The coming of Protestant Christianity in the last century has 
created a minority church. It has been a church with a general sectar-
ian and anti-catholic attitude and with an ideological identification 
8 
with the liberal ideology. 
5 
Cf. Antonio Dominguez Ort{z, pp. 220-239. Also Darcy Ribeiro, 
Las Americas y la Civilizacion, 3 vols. (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor 
de America Latina, 1969), 1: 68-98. 
6 
Cf. Enrique Dussel, "Sabre la Historia de la Teolog{a en Ame-
r:tca Latina," in Liberacion y Cautiverio, Debates en Torno al Me'todo 
de la Teolog{a en America Latina, ed. Enrique Ruiz Maldonado (Mexico: 
1975), p. 46. 
7 
Ibid., l 90-201. 
8 
Cf. Hiber Conteris, "La Educacio'n Teologica en una Sociedad 
en Revolucion," in " ••• Par la Renovacion ·del Entendimiento ••• " ed. 
Justo Luis Gonzalez (Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico: Librer{a "La Reforma." 
1965), pp. 103-109. 
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The inspiration of the revolutions in France and the United 
States, the English industrial revolution, the Napoleonic blockade, 
and other factors provided conditions for the Latin American struggles 
9 
for independence at the beginning of the 19th century. The struggle 
for political independence without a basic economic development had 
provided conditions that made possible dominations by England and the 
United States. 
England promoted a Balkanized independence. Latin America was 
broken up into a series of small countries, each of which had different 
10 
possibilities of development. For instance, Venezuela had oil; Bali-
via, tin; and Chile, copper. No country had all the necessary natural 
resources in its own borders. In virtue of these conditions, England 
consolidated its commercial empire, and Latin American countries shaped 
their production according to the "international demand." That meant 
that these countries could not develop their own plan of production and 
diversification. Their production was oriented toward a mono-culti-
vation in order to satisfy a mono-exportation. Their national economy 
fluctuated according to the oscillation of the international market. 
Given their lack of markets, this style of production resulted in cata-
strophic consequences during the time of the Second World War. 
The growing influence of the United States at the beginning of 
9 
Cf. Ronald M. Gassman, Political History of Latin America 
(New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1969), pp. 284-295. 
10 
Cf. Jose Claudio Williman, pp. 12-17. 
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the present century provided the conditions for it to be at the head 
11 
of the Western nations after the Second World War. This leadership 
included the promotion of the development of the Third World countries. 
At the same time, Latin American oligarchies increased the importation 
of manufactured products and borrowed capital to satisfy that importa-
tion debt. Their national industries, concentrating on the production 
of consumable goods, used foreign models, foreign technology, foreign 
money, foreign advice, and foreign training. This industrialization has 
produced a negative impact upon Latin American economy such as the 
increase of indebtedness, the concentration of capital in the Fir.st 
World, the development of multinational corporations, and as a conse-
quence, the internationalization of production and markets. With these 
new forms of capitalism, Latin American countries entered a new phase of 
12 
colonialism. Latin Amer~ca, participating in international production 
and markets, provided cheap manpower, cheap natural resources, and 
cheap products. Latin America had to sell at the price imposed by the 
purchaser, who in this case was the United States. Given the favorable 
conditions for the "center," the United States has spread its foreign 
investments and banks promoting a high rate of concentration of foreign 
11 
Cf. Ibid., pp. 17-24. 
12 
Cf. Pablo Steele, Quienes son los Duefios de America Latina? 
CPanama: Instituto Cooperativo Interamericano, 1972), pp. 55-75. 
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capital in banks of the United States (70% of all its investments). 
b) The Socio-Economic Context 
13 
Latin America has been one of the regions of the world with a 
high demographic rate. In 1950 Latin America had 163 million people, 
but in 1960 it had 205 million people, growing at a rate of 3% per 
14 
year. As a consequence, there has been a dramatic increase of young 
people. In 1960, 50.3% was under 20 years of age; and at least 42% of 
15 
the whole population was less than 15 years of age. 
This accelerated growth of Latin America did not correspond to 
its rate of economic development and the increase of per capita income, 
Peasants and employees, who were the majority of people, became poorer. 
For instance in Mexico, 1957, 65% of the population did not receive any 
16 
benefits of all from national development. According to Josue de 
Castro, two thirds of the population in Latin America is hungry. "The 
13 
Cf. Folker Frobel, et. al. "La Internacionalizacidn del Capi-
tal y.del Trabajo," Cristianismo y Sociedad, XII, No. 40/41 (1974): 
18-25. Paulo Franco, Influencia de los Estados Unidos en America Lati-
na (Montevideo: Ediciones Tauro/ISAL, 1967), pp. 45-85. 
14 
Cf. Luis E. Odell, "La Situacion Actual de America Latina, As-
pectos Sociales," in Responsabilidad Social del Cristiano, Gu{a de Estu-
~ (Montevideo: Iglesia y Sociedad en America Latina, 1964), pp. 80-81. 
15 
W. Stanley Wycroft and Myrtle M. Clemmer, "Urbanizaci6n de Ame-
rica Latina," in Realidad Social de America Latina ed. Luis E. Odell, pp. 
34, 35. Also Jether Pereira Ramalho, "A Populacao da America Latina e as 
Migracoas Internas" in las Migraciones Internas ed. Jether Pereira 
Ramalho, (Montevideo: Iglesia y Sociedad en America Latina, 1968), pp. 
13-15. 
16 
Cf. E. Odell, pp. 81-83. 
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17 
wrong is not the race, the weather, but hunger," he says. There are 
also problems of housing. In 1954, houses without minimum conditions 
18 
for living in Latin America were 80% of the total. There were also 
the continuing problems of health and illiteracy. 
Another characteristic is the growth of urban areas. The demog-
raphic explosion, the low standard of living, the loss of educational op-
portunity, and the scarcity of medical care have produced a massive immi-
gration of peasants of the cities looking for a better life. This immi-
gration has produced an accelerated growth of the urban areas. The 
Federal District of Mexico, for example, which in 1950 had three million 
people, in 1960 had reached five million. Obviously, this immigration 
has created a serious housing shortage and unemployment. The immi-
sration has generated an agglomeration of people living in inhuman condi-
19 
tions. Quoting a Peruvian anthropologist, Julio de Santa Ana notes: 
In Caracas, 25% of the population live in quarters called "ran-
chos" which are in the hills around the valley of the city. In 
Rio de Janeiro, the infamous "favelas" have almost 20% of the 
population. In Lima, the "barriadas" have 19% of the population. 
In Santiago de Chile more than 10% of the population live in 
"callampas." In Buenos Aires, 5% of the population occupy the "vi-
1961), 
Aires: 
17 
Josue de Castro, Geograf1a del Hambre (Madrid: Editorial Cid, 
p. 101. Cf. Josue de Castro, El Libro Negro del Hambre (Buenos 
Eudeka, 1972), pp. 13-15. 
18 
Cf. Julio de Santa Ana, "La Insatisfaccion de las Masas en 
America Latina," Cristianismo y Sociedad, II, No. 5. (November, 1964): 
27-29. 
19 
Cf. Jether Pereira Ramalho, pp. 15-24. 
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llas miseria." The numbers are 10% for Bogota, 30% for Guayaquil, 
30% for Guayaquil, 30% for Cali, and 20% for Maracaibo.20 
There are also big sectors of Indians who are "marginalized." 
In some places, like Mexico, Guatemala, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, 
and Brazil, Indians were not eliminated but rather were dominated and 
subjected to the most cruel exploitation. Indians are a silent pre-
h " . " f 21 sence, t e test1mony people o Darcy Riveiro, who in some places 
make up more that 60% of the whole population. The major part of the 
Indian population are peasants, who are exploited as cheap manpower, as 
small producers, if not even driven from their lands. This condition 
22 
has produced explosive situations. 
There are two kinds of people in the rural areas: those who are 
the owners of most of the fertile soil and those who work for the owner 
or who are owners of a little piece of land where they marginally survive 
as families. The case of Guatemala is dramatic: 2.1% of the landowners 
20 
"En Caracas, 25% de la poblacion vive en tugurios llamados 
"ranchos" que ocupan los cerros en torno al valle de la ciudad. En 
Rl.o de Janeiro, las mal afamadas "favelas" alojan casi el 20% de la 
poblaci6n. En Lima, las barriadas contienen el 10% de la poblacion. 
En Santiago de Chile, mas del 10% de los habitantes viven en "callam-
pas". En Buenos Aires, un 5% de la poblacion ocupa las "villas mise-
ri~'. Y las cifras son, 10% para Bogota, 30% para Guayaquil, 30% para 
Cali y 20% para Maracaibo". Julio de Santa Ana, p. 32. 
21 
Darcy Riveiro, v. 1., p. 115. 
22 
Cf. Luis E. Odell, p. 82. Also Andrew G. Frank, "Estructura 
Social Rural," in Realidad Social de America Latina ed. Luis E. Odell, 
Pp. 55-58. 
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own 72.2% of the fertile soil, while the 91.4% of the landowners own only 
23 24 
21.9% of the land. Latin America has a system of latifundium with 
the following economic consequences: inconvenient use of natural re-
sources, inadequate use of capital for social interest, inequal distribu-
tion of income, and the impossibility of peasants becoming owners of 
25 lands. The agrarian reforms made by many governments have not had 
success because of the economic and political power of the latifundiary 
.1. 26 fam1 1es. 
Latin American conditions during the decade of the nineteen six-
ties were deplorable, and today these same conditions still exist with 
even more serious consequences. The reality of evident disparities may 
be expressed by a series of contrasts such as the explosive population 
and low growth rate of basic production, high level of technology and 
primitive structures of social and economic organization, necessary 
capital to promote national development but low capacity to generate in-
come, and the need for adequate training necessitated by imported tech-
nology and low levels of education. Latin America has been a real 
23 
Cf. Nelly Castillo, "Social and Economic Situation of Guatema-
la." Lafayette, Indiana, 1979 (Typewritten.). 
24 
Myra Bergman Ramos explains: "Latifundium: a noun of Latin 
origin which, in Spanish and Portuguese, means a large privately owned 
landholding." Quoted in Paulo Freire, Education for Critical Conscious-
~ (New York: The Seabury Press, 1974), p. 15. fn. 15. 
25 
Cf. Julio de Santa Ana, p. 30 
26 
Cf. Luis E. Odell, p. 86,87. 
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economic, social, and cultural "periphery" of the "center" of the devel-
oped countries. 
c) The Educational Context 
Freire's interest in education makes crucial the role of educa-
tion in the historical and socio-economic context just described above. 
At all times, education serves the economic, social, and political 
system in which it exists. Latin American education is not an excep-
tion. For instance, during the three hundred years of colonization, 
27 
universities worked to educate functionaries of the Spanish Crown. 
When the struggles for independence triumphed, education was serving the 
bureaucracy by training young people to help maintain effective exporta-
tion of agricultural products. Education was used to stimulate the 
national process of economic, judicial, and political organization; it 
trained new professionals to play effectively the game imposed by the 
international "centers." Education was intended to integrate Indians, 
mestizos, and immigrants to the new nations. The motto was "education 
for everyone." Economic progress and the European culture were the 
principal elements in the "project" to confront the "ignorant" in the 
hope of bringing about a change. However, the ignorant had been all 
marginalized by the socio-economic system of those who had seized power. 
ln other words, education was the tool to reinforce the social system. 
However, the result of these aspirations was a great contradic-
27 
The first universities in Latin America were Santo Domingo 
(1538), Lima (1548), and Mexico (1553). 
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tion. For instance in Argentina, the country with the greatest number 
of educated people in 1966, for each 100 children who began elementary 
school, only 40 graduated; of the 32 who began high school, only 19 
28 
graduated, of the 11 who began university, only 5 graduated. But 
this situation is only a partial picture of the educational reality be-
cause these data refer to the people who have had the opportunity to go 
to school and to Argentina, one of the countries with the highest per-
centage of people with formal education. In 1959, only 35% of the pop-
ulation between 5 and 15 years of age were registered in school of four 
Central American countries. An average of 55% of the population of the 
29 
same age was registered in schools in the rest of Latin America. The 
educational system serves a national "project" which makes it impossible 
to improve education and, as a consequence, to improve social and eco-
nomic participation. Even if people have adequate education, that 
education does not correspond to the real possibilities for jobs. 
There are two consequences of this reality that I want to 
discuss: first, between 1960 and 1970 we observe a significant improve-
ment in the rate of registration for formal education (179.3% in all 
Latin America), but at the same time the drop-out rate also increased 
dramatically. Studies made in fifteen Latin American countries (85.5% 
of all school-aged children registered in all Latin American schools) 
28 
Cf. Emilio N. Monti, "EducaciO'n y Sistemas Educativos en Ame-
rica Latina" Cristianismo y Sociedad, XVII, No. 60 (August 1979): 43-ss. ' 
29 
Cf. Luis E. Odell, p. 85. 
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shoW an average drop-out rate of 62.8% with an even higher percentage in 
30 
the rural areas. For instance, UNESCO says that in Uruguay, from 1963 
to 1968, for every thousand children registered in elementary school 
(a period of 6 years), there were 736 who finished their studies in 
urban areas, as compared with 416 who finished in rural areas. In 
Guatemala, during the same years, for each 1,000 registered in elementa-
ry school (a period of 6 years) there were 496 who finished their stud-
ies in urban areas, as compared with only 35 who finished in rural 
31 
areas. To summarize; in four countries between 20% and 40% of the 
people were without elementary education; in four other countries 
between 55% and 65% were without elementary education, and in eleven 
other countries between 72% and 92% were without elementary education. 
These percentages correspond to the educational condition during the 
years between 1950 and 1970. 
The second consequence was the high percentage of illiteracy. 
32 
Ln 1950, when there were 97 million people in Latin America, between 40 
33 
and 42 million people did not know how to read and write. The worst 
part was that this number was not decreasing; on the contrary, it was 
30 
UNESCO is the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and 
Cultural Organization. 
31 
Cf. Emilio N. Monti, p. 50 fn. 14. 
32 
Cf. Luis E. Odell, p. 86. 
33 
Cf. Rycroft and Clemmer, p. 58. 
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increasing, especially in the rural areas. Studies made in the nineteen 
seventies can illustrate this situation. 
Rural Population 
over 15 years of 
age (%) 
Argentina 28,0 
Bolivia --,-
Brazil 41,7 
Chile 24,0 
Colombia 36,6 
Haiti 80,6 
Mexico 38,8 
Peru 45,4 
Uruguay 14,0 
Venezuela 24,3 
The year the 
figures were 
gathered 
(1970) 
(1973) 
(1970) 
(1973) 
(1971) 
(1973) 
(1973) 
(1970) 
Illiteracy 
(%) 
7,4 
61,2 
33,8 
11 '9 
19,2 
85,5 
25,8 
27,7 
9,6 
23,5 
The year the 
· figures were 
gathered 
(1970) 
(1960) 
(1970) 
(1970) 
(1973) 
(1960) 
(1970) 
(1972) 
(1963) 
(1971) 34 
35 
The document on Education of CELAM II of Medell{n, 1968, 
summarizes the most relevant problems of Latin American education: (1) 
theeducational system does not overcome illiteracy in spite of the 
emphasis on universal, free, and obligatory education. (2) It imposes 
the obligations of unrealistic schooling which provokes high drop-
out rates. (3) Content is generally abstract and formal (4) Di-
dactical methods are more directed towards transmission of content 
than toward the creation of a critical spirit. 5) Those methods are 
34 
Cf. Emilio N. Monti, p. 59. fn. 17 
35 
Cf. CELAM, La Iglesia en la Actual Transformacion de America 
1atina a la Luz del Concilio, 2 vols (Bogota: Secretariado General del 
CELAM, 1968), 2:91-100. CELAM is the General Conference of the Latin 
American Episcopate of the Roman Catholic Church (Conferencia General 
del Episcopado Latinoamericano). 
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oriented to support the social and economic structures. (6) They are uni-
form and passive. (7) They are oriented to maintain an economy on the 
basis of "to have more" rather than to respond to the young people's exi-
gencies "to be more." (8) Education sacrifices the human being to pro-
mote pragmatism and immediacy. (9) The human being is asked to serve the 
economy rather than to serve other human beings. 
d). The Ideological Context 
In colonial times there were no Latin American ideologies. How-
ever, when the struggles for independence began, ideological thought and 
action came also. In the 19th century, there were two. kinds of social 
classes with clear social, economic, and political interests: the land-
owners with a conservative ideology and the traders with a liberal ide-
ology. Conservative ideology defended the regime of economic exploita-
tion which was operating in the centuries of colonization. Liberal ide-
ology adopted many elements such as European freemasonry, encyclopedism, 
36 
and the capitalistic liberalism of the 19th century. In our century, 
there are three elements generally accepted as modifiers of the Latin 
American ideological background: Socialism, the Mexican Revolution, and 
Peruvian "indigenism."37 
36 
Cf. Hiber Conteris, "El Marco Ideol6gico de la ·RevoluciO'n La-
tinoamericana," in Responsabilidad Social del Cristiano, Gu::la de Estu-
dios (Montevideo: Iglesia y Sociedad, 1974), pp. 94-96. Also Miguel 
Jorr{n and.John D. Martz, Latin American Political Thought and Ideology 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1970), pp. 34-120. 
37 
Cf. Hiber Conteris, "El Marco Ideol6gico de la Revolucion La-
tinoamericana," pp. 96-100. 
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First, the influence of the European socialism came to Latin 
America through immigrants. Juan B. Justo organized the first socialist 
party in Argentina with an impact through all Latin America. This move-
ment includes workers and peasants, social sectors who had been forgotten 
38 
by traditional conservatives and liberals. 
Second, the Mexican Revolution (1910) demanded political freedom, 
freedom from clerical domination, nationalism, redistribution of land, and 
the administration of the economic and social justice by instruments of 
the state rather than by the landowners. This revolution also advocated 
a representative and democratic government with a free flow of informa-
tion and free enterprise. Its socialist expression was represented by 
39 
Lazaro Cardenas. 
Third, there was the influence of APRA a movement founded by 
Victor Raul Haya de la Torre in Peru. 40 APRA was not only a political 
party but an ideological formulation for those who dreamt of a 
unification of all Latin American countries, with the foundation of the 
United States of Indoamerica as a nation. This movement incorporated 
the Indian race as an important part of the Latin American future. Haya 
de la Torre dreamt of a unique constitution for the Latin American 
38 
Cf. Jorrin and Martz, pp. 271-280. 
39 
Cf. Ibid. pp. 209-227. 
40 
APRA~The Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana, known as 
the "Aprista Movement." 
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countries, with a common court, bank, and market. APRA emphasized 
nationalization of lands and industry and the promotion of agrarian re-
41 
form. 
Summarizing the ideological panorama in the decade of the six-
ties, Hiber Conteris points out four kinds of ideologies: the surviving 
ideologies, authoritarianism, the reformism, and the revolutionary ide-
42 
ology. 
The "surviving ideologies" are the conservative an~ liberal ide-
ologies. The conservative ideology generally acts or reacts against 
change. It is a "reactionary" ideology. It is traditionally supported 
by the landowners' oligarchy, the hierarchy of the church, and the army. 
Its reactions are generally violent: coup d'etat, election fraud, and 
military intervention. The liberal ideology is more sensible to change 
and is supported by the industrial and commercial burgeoisie. Its 
foundations are individualistic democracy and economic capitalism. 
Liberalism identifies with the West and Christian nations in the confron-
tation with the Communist and atheist countries. However, the failure of 
free enterprise in Latin America and the appearance of the leftist al-
ternative as a possible way to solve the worst problems have brought 
about political alliances of the two surviving ideologies in order to 
41 
Cf. Ibid., pp. 335-357. 
42 
Cf. Hiber Conteris, "El Marco Ideologico de la Revolucion La-
tinoamericana," pp. 103-112. 
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confront the danger of Communism. 
Conservative ideology has generated two kinds of "authoritari-
anism'': first, an authoritarianism which supports dictatorships, main-
tains regimes of police forces for the purpose of repression, and has 
support of foreign capital. Some examples have been Trujillo in the 
Dominican Republic, Somoza in Nicaragua, Batista in Cuba, Perez Jimenez 
in Venezuela, and Rojas Pinilla in Colombia. Second, an authoritarianism 
which has the capacity to support some kind of progress and modernization 
without abandoning the conservative principles. Supporters of this view 
assume a nationalist stance which justifies the expropriation of prop-
erties of foreign corporations. They look for popular support for their 
programs in the areas of salaries, public services, social benefits, 
jobs, and housing; they promote public education, strong bureaucracy, 
and repressive control. Getulio Vargas in·Brazil and Juan Domingo Peron 
44 
in Argentina are two examples of leaders a£ such regimes. 
Liberal ideology has generated the so-called "reformists" whose 
principal characteristic is the desire to avoid violence. Reformists 
recognize that the worst problems of Latin America are at the level of 
economic and social structures. They are in favor of change but through 
"democratic" ways, i.e. through the existing order, and through the 
43 
Cf. Hiber Conteris, "La Evolucion de las Ideolog:!as Modernas 
en America Latina," in Hombre, Ideolog{a y Revolucio'n en America Lati-
naL ed. Hiber Conteris, et. al. (Montevideo: Iglesia y Sociedad en Ame-
rica Latina, 1965), pp. 95-199. 
44 
Cf. Jorr:!n and Martz, pp. 239-269. 
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guarantees provided by the present institutions. Reformists have con-
stituted parties or governments that are left of center; they try to 
change the "peripheral" situation, to help the poor, exploited, and 
oppressed. Fernando Balaunde Terry in Peru, Eduardo Frei in Chile, and 
45 
Joao Goulart in Brazil are examples of such regimes. 
Julio Barreiro, quoting Jacques Chonchol from the United Nations, 
summarizes the principa.l, factors which are generating the "revolutionary" 
ideology: (1) Latin American countries are experiencing increased dis-
satisfaction. (2) The economic regime of a colonial capitalism has been 
an evident failure. (3) The political system has failed also. (4) Sub-
sequently, there is a loss of faith in the ruling classes, a rising 
consciousness of the existence of a regime of injustice, and the evident 
contradiction between the Latin American reality and the kind of educa-
tion received. (5) Latin America is ceasing to be the "back-yard" of 
the foreign policy of the United States. 46 The principal characteris-
tics of rising revolutionary ideology are: anticolonialism, anti-imperi-
alism, Marxism in its method of analysis, and centralized government 
with a unified party. Some examples of this new ideology have been 
clearly demonstrated in three revolutions: the Mexican revolution of 
1910, the Bolivian revolution of 1952, and the Cuban revolution of 1959. 
45 
Cf. Ibid., pp. 405-427. Also Juan Eugenio Corrali, "Cultural 
Dependence and the Sociology of Knowledge: The Latin American Case," in 
Ideology and Social Change in Latin America ed. June Nash, (New York: 
Garbon and Breach, 1977), pp. 7-30. Julio Barreiro, Ideolog{a y Cam-
bios Sociales (Montevideo: Editorial Alfa, 1966), pp. 69-103. 
46 
Cf. Julio Barreiro, pp. 107-118. 
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The Cuban revolution is the clearest model of a Marxist and Leninist 
47 
ideology. 
The Latin American people have seen in Cuba a possible alterna-
tive not because they are Marxist but because the other ideological 
alternatives have been ineffective in solving their economic and social 
problems. The Cuban revolution has demonstrated success, at least in 
48 
three aspects: medical care, housing, and education. 
In summary, all Latin American countries -with the exception of 
some islands of the Caribbean area-- have a common history which began 
with the Spanish or Portuguesse colonies and with a decisive and pro-
found participation of the Catholic church. The struggles for inde-
pendence brought about a political independence, but with economic 
dependence and with high demographic growth. The lack of growth in 
per capita income, national immigrations, the growth of rural areas, the 
silent presence of a high percentage of Indians, and the high percentage 
of peasants without lands have created a periphery who compose, according 
47 
Cf. "Primera Declaracion de la Habana" and "Segunda Declaracion 
de la Habana," in Proyeccion Internacional de la Revolucion Cubana ed. 
Juan J. Soto Valdespino, (La Habana: Instituto Cubano del Libra, 1975), 
PP· 9-58. Plataforma Programatica del Partido Comunista de Cuba, 
Tesis y Resolucidn. (La Habana: Departamento de Orientacion Revolucionaria 
del Comite Central de Partido de Cuba, 1976), pp. 38-47. Julio Barreiro, 
pp. 131-146. 
48 
Cf. "Discurso del Comandante de Vision Raul Castro en el XV 
Aniversario del Triunfo de la Revolucion," in Proyeccio'n Internacional 
de la Revolucion Cubana, ed Juan J. Soto Valdespino. 
75 
to some sociologists, 75% of all Latin American people. The educational 
system does not satisfy the needs of the majority of the people,·espe-
cially those of the rural areas. The ideological context has provided 
new ways of economic organization, social changes, and political action. 
Revolution is one of those ideologies which has become more persuasive. 
Paulo Freire also identifies himself as part of this new ideology. 
"I am not a liberal educator," he says, "what I attempt to be is a 
revolutionary educator." 
2. THE BRAZILIAN CONTEXT 
The Latin American reality is more understandable when we see 
the global situation of Brazil and find the same factors operating at 
the national level there. The following points try to show how the 
historical, socio-economic, educational, and ideological contexts are 
decisive in the development of Freire's thought. 
a). The Historical Context 
Brazil is an outgrowth of the former colonies of Portugal. A 
few year after the Spanish discovered Latin America (1492), Portugal 
claimed its rights to the lands discovered by its navigators. In the 
three hundred years of colonization, Portugal succeeded in providing 
protection for its colonies, especially from French and Dutch incur-
sions. However, like Spain, Portugal did not have much success in 
organizing its colonies for future development. Portugal's major 
interest was the exploitation of sugar and gold. 
Similar to the rest of Latin America, the religious colonies 
of Brazil were especially active in the evangelization, catechization, 
76 
and moral training of the Indians. Some of them tried to raise the moral 
level of colonists and to protect Indians against slavery. Catholicism 
was strengthened when it had to confront other religious tendencies such 
as the animism and fetishism brought by African slaves, and, of course, 
49 
indigenous religions. Since the sugar-cane economy depended on the 
work of African slaves, Brazil was one of the Latin American countries 
having a strong relationship with Africa, especially with Angola. 
One of the effects of the revolutionary and Napoleonic epochs 
in Europe as well as of the forced refuge of the Portuguese Crown in 
R{o de Janeiro (1808) was that Brazil acquired equal status with the 
mother country (1816). When the king of Portugal returned to Europe, 
Brazil acquired its independence easily and without violence (1822). 
When Pedro I, son of the king of Portugal, was proclaimed emperor, 
Portugal did not fight to retain Brazil. Unlike the Spanish colonies, 
the Portuguese colonies acquired their independence as a unit and 
50 
became the largest country of Latin America. 
The collapse of the Brazilian empire was followed by a repub-
lican government, but the situation did not change because the "new" 
politicians were in large part the former monarchists. The national 
economy was dominated, up to 1930, by the international demand for raw 
49 
Cf. Guillermo Francovich, Filosofos Brasilenos (Buenos Aires: 
Editorial Losada, S.A., 1943), p. 21. 
50 
Brazil is exceeded in size only by the Soviet Union, China, 
Canada, and the United States. It has an area of 3,286 70 sq. mi. 
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materials; it was a colonial economy. Most of the fertile soil was in 
the bands of the big landowners, and production was oriented to mono-
cultivated products (sugar, rubber, or coffee) for the purpose of 
monoexportation. The economic depression of 1929 had shown that the 
future of the national economy could not be in the hands of the big land-
owners. 
After fifteen years of the dictatorship of Getulio Vargas 
(1930-1945), a transition from a colonial to a national economy began. 
The Second World War made impossible the selling of national products in 
Europe and, as a result, Brazil was pushed toward production for domes-
tic needs. The participation of Brazil in the Second World War also 
provided the conditions to receive from the United States not only 
military help but help for the industrial infrastructure. However, the 
inflationary process was not slowed down in spite of the ambitious de-
velopmental progress of Kubitschek's administration (1956-1961). In-
terregional highways, hydroelectric power projects, the expansion of 
iron, steel, petroleum, and coal production, the rapid growing of 
private industry, and the construction of Brasilia (the new capital city 
in the midst of the inland plateau) did not contribute to the improve-
ment of the lives of the people. National production rose, but the 
standard of living of the majority of the people was either stationary 
or in decline. 
51 
Cf. Jordan M. Young, ed. Brazil 1954-64: End ~cle (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1972), pp. 1-12. 
Desenvolvimiento Nacional Brasileiro", Cristianismo y 
No.4 (Mayo 1964): 31-34. 
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The situation created the beginning of an atmosphere of popular 
expectation of radical changes when Janio Quadros became president 
(January 31-August 25, 1961). Quadros tried to change Brazil's foreign 
policy by opening economic relations with the Soviet Union, Cuba, and 
other socialist countries, but his domestic changes were rejected by 
the Congress. After Quadro's resignation, Joao Goulart became pres-
!dent (1961-1964); he tried to change the national economy by promo-
ting agrarian reform, nationalizing oil refineries, and pushing for 
adequate education. His educational emphasis began with a strong 
compaign for literacy in which Freire participated. Joao Goulart was 
accused of surrounding himself with extremist advisors and permitting 
communist penetration. As a result, Goulart was removed from office 
by military intervention. 
b) The Socio-economic Context 
Brazil is a very good example of high demographic growth. In 
1960, it had 70.1 million people compared with 51.9 million in 1950, 
a 35% rate of growth, or 3% per year. Thus, in 1960, Brazil could be 
called a young nation in terms of population: more than 50% of the 
people were under 20 years of age and only 10% were more than 50 years 
52 
old. 
Brazil is also an example of economic development with internal 
52 
Cf. Waldo Cesar, "As Migracoes Internas no Brasil," in Las Mi-
~ciones Internas en America Latina (Montevideo: Iglesia y Sociedad en 
America Latina, 1968), p. 30. 
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contradictions. There are two societies in Brazil: the archaic so-
ciety and the new society. The archaic is composed of people who live 
under a colonial situation managed by an oligarchy which looks out for 
its own interest. For instance, 70% of the peasants of Brazil are liv-
ing in subsistent conditions without even a semblance of a dignified 
54 
life. According to Josue de Castro, in the Northeast 81% of all 
55 
families cannot buy the milk necessary for adequate nutrition. The 
new society has been built upon the archaic one. Brazilian development 
has· not been a development of all the people. Technological development 
is not the result of the growth of production of the Brazilian people 
but the result of importation. There is a high level of industry, but 
at the same time there are feudal conditions of agricultural production. 
There is an auto industry, a beautiful and modern capital (Brasilia), 
and a project to build the atomic bomb. But at the same time are many 
similarities to other Latin American countries in terms of hunger, 
56 
malnutrition, poor housing, illness, poverty and inadequate education. 
After the failures of Quadros and Goulart, economic help from the 
53 
Cf. Juarez Rubem Brandao Lopez, "Resistencias a Mundanca 
Soc:Lal no Brasil,'' Iglesia y Sociedad, I, No. 2 (1963): 25-33. 
54 
Cf. Luis E. Odell, p.83. 
55 
'Cf~ Quotation, Julio de Santa Ana, p. 28. 
56 
Cf. Juan E. Guglialmelli, Argentina, Brasil y la Bomba Atomica 
(Buenos Aires: Tierra Nueva, S. R. L., 1976), pp. 27-39. Josue de Castro 
El Libro Negro del Hambre (Buenos Aires: EUDEBA, 1972), pp. 140-144. 
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United States was provided in the context of an agreement between U. S. 
corporations and the Brazilian bourgeoisie, mediated by their gover-
ments. The impulse to develop the Brazilian economy satisfied inter-
national demands instead of meeting the internal needs of majority of 
57 
the people. 
Brazil had also had an accelerated process of internal immigra-
tion. There are four states which have exerted a powerful attraction 
upon the other 22 states and federal territories. Those four states 
have suffered the subsequent problems of great concentrations of people 
immigrating, especially into the urban areas. In 1950, Sao Paulo had 
2,198,000 people and in 1960 it had 3,674,000. In 1950, Rio de Janeiro 
58 
had 2,377,000, and in 1960 it had 3,220,000 people. There were also 
two principal places from which the departure of people was more fre-
quent the Northeast states and Rio Grande do Sul. 
The economy of the Northeast region, which is our special in-
terest because Freire is from that area, is fundamentally agrarian. 
Socieconomic conditions make it impossible to overcome the long dry 
weather suffered each year; problems abound such as low level produc-
tion, high level economic necessity, poor technology, monocultivated 
production (sugar-cane or cotton), a bad system of transportating prod-
ucts, high costs, poor medical care, and lack of educational oppor-
57 
Cf. Pablo Franco, La Influencia de los Estados Unidos en Ame-
Efca Latina, pp. 37-39. 
58 
Cf. Julio de Santa Ana, p. 32. 
59 
tunity. 
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In a way similar to other countries in Latin America, Brazil has 
the problem of distribution of lands. For instance in Pernambuco 
(Garanhuns), 1.34% of the landowners own 31% of the fertile soil, and in 
60 
Para (Santarem) 0.2% own 59.4% of such lands. The disparity in dis-
tribution of land has created a latifundium with its consequent prob-
lems. According to Luis Odell, only 2% of the national land is culti-
61 
vated. 
There are two Brazils: the developed Brazil of the "center" , 
with its high technology which satisfies the demands of the interna-
tional "center," and the archaic Brazil of the "periphery," which 
comprises the majority of the people. One name masks an internal con-
tradiction. 
c) The Educational Context 
During the three hundred years of the colonization of Brazil, 
Portugal had prohibited schools, publication of newspapers, circulation 
of books, formation of associations, discussion of ideas, libraries, 
factories, political organizations, and any other forms of cultural 
movement or production. During these years, Brazil was "outside the 
process of civilization": production which was not agrarian was 
59 
Cf. Waldo Cesar, pp. 32-34. 
60 
Cf. Ibid., p. 31. 
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Cf. Luis E. Odell, p. 87. 
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deliberately forbidden; so, too, was the education of the "mestizo." 
The "aulas regias" of Pombal reinforced colonial control. 62 Seventeen 
seminaries were established to educate priests who were working for the 
Christianization of Indians. This added element greatly lessened the 
violent process of colonization. 
The Portuguese King Joao VI (1808) founded two military schools, 
one school of fine arts, and two schools of surgery. As a result of 
these foundations, Brazil had upper level and professional schools 
without having primary and secondary schools. Dom Pedro I, the first 
king of the independent Brazil, founded the Faculty of Law in Sao Paulo 
and another in Olinda, but he was not interested in creating schools 
in towns and hamlets. Dom Pedro II created the first secondary schools. 
Between 1840 and 1889 elementary studies began in many cities and towns, 
and many states founded lyceums and normal schools. 
National coordination of education took place when the Ministry 
of Education was founded in 1930. According to some historians of 
education, the royal empire and the "old republic" (1908-1930) only 
functioned as the modernization of the old colony. Up to 1930, Brazil 
was a vast archipelago of farms primarily raising cattle or growing 
coffee, both being managed by a "colonel" with his "cabras," i.e. ,his 
62 
The "mestizo" is half-breed. The "aulas regias" were the 
" royal classrooms" founded by the Marquis of Pombal. 
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personal army. With the Reformation of Francisco Campos (1931), 
Brazil instituted the structuralization and systematization of national 
education beginning in the elementary grades and continuing to univer-
sity studies. 
However, in addition to other problems of formal education 
--centralization, decentralization, diversification, high percentage of 
drop-outs,-- the major problem of Brazil seems to be the high percent-
age of illiteracy. According to statistics quoted by Emilio Monti, in 
1970, illiteracy among peasants 15 or more years old was 33.8% and in 
1973, the percentage of illiteracy among peasants over 15 years old 
64 
was 41.7% of the population. Given the high percentage of drop-outs 
in the first years of school, it is not an exaggeration to say, as 
Julio de Santa Ana did in 1964, that in the years of the nineteen 
65 
sixties 50% of the Brazilian population was illiterate. This prob-
lem was especially great in the rural areas. For instance, in the 
Northeast region in 1950, of 10.3 million people who were over 5 years 
old, 7.7% million were categorized as illiterate. This represented 
66 
75% of the population. 
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Lauro de Oliveira Lima, Estorias da Educacao no Brasil: De 
Pombal a Passarinbo (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Brasilia), pp. 17-18, ·89-92. 
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Cf. Emilio N. Monti, p. 50. 
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Cf. Julio de Santa Ana, p. 29. 
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Cf. Waldo Cesar, p. 34. 
84 
d) The Ideological Context 
The· Latin American ideologies discussed above have been shown to 
be present in Brazil: conservatism (the ideology of the landowners), lib-
eralism, and its later expressions: authoritarianism and reformism. 
Conservatism dominated as Brazil's ideology up to the revolution of 
1930. 
One example of an authoritarian was Getulio Vargas, president of 
Brazil during the period from 1930 to 1945. He proclaimed his government 
an "authoritarian democracy." Inspired by European Fascism, Vargas made 
possible the transition from a semicolonial status to nationhood. His 
authoritarian paternalism represented the nationalistic populism of the 
revolution of 1930. Vargas had popular support, promoted nationalism, 
education, strong bureaucracy, strong dictatorship, and national develop-
ment without changing the social structure. His government developed 
extensive social legislation, principally in the realm of l~bor, such as 
67 
eight-hour work days, six-day work weeks, and minimum salary. 
An example of a reformist was Joao Goulart, president of Brazil 
between 1961 and 1964. He maintained the foreign policy of former 
president Quadros, a policy of economic relations with the Soviet Union, 
Cuba, and other socialist countries. He also tried to maintain economic 
relations with the United States, and this effort made it possible for 
him to visit the United States in April, 1962. Popular expectations, 
the revolt of the peasants which took place in the Northeast under 
67 
Cf. Jorrin and Martz, pp. 239-249. 
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the leadership of Francisco Juliao, the strike of the General Workers 
Union (September, 1962), and other factors pushed the President to make 
more radical changes. These changes included the nationalization of 
foreign investments, the proclamation of "authentically national" 
agrarian reform, increased government participation in education, broad-
ening of electrification and telecommunications, and the nationalization 
of the petroleum industry. Accusations of extremism and communist 
orientation frustrated this attempt for structural change through in-
68 
stitutional ways. Joao Goulart headed a reformist government inspired 
by a liberal ideology. The last part of his government was characterized 
by more revolutionary decisions. The military intervention of April, 
1964, was clearly an opposition to social change on a structural level. 
The new government, in the hands of the generals, was to serve the na-
69 
tional oligarchy. 
There are other ideological tendencies which have had importance 
in the life of Brazil: Spiritism, a kind of primitive and magical cult, 
came to Brazil through the old beliefs of African slaves. Fascism 
exalted the will to power and the will of the state. During recent 
decades, however, a new ideology was been growing through the influence 
68 
Cf. Jordan M. Young, ed., pp. 113-184. Also Andrew Pearse, 
"Peasant Movements in North East Brazil," in Dependance et Structure de 
Classes en Amerique Latine, Documentos Presentados en el IV Seminario de 
CETIM (Geneve: Association du Foyer John Knox, 1972), pp. 313-323. 
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Cf. Paulo R. Schilling, "El Militarismo Brasileno," Cristia-
~ismo y Sociedad~ Afio XII, 42 (Noviembre, 1974): 95,96. 
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of Marxism. 
In summary, the primitive world of the forest, the medieval ec-
onomy in the rural areas, and the advanced industry in the urban areas 
have revealed a new reality which philosophers never saw before. As 
Joao Cruz Costa says: 
The anxiety which today possesses Brazil's intelligentsia --which 
will not be resolved simply by the solutions of an imported anguish 
or the juggling tricks of a neophilosophism-- will find its salva-
tion only if we have eyes to see, ears to hear, and, above all, the 
wisdom to taken action.71 
Sociologists like Celso Furtado have helped people to see their 
own reality. The theological interpretation of that reality given by 
people such as Helder Camara (Bishop of Recife), Hugo Assman, and Rubem 
Alvez, and the philosophical interpretation of people such as Freire and 
Pierre Furter have demonstrated a critical attitude toward European and 
North American solutions. The historical, socio-economic, educational, 
and ideological context show us an internal contradiction which Paulo 
Freire will analyze from a new perspective, the Latin American perspec-
tive. 
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Cf. Guillermo Francovich, pp. 133-136. 
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Joao Cruz Costa, A History of Ideas in Brazil, The Development 
of Philosophy in Brazil and the Evaluation of National History 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), p. 277. 
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3. PAULO FREIRE, HIS LIFE AND WORKS 
Paulo Regulus was born in Recife, September 19, 1921. 
Recife is the capital city of Pernambuco state, one of the chief parts 
of northeast Brazil. 
That Northeast is famous as one of the world's most poverty-
stricken areas, scorched by recurrent droughts that, combined 
with the unbelievable maldistribution of land, have made it an 
ideal place for studying the geography of hunger.72 
His father was Joaquin Tem{stocles Freire, a military police 
officer, a spiritist, and a "good, intelligent man, with great capacity 
73 
to love." He "died long ago, but he leaves me indelible impressions." 
His mother was Edeltrudis Neves Freire, a "Catholic, a sweet, good, and 
just" woman, who "actually loves and suffers, but who trusts unceasingly 
74 
in God and His goodness." Freire talks gently and lovingly about both 
of them. They were to him examples of love, of using dialogue, and of 
showing respect for the choices of other people. 
With them I learned that dialogue which I have tried to maintain 
with the world, people, God, my wife, and my children. The 
72 
Cesar Jerez and Juan Hernandez-Fico, "Cultural Action for 
Freedom," in Cultural Action for Freedom by Paulo Freire, et al 
(Washington, D.F.: Division for Latin America-USCC), p. 29. 
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"Bueno, inteligente, capaz de amar ••• ," "El muri6 hace mucho 
tiempo, pero me dejo una huella imborrable." Paulo Freire, "Yo, Paulo 
Freire," in El Mensaje de Paulo Freire, Teor1a y Practica de la Libera-
cion, by Paulo Freire (Madrid: Editorial Marsiega, S.A., 1976), p. 19. 
~-
74 
"Cat6lica, dulce, buena, justa ••• ," "Ella vive y sufre, con-
f{a sin cesar en Dios y en su bondad." Paulo Freire, "Yo, Paulo Freire," 
Ibid. 
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respect of my father for the religious beliefs of my mother 
taught me, from my infancy, to respect the options of other 
people.75 
When he was eight years old, his family suffered the consequences 
of economic depression. At age ten his family moved to Jaboatao, looking 
for a better life (April, 1931). In Jaboatao Freire experienced hunger, 
and at this time he began to understand the hunger of others. "I was a 
middle class child," he says, "who suffered the impact of the 1929 crisis 
and who knew hunger ••• I know what it is like not to eat, not only 
76 
qualitatively but quantitatively," As Jerez and Hernaridez-Pico say: 
His father kept up the appearance of solvency: he never gave up 
wearing a tie, and he held on to the family house, although it 
was almost empty. Freire admits that only his father's stubborness 
made it possible to continue with his education. In those hard 
years, though, he fell behind his schoolmasters' performance and 
~abored under what his teachers interpreted as mild mental retarda-
tion. 77 
His father died in Jaboatao and Freire finished his primary school 
two years later than expected. He also had difficulties getting admitted 
to secondary school. When the family's financial situation improved, he 
75 
"Con ellos aprend::l ese dialogo que he tratado de mantener con 
el mundo, con los hombres, con Dios, con mi mujer, con mis hijos. El 
respeto de mi padre por las creencias religiosas de mi madre me ensefiO 
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''Accion Cultural Liberadora," Annual Conference of CICOP, New York, 
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completed his school and was admitted to the Faculty of Law at the Univer-
sitY of Recife. 
78 He confesses that in law he was a "mediocre student." 
However, while studying law, he was also reading some Portuguese and 
Brazilian grammarians, some basic works of Brazilian literature, and some 
writers of other countries. When he was twenty years old, he began to 
study philosophy and psychology of language. Later, in order to help 
support his family, he became an instructor of Portuguese in a secondary 
school. 
Paulo was disillusioned by the church. He found inconsistency 
between that which was preached and that which was lived in real life. 
Thus, he withdrew from the church for a year, "but not from God," he 
says. His absence gave great pain to his mother. Paulo returned when 
he began his readings of Tristao de Athayde, one of the nee-scholastic 
philosophers of Brazil. He also was reading sam~ French nee-scholastic 
such as the novelist Georges Bernanos, and the philosophers, Jacques 
Maritain and Emmanuel Mounier. 
When he was 23 years old (1944), he married Elsa Maria Costa Oli-
veira, a grade school teacher, later principal of schools. She was a 
devoted Catholic. Paulo and Elsa have three daughters (Magdalena, Cris-
tina, and Fatima) and two sons (Joaquim and Lutgardes). Talking about 
his wife, Paulo says: 
I owe much to Elsa ••• Her courage, her comprehension, her capacity 
to love, her interest in all that I do, her help which she never 
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has refused and for which I do not even need to ask, have supported 
me in many problematic situations. It was precisely from the 
beginning of my marriage that I began to be interested, in a 
systematic way, in the problems of education.79 
In relation to the development of Freire's work in education, I 
have found three important factors: the Brazilian experience, the Chilean 
experience, and the international experience. 
a) The Brazilian Experience 
When Freire received his Licenciatura in Law (his master's), and 
even in his early years as labor union lawyer, he was more interested in 
education, philosophy, and the sociology of education than in law. 
According to his own confession, his first legal case was enough to show 
him that the law was not his profession. He was more comfortable organ-
80 
izing adult education seminars for the slum workers of the unions. 
Freire preferred to work in the Social Service Department of his 
University. Later, he was appointed director of the Educational and 
Cultural Department of SESI (Social Service) of the State of Pernambuco. 
From 1946 to 1954 he worked as Superintendent of SESI. That work gave 
him the opportunity to be with the dispossessed, to be involved in adult 
education, to lead seminars, and to teach courses in history and philos-
ophy of education at the University of Recife. 
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Between 1946 and 1961 Freire performed experiments in educational 
methods. In 1947, he began to implement his method of teaching adult 
peasants to read and write. At that time, he identified two basic prob-
lems in traditional education, especially in elementary and secondary 
studies: first, traditional education usually manipulated students and, 
second, traditional education usually "domesticated" rather than gave 
freedom to human beings. Traditional methods did not work, and they were 
inefficient. In spite of these discoveries, Paulo considers this time as 
81 
his "assistencial" practice of education. When his experiments became 
famous, the University of Recife gave him an honoris causa degree of 
<Doctor in Philosophy (1959). 82 
In the decade of the sixties, Brazilians lived in a climate of 
political ferment. When President Quadros began his administration 
(January, 1961), political organizations were looking for solutions to 
national problems. In 1960, socialists, communists, and populists, 
confronted a nation of 34.5 million people, of whom only 15.5 million 
were able to vote. A high percentage of people in the electorate could 
83 
not vote because they were illiterate. It was no surprise that a few 
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months later, Joao Goulart, succesor of Quadros, was interested in the 
peasants' leagues, radical economic solutions, assistance programs, a 
literacy campaign, and other efforts to improve the political participa-
tion of all Brazilians. That was the reason the economist Celso Furtado 
was appointed by SUDENE (a government agency) to improve the Northeast 
region. That was also the reason Francisco Juliao was organizing and 
84 
extending his peasant leagues. It was in this context that many 
popular movements made up of students, labor leaders, Christian activ-
ists, and workers began to awaken. 
rhe Popular Culture Movement of Recife was founded by Freire and 
others in 1961. Freire's method owes its birth to the effort made by 
this movement for educational and political change. His organized work 
began when Freire was Director of Cultural Extension of the University 
of Recife. According to Francisco C. Weffort, the Northeast states were 
inhabited by 25 million people, and 15 million of them were illiterate. 
He says that Freire's method made it possible to teach 300 peasants to 
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read in only 45 days. In 1962, thousands of peasants learned to read 
and write in a surprisingly short time. 
Given this success, the Minister of Education of the Goulart 
government adopted the method of Freire as the method for the whole 
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nation. From 1963 to March 1964, Freire's teams worked throughout the 
nation organizing seminars and training leaders. According to Weffort, 
the training of "coordinators" of "circles of culture" went on in 
almost all the capitals of the states. For instance, in the state of 
Guanabara 6,000 leaders were registered. 
The plans during 1964 anticipated establishing 20,000 circles 
which would have made it possible to teach about 2 million 
illiterates during a year (30 in each circle, with a duration 
of 3 months in each course).86 
The illiterate peasants lived, especially in the Northeast states 
of Brazil, to serve the interests of the dominant minority of the land-
owners. At the same time, they were marginalized in relation to the 
economic, social, cultural, and political life of the nation. However, 
the literacy campaign had raised expectations in different ways. The 
government expected an increase in the number of voters, such an expec-
tation is a characteristic of a populist government like that of 
President Goulart. For instance, in Sergipe State, the government 
expected between 80,000 and 90,000 new voters. In Pernambuco between 
87 
800,00 to 1,300,000 new voters were expected. Freire's teams expec-
ted not only to teach people how to read and write but also how to 
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"O plano de 1964 previa a instalacao de 20,000 c::lrculos que ja 
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se encontravam capacitados para atender, durante este ano, a aproximada-
mente 2 milhoes de alfabetizados (30 por c::lrculo, com duracao de 3 meses 
cada curso)." Ibid. 
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democratize culture. The educational practice of Freire was not only 
a technique in education but also a technique based upon a process of 
"concientizacao" (conscientization), which is consciousness-raising 
~ 
through the process of action-reflection mediated by one's own reality. 
Illiterate peasants expected to participate freely in decision-making 
in order to solve their problems, especially those problems which 
affected them directly. The traditional passivity and fatalism of 
peasants were disappearing, and "consciousness-raising" was pushing them 
toward political participation. The powerful landowners, and the ~il-
itary forces with them, expected the end of a system which gave them 
privileges. As such, they saw a dangerous politicization. The method 
of Freire increased dissatisfaction and the possibility of insurrection. 
Attendance of peasants in circles of culture every night for six or 
eight weeks increasingly vexed the big landowners; they were fearful of 
losing their power, prestige, and economic privileges. 
In April 1964, President Goulart was overthrown. The military 
people of the coup d'etat stopped all economic and social reforms of 
the administration of President Goulart, including adult education and 
the so-called popular culture. Their repression was so irrational that 
they destroyed 20,000 film projectors donated by the Czech government 
for the literacy campaign. 89 
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Freire and many of his co-workers were thrown into jail, accused 
90 
of "subversion of the democratic order. Freire was questioned inten-
sively; after 70 days, he was released and told to leave the country. 
Freire looked for refuge at the Bolivian embassy (September, 1964) and 
escaped to Bolivia and later to Chile. In relation to the questioning 
to which he was submitted, he says: 
They (the judges) wanted to prove, in addition to my "absolute 
ignorance ••• " the danger which I represented. They considered 
me an "international subverter," a "traitor of Christ and of 
Brazilian people." "Do you deny --asked one of the judges--
that your method is like the method of Stalin, Hitler, Peron, 
and Mussolini? Do you deny that by means of the so-called 
method you want to make Bolshevists of all of the country?"91 
tn these days of imprisonment, Freire began to write ~is first 
book, Educacao como Practica da liberdade (Education as the Practice of 
Freedom) which was completed in exile. In this book, Freire summarizes 
the educational situation, the method, and philosophy which he applied 
in Brazil. 
b) The Chilean Experience 
Paulo Freire arrived in Chile with his wife and children while 
Eduardo Frei Montalva was president (1964-1970). Chilean history, 
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"Lo que se que queria probar, ademas de mi "ignorancia abso-
luta" ••• era el peligro que yo representaba. Se me considerd como un 
"subversive internacional", un "traidor de Cristo y del pueblo brasile-
fio". Niega usted -me preguntaba uno de los jueces- que su metodo es 
semejante al de Stalin, Hitler, Peron y Mussolini? Niega usted que 
con su pretendido m~todo lo que quiere es hacer bolchevique al pa:!s?" 
Paulo Freire, "Yo Paulo Freire," p. 22. 
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society, economic stratification, educational conditions, and the ideo-
logical and political situations were different from Brazil's in many 
ways; however, they were parallel to the historical, social, educational, 
ideological, and political situations of the rest of the countries of 
Latin America. Chile and Brazil had similar problems with similar char-
acteristics. 
Eduardo ·Frei had become president with the support of the 
Christian Democratic Party under the slogan "Revolution in Freedom." 
Frei tried to make important reforms such as the "Chileanization" of 
copper mines; he also made agrarian and banking reforms. He was inter-
ested in solving problems of housing, labor, education, and cultural 
development. For instance, the new law of agrarian re_form (approved in 
1967) enabled the government to expropriate uncultivated lands, to 
limit the amount of land which could be conserved by each owner, and to 
organize peasants in cooperatives. 
Literacy was added to government programs to improve the stan-
dard of living of the masses of peasants and of the people in the slums 
of the urban areas. President Frei wanted the participation of these 
people in solving problems arising from "jobs, local and regional life, 
the necessities of the family, the culture of the common people (la cul-
tura de base), and the economic-social organization."92 The government 
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created a Planning Office for Adult Education (1965) led by Waldemar 
; 
Cortes. 
Cortes thought that the materials for adult education needed to 
be reviewed. Up to this point, Cortes had not heard of Freire. Cortes 
was informed that the renowned Freire had come to Chile. Upon meeting 
Freire, he discovered in Freire's work precisely what he needed. How-
ever, the first problem was to persuade people to accept a method which 
was considered subversive in Brazil. Once the method was accepted, it 
was applied through institutions which were working in close relation-
ship with rural areas which had a high rate of illiteracy. The 
Planning Office worked only in the development of pedagogical material 
and training of coordinators. 
Chile was, in two years, one of the five nations of the world 
which had best succeeded in overcoming illiteracy. In 1968 there were 
about 100,000 students and 2,000 "coordinators." The expectation was 
to reduce illiteracy to a 5% level within 6 years. Meanwhile, Freire 
was working as a consultant to UNESCO's Institute of Research and 
Training in Agrarian Reform (ICIRA) and also as a professor at the 
University of Chile, up to 1969. 
Three important works were published during this time: Sobre la 
Acci6n Cultural, Extension o Comunicacibn? and Pedagog{a del Oprimido. 
Sobre la Accion Cultural discusses how to make change by humanizing 
agrarian reform. Extension o Comunicacibn? La Concientizacion en el 
Medio Rural makes a semantic analysis of the two words extension and 
communication. The business of the agronomist educator is not "cul-
,II 
,I 
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tural invasion" but the bringing about of communication through an authen-
tic dialogue. In these years, he also published his controversial book 
Pedagogy of the Oppressed, perhaps his most philosophical and rigorous 
work. He discusses the principles of pedagogy from the perspective of 
the oppressed and demonstrates how this pedagogy can be the education 
of people who are walking in the way of freedom. 
c) The International Experience 
In 1969, Freire was invited by Harvard University to be a Fellow 
of the Center for the Study of Development and Social Change and to be 
a Visiting Professor at Harvard's Center for Studies in Education and 
Development. With the invitation of Harvard, Freire not only left Latin 
America but became a world figure in education. His experience in the 
United States (1969-1970) not only provided him contact with a new cul-
ture, but the opportunity to confirm his theory of education. The "cul-
ture of silence," which in Latin America was generally a peasant culture, 
was also present in the sub-cultures of the first world. 
After his work at Harvard University, Freire moved to Geneva to 
serve as Special Educational Consultant of the World Council of Churches 
(1970-1980). In Geneva, Freire had a world platform where he could 
dialogue with the whole world and promote his ideas through a wider 
medium. He traveled all over the world assisting nations and churches 
with their educational programs. For instance, he has been invited by 
Tanzania and Guinea-Bissau in Africa and by Nicaragua and Costa Rica in 
Latin America. 
The apparent opening up of the government of Brazil caused Freire 
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to think of the possibility of returning to his own country. Returning 
to Brazil had always been a dream which he maintained during his years 
in exile. Thus Freire returned to his country --in Summer, 1980--
sixteen years after his expulsion. A new chapter in his life has begun 
at age 60. 
This world experience gave him the opportunity to write two 
important works: Cultural Action for Freedom and Cartas a Guine-Bissau. 
During his residency in the United States, he wrote two important arti-
cles published in a volume called Cultural Action for Freedom. This vol-
ume is perhaps the first summary of his educational theories. Taking 
as a point of reference the "culture of silence," he discusses themes 
such as alienation, domination, and oppression. Cartas a Guine-Bissau, 
Registros de uma Experiencia em Processo is an explanation of the process 
of education in Guinea-Bissau under the advice of Freire. It jncludes 
also a collection of pedagogical letters related to this process. 
His work consists not only of his published books but also 
includes many articles written to explain different aspects of his 
method of his principles. He also has written articles to discuss 
specific experiences. Many of his publications are interviews or dia-
logues transcribed from recording tapes, and mimeographed materials' 
duplicated for specific purposes. There are collections of articles 
or parts of articles published as books under his name. For instance, 
El Mensaje de Paulo Freire, Teoria y Practica de la Liberaci6n, published 
in Spain by INODEP, has also been published in Colombia under another 
title: Concientizacion, T·eor{a y Practica de la Liberaci6n. This book 
100 
is a collection of 14 articles, some of which are by Freire. There are 
also journals which have published his articles such as Cristianismo y 
Sociedad (Special Supplement), and Fichas Latinoamericanas, n. 4. Some 
of his articles are not easily found because they are only mimeographed 
editions with limited distribution, or because publication of his works 
has been prohibited in some places. 
Attempts to classify Freire in a particular school of thought 
have only demonstrated how diverse, varied, and important are the influ-
ences of others upon him. Many of his insights have come from these 
philosophical, psychological, sociological, educational, and theological 
influences. His rich experience in the Third World Countries (Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America), as well as at the universal level, makes it 
.diffjcult to have a global picture of Freire's thought. Talking about 
the experience of reading Freire's works, Fausto Franco says: "in all 
places we listen to known sounds, but at the same time, we experience 
93 
vividly the harmony as a whole which becomes new." 
Some influences are evident such as influence from Christian prin-
ciples, especially through those philosophers who are personalists 
(Tristao de Athayde, Maritain, Bernanos, and Mounier); influence from 
German idealists, especially from Hegel, influence from existentialists, 
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"Por todas partes se escuchan sonidos conocidos, pero al mis-
mo tiempo se experimenta vivamente que la armon{a de conjunto resulta 
nueva." Fausto Franco, p. 20. 
101 
especially from Sartre, Jaspers, Marcel, Heidegger, Camus, and Buber; 
influence from humanists, especially from Marcuse and Fromm; influence 
from Marxists, especially from Marx, Engels, and Mao. 
Denis Collins, trying to explain the coincidence of different 
branches of philosophy in Freire, some of which seem contradictory, 
says: 
His thinking flows from his life experiences and is eclectic, a 
synthesis of many strains of thought which do indeed lead him to 
the conclusion that education must lead to political liberation. 
Because of his syncretism he has been called an idealist, a 
communist, a "theologian in disguise," a phenomenologist, and an 
existentialist.94 
If eclecticism means "to borrow doctrines from different sources," 
to "attempt to retain them side by side," "without possessing a fundamen-
95 
tal or unitary system," then Freire is not an eclectic thinker. Freire 
is not a neo-scholastic, an idealist, an existentialist, or a Marxist, 
but neither is he an eclectic. In other words, Freire is not an Euro-
pean philosopher living in Latin America as many Latin American philos-
ophers have been. 
Latin America has had philosophers of the "center" and philos-
ophers of the "periphery." Philosophers of the "center" have received, 
transmitted, and adapted European and North American philosophy. In 
other words, Latin American philosophy has usually been the recipient 
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of the philosophical production of the intellectual centers such as 
England, France, Germany, Spain, or the United States. So we have had 
scholastics and nee-scholastics in Brazil and other parts of Latin 
96 
America. We have had nee-scholastics such as Tristao de Athayde and 
97 
Leonel Fransa in Brazil and Octavia N. Diosio and Osvaldo Robles in 
98 
other parts of Latin America. We have had positivists such as Luis 
99 
Pereira Barreto and Miguel Lemos in Brazil, and Enrique Jose Varna, 
Gabino Barreda, Justo Sierra, and Jose Ingenieros in other parts of 
100 
Latin America. We have had Kantians such as Tobias Barreto and 
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Raimundo Farias Brito in Brazil, and Samuel Ramos, Eduardo Garcia 
Mayney, Francisco Romero, Risiery Frondizi, Francisco Miro Quesada and 
102 
Augusto Salazar Bondy in other parts of Latin America. 
The second kind of philosophers receive European and North 
American philosophy with a critical attitude. Their point of reference 
is, at the national level, the distinction between thinking as part of 
the oppressor classes (the national center) and thinking as a part of 
the oppressed people (the national periphery). At the international 
level, the starting point is the distinction between thinking as part 
of the great empires (the center) and thinking as part of the colonies 
(the peripheries of those empires). These philosophers refuse to ere-
ate philosophy which has no relation to the Latin American reality and 
which does not respond to Latin American needs. 
Freire has committed his life and thought to the colonized and 
the oppressed. He can be numbered among the most important Latin Amer-
ican philosophers along with Leopoldo Zea in Mexico, Enrique Dussel in 
Argentina, Arturo Ardao in Uruguay, Jose Antonio Portuondo in Cuba, and 
103 
Pierre Furter in Brazil. When Freire says "I am not a liberal educa-
tor; what I attempt to be is a revolutionary educator," he is also saying 
101 
Cf. Guillermo Francovich, pp. 57-95. Also Joao Cruz Costa, 
pp. 176-202. 
102 
Cf. Jorge J. E. Garcia, pp. 37-40. 
103 
Cf. Arturo Ardao, ed. La Filosofia Actual de la America Lati-
na (Mexico, Dr. F.: Editorial Grijalbo, S.A., 1976). 
104 
that he is not an European philosopher but a Latin American educator. 
Freire is a revolutionary educator, a revolutionary philosopher of educa-
tion, because his starting-point is not the "center," as all philos-
ophy has been up today; rather, it is the "periphery" (his terminus a 
quo). He is a revolutionary because his point of arrival is not an 
abstraction which directly or indirectly supports, helps, dissimulates 
or simply remains silent about the domination by the center. His 
terminus ad quem is freedom. Freire has recognized the contribution 
of European and North American philosophy; however, he has assumed a 
critical attitude toward it because the most important work is to 
philosophize from his perspective as a participant in the Latin American 
reality. When he has been accused of lacking originality, he has 
responded, quoting John Dewey: "Only silly folk identify creative orig-
inality with the extraordinary and fanciful; others recognize that its 
measure lies in putting everyday things to uses which had not occurred 
104 
to others." What is this new use of everyday things which has not 
occurred to others? What is Freire's philosophy and his concept of 
freedom? These will be the questions answered in the second part of 
this dissertation. 
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PART TWO 
PAULO FREIRE 1 S THOUGHT 
From the perspective of my method, the following three chapters 
are parts of one unit: Freire's thought as a whole. This unit is the 
via ad of the whole work, i.e., the analysis of Freire's work as a way 
to understand his concept of Freedom. The first part is "Freire's 
Philosophical Thought" (Chapter III), the terminus a quo of the anal-
yses of Freire's thought. The second part is "Freire's Philosophy of 
Education" (Chapter IV), the dialectical relationship between Freire's 
philosophy and freedom. This is the via ad of the analysis of Freire's 
thought. The third part is "Freedom and Liberation" (Chapter V), the 
terminus ad quem of the analysis of Freire's thought. The same method 
is used in the analysis of the main divisions of each chapter. The 
following schema will help the reader understand the analysis of Freire's 
thought. 
Chapter III- "Freire's Philosophical Thought," the terminus a 
quo of all my analysis of Freire's thought. 
1.- The social Weltanschauung, the terminus a quo of Freire's 
philosophical thought. 
a) The closed society, the terminus a quo of Freire's social 
theory. 
b) The society in transition, the via ad of Freire's social 
theory. 
c) The open society, the terminus ad quem of Freire's social 
105 
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theory. 
2.- The philosophy of praxis, the via ad of Freire's philosophical 
thought. 
a) The contradiction of oppressor-oppressed, the terminus a quo 
of Freire's philosophy of praxis. 
b) Praxis, the dialectical method, the via ad of Freire's 
philosophy of praxis. 
c) The overcoming of the contradiction, the terminus ad quem 
of Freire's philosophy of praxis. 
3.- The anthropology, the terminus ad quem of Freire's philosoph-
ical thought. 
a) Anthropology as a keystone, the terminus a quo of Freire's 
anthropology. 
b) Anthropology as a reconceptualization, the dialectical method 
the via ad of Freire's anthropology. 
c) Human freedom as the highest anthropological realization, 
the terminus ad quem of Freire's anthropology. 
Chapter IV- "Freire's Philosophy of Education," the via ad of 
all my analysis of Freire's thought. 
1.- The anthropological foundations, the terminus a quo of 
Freire's philosophy of education. 
a) The cultural contradiction, the terminus a quo of the 
anthropological foundations. 
b) Conscientization, the dialectical method, the via ad of the 
anthropological foundations. 
c) The overcoming of the cultural contradiction, the 
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terminus ad quem of the anthropological foundations. 
2.- The reconceptualization of education, the via ad of the 
Freire's philosophy of education. 
a) The "banking" concept of education, the terminus a quo 
of the reconceptualization of education. 
b) The dialogue, the dialectical method, the via ad of the 
reconceptualization of education. 
c) The "problem-posing" concept of education, the terminus ad 
quem of the reconceptualization of education. 
3.- The education for freedom, the terminus ad quem of Freire's 
philosophy of education. 
a) The "pedagogy of the oppressed," the terminus a quo of the 
education of freedom. 
b) Knowledge, the dialectical method, the via ad of the educa-
tion of freedom. 
c) The pedagogy of the free people, the terminus ad quem of 
the education for freedom. 
Chapter V - "Freedom and Liberation," the terminus ad quem of 
all my analysis of Freire's thought. 
1.- Freedom and Limitations, the terminus a quo of the concept 
of freedom. 
a) The social limitation, the terminus a quo of the problem of 
freedom and its limitations. 
b) The cultural limitations, the via ad of the problem of 
freedom and its limitations. 
c) The educational limitations, the terminus ad quem of the 
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problem of freedom and its limitations. 
2.- Liberation, the dialectical method, the via ad of the 
concept of freedom. 
a) Liberation, a revolutionary process, the terminus a quo 
of liberation as dialectical method of freedom. 
b) Liberation, a praxiological method, the via ad of liberation 
as dialectical method of freedom. 
c) Liberation, a struggle for humanization, the terminus ad 
quem of liberation as dialectical method of freedom. 
3.- Freedom, the permanent search, the terminus ad quem of 
the concept of freedom. 
a) Freedom, a revolutionary concept, the terminus a quo of 
freedom as a permanent search. 
b) Freedom, a dynamic concept, the via ad of freedom as a 
permanent search. 
c) Freedom, a political concept, the terminus ad quem of 
freedom as a permanent search. 
CHAPTER - III 
FREIRE'S PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT 
To be human is to engage in 
relationships with others and 
with the world. It is to 
experience that world as an 
objective reality, independent 
of oneself, capable of being 
known. Freire.! 
Given the importance of the Brazilian experience in Freire's 
thought and his criteria to differentiate societies, I will try to 
explain how this philosophical thought was born from his understanding 
of his own social world. When he writes about his educational experience, 
he does not explain only his theory and method; he starts by analyzing 
his social reality. His philosophical principles and his philosophy of 
education always begin with this reality, i.e., the terminus a quo of 
Freire's philosophical thought. 
Freire's purpose is not to write a philosophical system; however, 
his philosophy of education suggests a clear philosophical framework. My 
intention is not to develop such framework. What I want to do is to point 
out the first principles which are explicit in his works. As we shall 
see, his comprehension of the nature of social reality and of the human 
being is mediated by a universal, unitive and rational mode of thinking, 
the via ad of Freire's philosophical thought. 
1 
Paulo Freire, Education for Critical Consciousness, p.3. 
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Whatever would be the explanation of the philosophical first 
principles and the world --the social reality in the case of Freire--
they do not only make room for human beings but generate an anthro-
pology. Freire is explicit in his conceptualization of "human being" and 
his clarification of the place of man in his world. The concept of 
free human beings is the terminus ad quem of Freire's philosophical 
thought and the keystone of his philosophy of education. 
Thus, the present chapter will have three major points: the 
social world-view of Freire's reality (the terminus a quo of Freire's 
philosophical thought), the philosophical principles (the via ad), and 
the anthropological principles (the terminus ad quem of Freire's 
philosophical thought). 
1. THE SOCIAL WELTANSCHAUUNG 
Freire's thought is not understandable without a knowledge 
of his social reality. My second chapter tried to explain the Latin 
American and Brazilian reality. However, his thought also is difficult 
to grasp without an understanding of the process of Freire's thinking 
about his own reality. The first affirmation here is, as Maria Fiori 
says, that "Paulo Freire is a thinker committed to life; he does not 
think ideas, what he thinks is existence."2 In order to comprehend his 
thought, it is essential to take into account that Freire thinks about 
2 
"Paulo Freire es un pensador comprometido con la vida; no 
piensa ideas, piensa la existencia." Emani Maria Fiori, "Aprender a 
Decir su Pal~bra: El Metodo de Alfabetizacion del Profesor Paulo 
Freire," Cristianismo y Sociedad, Suplemento (Setiembre 1968): 95. 
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the historical process of his own society and his experience in this 
process. 
Freire's social world includes his whole nation and specifically 
the reality of Recife, the capital city of his state, and the rural 
areas of the Northeast region of the state of Pernambuco. Likewise, his 
invitations from around the world, as an educational consultant, have 
also demonstrated Freire's consciousness of the differences regarding 
social reality. From his point of view, it is of paramount importance 
to learn about the immediate context before suggesting a philosophy and 
becoming an educator of a specific group of people. 
The world-view of Freire (Weltanschauung) is the social universe, 
the order (cosmos) of human relations. But, what is his understanding 
of his own concrete world in Brazil? On the basis of his analysis of 
the Brazilian society and history, he differentiates three kinds of 
societies: the "closed," the "transitional," and the "open" society. 
The closed society is the social terminus a quo, the transitional 
society is the social via ad, and the open society is the social 
3 terminus ad quem. 
b) The Closed Society 
For Freire, the Brazilian closed society was the "colonial 
3 
Paulo Freire, Cambio (Bogota: Editorial Am~rica Latina, 1970) 
p. 67. The social theory of Freire is explained in four of his most 
important works: Educacao como Practica da Liberdade, Pedagog!a do 
Oprimido, Cambio, and Education for Liberation. 
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slavocratic," "reflex," and "antidemocratic society." This society is 
illustrated by the three hundred years of colonial history of Brazil 
and Latin America. 
The colonial economy of Brazil was based on a commercial en-
terprise where the colonizer never came to cultivate or industrialize 
the colony but to be the dominator, to be "over" the people, and to 
exploit them. The colonizers came to make themselves rich. Brazil 
5 
was left to the "gluttonous incursions of adventurers." Brazilians 
were living in fear under Portuguese rule. Other countries of Latin 
America during the years. of_ colonization had similar experiences. 
These closed societies grew, existed, and developed outside the center 
of decision-making. They were a "reflex" of another economy and anoth-
er culture. They were objects and not subjects. 
The social organization of the colony in Brazil was built upon 
the rights of the large landowners to oppress workers and slaves who 
came from Africa. Landowners were proprietors of big "fazendas" 
(plantations) and "engenhos" (sugar mills). They possessed immense 
tracts of lands. They also possessed people who lived or worked on 
their land. Inhabitants and workers had no other alternative than to 
be proteges of their masters because they needed protection from the 
sporadic incursions of Indians, the raids of the other masters, or the 
4 
Paulo Freire, Education for Critical Consciousness, p. 21. 
5 
Ibid., p. 22. 
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violence of the tropics. That which the colonial "epoch" witnessed 
was people who dominated or were dominated, who oppressed or were 
oppressed, who protected or were protected. People lived in 
a system of oppression, dependence, and marginalization with a men-
tality of oppression which embodied both extremes: masters and slaves, 
oppressors and oppressed. It was a feudal system. 
In other words, the colonial economy depended on an external 
. h " . t . 1" k t economy, 1.e., t e 1nterna 1ona mare • It was not a national economy 
because the economy did not respond to the national interests. Brazil 
was a country which produced raw materials to satisfy external demands. 
Portuguese colonizers imposed a life without the press, foreign rela-
tions, schools, and other means of communication. The colonizers re-
stricted communication among people drastically; that is, they restric-
ted external relations as well as relations among provinces. The inter-
national market and internal production were controlled by the oppressor. 
Law and decrees favored the masters; the system generated despotism, 
stimulated a masochistic desire to submit to others, and created a eli-
mate of ambition to be all-powerful. 
Brazil had not had the opportunity to achieve a democratic ex-
perience from the early years of its history. There could be no real 
democracy when the center of authority was in the hands of landowners, 
governors, captains, viceroys, and the Portuguese crown. The center 
was located in external authority, and the Brazilian people did not 
have the opportunity to form a communitarian life and participate in 
solving common problems. The sporadic solidarity of workers with 
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their own masters was merely apparent. For instance, the creation of 
cities was imposed, the municipal councils and senate provided op-
portunity to the privileged classes: the sugar aristocracy, the 
powerful landowners, the highborn, and wholesaler. Ordinary people 
were forgotten. They had no rights, they could not participate in the 
political, social, and economic life of the nation, except as the op-
pressed. They were abandoned left to their work and isolated from the 
rest of the world, living in obedience far from the center of power, 
working other people's lands, and being unable to communicate with 
others. This situation generated an uncritical consciousness and a 
rigid and authoritarian mentality. 
Brazil had not had an opportunity for a democratic experience 
when the Portuguese crown arrived at Rio de Janeiro (1808) or even when 
Brazilian independence was proclaimed (1822). These two events pro-
moted industry, schools, press, libraries, universities, and new customs. 
However, they changed only the style of oppression. Participation in the 
center of power was more evident in the cities than in the rural areas. 
More power was in the hands of the bourgeoisie than in the hands of the 
landowners. More privileges were given for the European, or the people 
with a European lifestyle, than the ordinary people. The moving of 
the Portuguese crown to Brazil was, in fact, a superimposition upon the 
feudal situation. Independence created bewilderment for the majority 
of people. Even the model of democracy was imported and imposed as 
had been the conquest. The previous extremes of masters and slaves 
were reinforced, .. and.new extremes were created such as rich-poor, 
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Europeans-Africans, or bourgeoisie-natives. 
In reality, then, Brazil has had a history of being an "antidem-
ocratic society." The majority of people have had an "insurmountable 
barrier": inexperience in self-government, in social and political 
participation, and in the creation of their own society with "their own 
hands"; in a few words, they have had the "inexperience of democracy." 
People continued to be defeated, crushed, and silent. People did not 
use their voice in crucial situations; they suffered a kind of "mut-
ism." They were victims of communiques but never could dialogue. 
The colonized generally were adapted and inactive; they had no oppor-
tunity to assume responsibility or to have an experience of solidarity, 
and they remained at the "periphery" of their historical events. They 
participated when the elite led them demagogically into the events. The 
elite was superimposed on and not integrated with the people. 
Th.e closed society embraced a "series" of aspirations, concerns, 
and values generated by the large landowners, bourgeoisie, nobles, and 
their elite in power. Such a series had to confront certain "obstacles" 
to their fulfillment. Series and obstacles were expressed by "epochal 
themes" which formulated and represented these series and obstacles. 
Such epochal themes proposed "tasks" which ordinary people had to 
perform on behalf of their own interests. On the one hand, the ordinary 
people of the closed society --who form the larger part of the nation--
could not grasp these themes and tasks. On the other hand, the elite 
in trying to consolidate the "themesu of the closed society tried to 
fulfill their tasks without questioning the reality to which those 
themes referred. 
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Ordinary people of the closed society developed a consciousness 
6 
in a low level of transition which Freire calls "semi-intransitive" 
consciousness. With this consciousness people focussed on problems 
arising out of biological necessity. Their sphere of perception was 
limited to their innnediate needs. They were satis.fied by illogical or 
magical explanations because they could not see the causes of social 
phenomena. They were alienated and separated from their economic, 
social, cultural, and political reality. For this reason they were 
incapable of really knowing themselves, their limitations, and their 
possibilities; they oscillated between ingenuous optimism and desper-
ation, between idealism and pessimism. They imported foreign models of 
thought without taking into account the original context of such models, 
so different from their own. 
From \vhat has been said, the characteristics of a closed socie-
ty are five-fold: 1. The economic center of decision-making is located 
outside of its own geographical borders. 2. Social organization is rig-
id and authoritarian; there is no upward and downward social mobility; 
society is static. 3. The national power is in the hands of an elite 
who obey the prescriptions of the center and the prescriptions of the 
local representatives of the center. 4. The closed society conserves 
the status in every way possible: through technology, the educational 
6 
"Semi-.intransitive" consciousness has not "sufficient dis-
tance from reality to objectify it in order to know it in a critical 
way." Paulo Freire, Cultural Action for Freedom (Cambridge: Harvard 
Educational Revie>v, 1970), p. 36. 
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system, the importation of new models, and through all the social in-
stitucions. 
b) The Society in Transition 
Transitional society in Brazil has two contradictory elements 
co-existing: the closed society and the open society. The closed so-
ciety depends on values which justify the old way of life; it gener-
ally looks back on "yesterday," rejects participation of the people, 
emphasizes old themes, and maintains naive attitudes. The new socie-
ty defends new values, new themes, and new tasks; it improves partici-
pation of people and gives rise to critical attitudes. Only a critical 
attitude makes 
and new tasks. 
possible the perception of new themes, new obstacles, 
A transitional society appears when the discordant elements 
inherent in a closed society disturb the people of the open society. 
It begins when old themes collapse and new themes emerge. For example, 
Brazil experienced this transition between a closed and an open socie-
ty during the decade of the nineteen sixties. 
Some "alienated intellectual groups," who had been in their 
mental life living apart from the social conditions in which they were 
embedded, decided to face their own reality. In Freire's terminology, 
they began "integrating" with their reality. As a consequence, they 
developed a critical consciousness and discovered their own themes and 
their own tasks. m1en they understood their own reality, they dis-
covered their place in the world in relation to that reality, their 
limitations, and their real potentialities. They also discovered that 
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their social order was not an accomplished fact never to be revised, 
but it was in the process of creation. Hope replaced hopelessness, 
critical perception replaced ingenuous optimism, reality as challenge 
replaced reality as inevitable destiny, and purposeful action replaced 
the automatic response. 
When these groups, the "progresistas," rejected accommodation 
and claimed the right to participate, the reactionaries saw clearly 
the threat to their interests. At first, the elite who were under the 
control of the reactionaries reacted spontaneously. Later, the elite 
created a program of social benefits, sent social workers to assist 
the people, tried to apply "band-aids" to the problems, and tried to 
create special institutions to promote social welfare. When the 
"progresistas" began to participate, society began to change dramat-
ically. The new society was in labor and the old society was trying 
to survive. The new society was groping toward the shape it would as-
sume, and the old society was in the process of disappearing. 
As we have seen, a society in transition proposes two alter-
natives to its people: the first alternative is to be "reactionary" which 
means to be "in" one's reality, to be "submerged" but in opposition 
to the process of transition. Reactionary people obstruct any advance, 
maintain the status quo, look backward, or simply react against change. 
The second alternative is to be 11 progresista" which means to be part 
110f 11 h f II II f h h t e process o transition, to emerge as subjects o t e istor-
ical process. "Progresista" people renounce folding their arms, being 
only spectators, and demand intervention in the process and full par-
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ticipation. Persons in this society in transition must choosebet-
ween the options of being an object or a subject of history; they 
must opt for the new or for the old; they must make a commitment which 
is radical. 
There is a distinction between the sectarianism of the reaction-
ary and the radicalism of the "progresista." Sectarian people are un-
critical and anticommunicative. They follow myths, absolutize half-
truths, make propaganda and slogans, impose their choice and goals, and 
reduce people to masses. Because they are uncritical, they act without 
reflection. They depend on the reflection of somebody else. Ingenu-
ously, they think they are the proprietors of history because they think 
of themselves as capable of stopping or of changing history. When they 
are successful, they stop all changes because they are incapable of 
creating an open society. They only take people into account when they 
want to use them for their goals. Other people are only followers, only 
objects. Sectarians are fanatics, and fanaticism brutalizes people and 
generates hate. 
7 
The radical option is "to take root in one's own option," in 
other words to assume a critical, loving, humble, and communicative 
attitude. Because radical people are critical, they reject every 
attempt of the reactionaries to silence others, to abuse their rights, 
or to suppress their freedom. Radicals submit all action to reflection. 
7 
"Enraizamento que a homen faz no opc~o." Paulo Freire. 
Educ!:lsao como Practica da Liberdade, p. 50. The term "radical" comes 
from the Latin word "radix" which means "root.". 
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They are the real sujects of history because, in recognizing the epochal 
themes, obstacles, and tasks, they can act in order to change what must 
be changed, and they can create the new society. They are actors and 
creators. However, they do not feel that they are the exclusive pro-
prietors of history, the only ones who can change history. Other 
people have the same capacity and are also subjects. Radicals want to 
solve problems "with" people and not "for" people or "upon" people. 
8 
They reject "assistentialism," impositions, and fanaticism. Thus, 
they demand deep changes. 
However, the Brazilian people were not prepared to assume a 
critical attitude at the moment of transition. The elite as well as 
the masses embraced sectarianism. At the very time the "progresistas" 
were attempting to change the situation, the sectarians, not seeing any 
other possible solution, provoked a coup d'etat with the aid of the 
military forces (1964). The reactionaries, generally centered around 
latifundia , were helped by outside forces which did not want the advent 
of an open society in Brazil. These forces exerted their own pressures 
and recommended their own assistential solutions. 
The radicals disturbed the elite. The reactions of the elite 
were justified by a so-called defense of democracy. Firstly, their 
spontaneous reactions were the consequence of an uncritical and emotive 
position. Secondly, their reactions were assistential and violent. 
8 
"Assistentialism" refers to social assistance which focuses 
on the symptoms, but not the causes. "Assistentialist" is the person 
who makes an assistential service. See p. 89, fn. 81. 
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"Assistentialists" attack symptoms but not causes, treat others as re-
cipients and passive objects but consider themselves as subjects and 
as people who make decisions. Assistentialists will not allow the 
recipients to participate in the solution of their problems. They 
impose mutism, passivity, and non-dialogue; they convert a group of 
persons into an undifferentiated mass. They domesticate people. For 
this reason, assistentialists will never create a democracy. 
Violence is an irrational action which is the "natural" conse-
quence of sectarianism with its system of egoistic interests. The 
concept of democracy of the elite is a sui generis one. Sectarians 
think that the "disease" of people is to speak and to participate and 
that "health" is to be silent and inactive. In this kind of democracy, 
the elite protect the people from "foreign ideologies," which means 
denying them participation in their own historical process. If people 
participate, they are "subversive" because they "threaten order." The 
elite defend the social "order" which makes them the dominators. For 
9 
this reason, the elite preserve their order at all costs. 
By way of summary, a transitional society has the following 
theoretical characteristics: 
First, a transitional society has two contradictory elements: 
it is a closed and an open society at the same time. The closed society 
loses its aspirations, concerns, and values, and the new society comes 
9 
Cf. The experience of Peru. Paulo Freire, "La Educacio'n como 
Practica de. la.Libertad, Educacion Versus Masificaci6n." Bolet::Cn HOAC 
580-58 (November): 3. 
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with new aspirations, concerns, and values. The transitional society 
is the coincidence of a society which looks for consolidation against 
change and a society which is in change. In these conditions, all 
b II • II people have two alternatives; to e reactionary or to be progres1sta. 
All must choose one or the other. 
Second, when the participation of "progresistas" is more than 
words, reactionaries and their elite react with an assistential or 
violent attitude. 
Third, this tension produces a movement characteristic of 
transitional society: the movement of "flux and reflux, advances and 
retreats." Retreats can retard or distort the process but they cannot 
stop it. When there are retreats, the new themes are repressed but 
they do not disappear. New themes persist underground up to the 
moment in which there are new opportunities for transitions. 
c) The Open Society 
The roots of the open society in Brazil are to be found at the 
end of the last century. The industry "upsurge" (1885), the civi-
lizing movement vigorously supported by immigrants, the suppression of 
the slave regime (1888), the increase of production, and the new eco-
nomy of free labor were important factors in bringing about the trans-
formation of social and economic structure of Brazil. New aspirations, 
new concerns, new values, new habits, and a new mentality arose, espe-
cially in the urban areas. 
The growth of the open society was more evident after the 
First World War (1920) and especially after the Second World War (1945) 
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when Brazilian industrialization made its strongest movement forward. 
These changes affected culture, arts, literature, and science. People 
began to see their own reality and were able to identify and solve 
their own problems. People began to participate in their historical 
process. Democracy began to be learned through the "exercise" of 
democracy and through experience of popular participation. The open 
society was at hand. 
When some intellectual groups, even some representatives of 
the elite, began to be integrated --not accommodated-- in their own re-
ality, plans and projects which were the product of serious and deep 
researches into their own reality were substituted for the imported 
prescriptions which were formerly used. This integration gave them an 
understanding of their own history and their location in the process, 
an understanding of their own themes, obstacles, and tasks, and their 
best course of action. 
Some important changes appear in this new society: naive opti-
mism and utopian idealism disappear; critical optimism and realistic 
hope appear; pessimism, frustration and desperation are overcome; con-
sciousness of problems, obstacles, dangers, and possibilities arises; 
people acquire a transitive consciousness and every day are more recep-
tive and questioning; they engage in dialogue. There are opportunities 
and participation for everybody; there is a climate of freedom and 
democracy, '~Before it (democracy) becomes a political form," Freire 
says, ''democracy is a form of life, characterized· above all by a 
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strong component of transitive consciousness." 
In summary, the characteristics of an open society are: 
First, equal opportunity for action. All people are subjects. 
The contradictions oppressor-oppressed, dominator-dominated, and 
subjects-objects disappear. The people are in touch with their own 
reality and are looking for new themes and new perceptions. The pea-
ple have the power to create a future they themselves desire. The 
people can participate in the historical process by means of their 
action. 
Second, critical consciousness. The people act rationally and 
lucidly. They confront rationally their own reality in order to act 
upon it. People reflect on all things --all social structures, all 
aspects of their world, all experiences in their world, even their own 
action-- in order to make all the changes necessary. 
Third, freedom. The open society is a transitional society 
without the obstacles of reactionary people. In other words, the open 
society is free because the reactionar~es no longer exercise paternal-
ism, assistentialism, or violence. The open society has an open future 
which will be fashioned according to human needs . 
. Fourth, democracy. A free society is one in which everybody 
11 
is free, i.e., a democratic society. In such a society all people are 
10 
Paulo Freire, Education for Critical Consciousness, p. 29 
11 
Cf. Paulo Freire, La Educacion como Practica de la Libertad 
pp. 99-118. 
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united and when all societies are be free, then all nations will be 
united. No one uses power to crush other people and nobody manipulates 
others. All people must be on guard against sectarianism, fanaticism, 
and irrationalism which are the enemies of freedom and democracy. 
12 
According to four of the most important books of Freire, 
his theoretical conclusions about his social world view are based on 
a clear understanding of his socio-historical moment. This moment 
I want to emphasize: Brazil had lived as a transitional society between 
1950 and 1964. The closed society was in decline and an open society 
was emerging. However, the Brazilian people were not ready for the new 
epoch, the open society. The majority of people had remained at the 
margin of historical events or were led to these events demagogically. 
The closed society produced a "retreat" from the new society with the 
coup d'etat of 1964. The military regime was rigid, authoritarian, and 
proclaimed a false democracy. Brazil was there, waiting for the op-
portunity to begin again its movement toward total liberation, the 
winning of real freedom, its real democracy. 
The social principles of Freire are related to the transitional 
society, the via ad, which moves between the closed society (the 
terminus a quo) ru1d the open society (the terminus ad quem). The tran-
12 
The four books are Educa1ao como Practica da Liberdade, Peda-
&og{a do Oprimido, Cambio, and Education for Liberation. 
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sitional society is the context in which are present simultaneously the 
closed and open society, the old and the new, which is to say there is 
stability by reason of the open and the new. Both of them are consti-
tutive of the social structure. The theoretical implications of this 
transitional society will be important to the comprehension of Freire's 
philosophical principles. 
2. THE PHILOSOPHY OF PRAXIS 
As I have said, Freire ha~ not constructed a philosophical 
system because his major concern has not been philosophy as such; he 
is more a philosopher of education. However, he suggests a clear 
philosophical framework which I want to point out. I will not develop 
all of its implications. What I want to do is an analysis of the 
first principles which are explicit in his works and which constitute 
the universal, unitive, and rational points of reference to all his 
thought. 
Thse principles are, at least, three: the contradiction of 
oppressor-oppressed as a fact seen by Freire in his social reality 
(the terminus a quo of Freire's Philosophy of Praxis), the dialectical 
method as a way --and at the same time as a moment-- to overcome such 
contradiction (the via ad of Freire's Philosophy of Praxis), and the 
overcoming of the contradiction (the terminus ad quem of Freire's 
Philosophy of Praxis). 
a) The Contradiction Oppressor-Oppressed 
Freire's first principles arise from his understanding of 
social reality. The Freire of the Educacao como Practica da Liberdade 
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and Cambio talks about the closed and open societies, both of them 
present at the same time, but both of which create a contradictory 
situation which he calls transitional society. The Freire of the 
Pedagog{a do Oprimido discovers in the core of the transitional society, 
the contradictory society, an anthropological principle, the contradictory 
principle of oppressor-oppressed. This principle involves the economic 
interrelationships, the social composition generated by these relation-
ships, and the political relationship of social groups. 
Firstly, the process by which people are located in social 
classes (lower, upper, and middle classes) is based upon the economic 
status which gives prestige and power. The economic development 
determines the social conditions and lifestyle in which the upper and 
lower classes live. The poorer the nation is and the lower the lower 
classes are, the more oppressive the upper classes are upon the lower 
13 
classes. So the upper classes become the oppressors and the lower 
classes the oppressed, a social contradiction. 
The middle class generally accepts the contradiction of 
upper-lower and oppressor-oppressed. They do not want to supersede this 
contradiction because they are in transition between a status of the 
oppressed and the status of the oppressor. Economic stratification 
makes possible their gradual and ordered promotion to the privileges 
of the oppressors. What the middle classes want is to leave the 
13 Cf. Paulo Freire, La Educacao como Practica da Libertade, 
pp. 85-87. 
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despicable condition of the oppressed and to aspire to be the oppressor. 
They lose touch with the anthropological significance of the contra-
diction and forget the human vocation everyone has, i.e., to humanize 
themselves. 
Secondly, there are two poles which are generated by this kind 
of distribution of wealth: the oppressive classes, which exploit, 
dominate, and rape by virtue of their power, and the oppressed classes 
which have no power to avoid such abuse. It is a contradiction which 
cannot exist without the presence of both poles: the oppressed cannot 
exist without the oppressor because they are oppressed by reason of 
the oppressor. The oppressor also cannot exist without the oppressed 
because they are oppressors of the oppressed. Each of them is the 
antithesis of the other; each of them is related to the other in a 
dialectical way. 
, 
When the lower classes emerge into a state of awareness, the 
upper classes and their elite in power react with contempt. The upper 
classes consider the lower classes innately inferior, a caste with 
only manipulative value. Participation of the lower classes in power 
is an absurdity. When lower classes emerge, the elite, which represent 
the upper classes, generally react in one of two ways: they develop a 
paternalistic way of solving problems or they stop people by force. 
In the end, the objective is the same: to silence and "domesticate" 
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lower classes. When the oppressed people speak about their needs, 
the necessity of reform and of participation in power, the oppressors 
increase their arms and defend their privileges. These are the 
circumstances in which an irrational climate, sectarian positions, 
and mistrustful attitudes appear. 
Thirdly, technological modernization has a close relationship 
to the social conditions of workers, the political values, and the 
lifestyle of the upper and lower classes. On the one side, technology 
has required mechanical behavior, has led to a narrow and excessive 
specialization, has reduced people's horizons, has separated people 
from their "total project," has cultivated fearful and naive conscious-
ness, and has distorted critical capacity. On the other side, technol-
ogy has created a climate of transition. Radio, cinema, television, 
highways, and transportation have been powerful influences of change 
and participation. Thus, modernization has produced contradictory 
effects in the social life. 
Technology can be used according to the political values of the 
social system. For instance, the mass media (radio, television, and 
newspaper) can be used as effective tools to manipulate people, to 
"up root" people from their reality, and to push them to adopt mythical 
explanations. Through the mass media people can easily adopt fearful 
and naive attitudes and conform to mechanical responses without a global 
14 
Freire uses the word "domestication" to refer to the 
dehumanizing way in which an individual, or social group, treat others 
to force them into a state of conformity and acco~nodation. 
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perspective. Through it people can be "domesticated," reduced to 
a manageable and unthinking agglomeration, and forced to live a life on 
the basis of illusions without an understanding of the challenges of 
society. However, the mass media can be used also in favor of the 
oppressed people to show them their reality, to create a healthy 
relationship among people, and to motivate a critical attitude. The 
import of technology has created different kinds of reactions among 
people: activist attitudes, perplexity, emotive reactions, and popular 
rebellion. But technology can also create conditions that make possible 
a critical attitude. 
The contradictory principle of·oppressor-oppressed involves the 
economic process: by which people are stratified into social classes, the 
social power by which the upper classes manipulate lower classes, and 
the political control by which upper classes domesticate and repress 
people. Technology can be used either to dominate or to liberate 
humanity. According to Freire, the social reality of Brazil and the 
rest of Latin America rests upon that contradiction: to maintain the 
power of the oppressor and to retain the weakness of the oppressed. 
The middle class confirms this contradiction when they want to escape 
from the oppressed condition and look for the privileges of the oppressor. 
The awakening of the oppressed and the paternalistic or violent reaction 
of the oppressor polarize the contradiction and make the two poles more 
evident. Technology, as well as other tools in human hands, can be 
15 
4,5. 
Cf. Paulo Freire, La Educasao como Practica da Liberdade, pp. 
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used to increase oppression or to improve the process of change and 
humanization. 
b) Praxis, the Dialectical Method 
A social reality, like all other cultural creations, exists as a 
product of human action. Economic relationships, social organization, 
political values,and criteria for using technology are creations of 
people who want to live better. For this reason, changing something 
which is necessary to change only happens by human action. Social 
change does not come about by chance because social reality does not 
exist by chance. Now, what is the most adequate way to change a 
social reality? 
Freire says that praxis is the dialectical method best suited to 
change that which is necessary to change at the physical, social, or 
thinking level. In the case of the social structure, praxis is the 
dialectical method which has the capacity to overcome the contradiction 
oppressor-oppressed. As we have seen, the oppressor-oppressed is a 
contradiction of two poles in which the oppressor cannot exist without 
the oppressed and the oppressed cannot exist without the oppressor. 
Each pole cannot exist without the presence of the other; one is the 
antithesis of the other, and both are related dialectically~ Praxis is 
the dialectical method with the capacity to confront, to break, and to 
overcome this dialectical and contradictory reality. 
Freire says: that praxis is "reflection and action upon the world 
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in order to transform it." There are two components in the confron-
tation of reality: reflection and action. Reflection is thinking about 
external reality and on the human action upon such reality; it is the 
expression of such reality and such action in concepts or judgments; 
and it is the lucid spiritual activity to illuminate human action. 
Action is the work of people upon reality, work which modifies reality 
and produces new things from this reality. When there is a coincidence 
of reflection and action, i.e., praxis, something new comes into exis-
tence. 
However, reflection and action cannot be isolated; they are in 
a dialectical relationship. If such a dialectical way of interaction 
does not appear, we have an inauthentic praxis. Inauthentic praxis 
results when action is simple activity, action without reflection, 
which is activism, mere pragmatism, without a lucid "integration" in 
the world. Inauthentic praxis results also when reflection is sepa-
rate from action; such reflection is only verbalism, just words, "bla-
bla-bla. " 1 T The danger of this inauthentic praxis appears when we 
realize that praxis is made so as to adjust to reality. The social 
reality shows that the creation of the human being --in this case 
the social structures-- has turned against its creators. People cannot 
16 
Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, trans. Myra Bergman 
Ramos (New York: The Seabury Press, 1974), p. 36. 
17 
Paulo Freire, "Investigacidn y Metodolog:la de la Investiga-
cion del "Tema Generador", Cristianismo y Sociedad, Suplemento 
(Setiembre, 1968), p. 27. 
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avoid the social reality which, in spite of being the creation of human 
beings, determines human behavior. People and their actions have been 
18 
alienated. That is what Freire calls the "inversion of the praxis." 
Authentic praxis avoids an exclusive subjectivism or an exclu-
sive objectivism. The subjectivist, avoiding the objectivist recog-
nition of oppression, inhibits action, expects that oppression will 
disappear by itself, and waits passively. The objectivist, avoiding 
the subjectivist analysis of reality, misunderstands the contradictions 
of such reality. A real objectivity cannot exist without subjectivity 
because subjectivity helps objectivity to be more accurate in its under-
standing of reality. A real subjectivity cannot also exist without ob-
jectivity because in this case objectivity gives real and truthful sense 
to the subjective analysis. Thus, according to Freire, there is no sub-
jectivity or objectivity alone; each of them is complemented by the oth-
er. Again, subjectivity and objectivity exist in a dialectical relation-
ship. The dialectic movement here is not an "objective" dialectic which 
holds in nature, society or a system of thought; neither is it a "sub-
jective" dialectic which holds in a pure reflection of thought, "the 
absolute mind" of Hegel. The dialectic which transforms the world is 
that which is related to the subjective and the objective, which is 
constituted by reflection and action, both of them mediated by the world. 
The dialectical relationship between reflection and action over-
comes both the contradiction subjectivism-objectivism and the dualism 
18 
paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, p. 36. 
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human spirit-reality of the world. Freire says that-to think about 
social reality without taking into account the dynamic intervention of 
human beings is "sociologism" and to think about the subjective activity 
of the human being without taking into account the reality of the world 
19 
is "psychologism." To deny the subjective activity of the human being 
is to deny the lucid action of humans and to permit the fixed scheme 
of the social reality to dominate humans. To deny the objective world 
is to deny the possibility of creating new things out of the social 
reality; it is to deny that the social reality can change and to fill 
all the world with fantasies separated from real life. When we separate 
subjectivity and objectivity we fall into that which Freire calls a 
total ambiguity; "To glorify democracy and to silence the people," 
"to discuss humanism and to negate man," "to say one thing and to do 
another." 
20 
Such democracy and humanism are a farce and a lie. 
In sununary, reflection and action dialectically related cannot 
only confront reality and explain it but also transform it. Reality 
here can be nature, society, or culture. Praxis is a dialectical rela-
tionship: reflection and action cannot be isolated. Reflection is the 
''emergence" of consciousness from its reality and action is the 
21 
"critical intervention" of humans inside reality. Authentic 
19 
Cf. Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, p. 35. 
20 
Cf. Ibid., p. 80. 
21 
Cf. Ibid., pp. 68, 100. 
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reflection·always "emerges" from reality or from the action of people 
upon reality. Authentic action is lucid work upon reality as a result 
of a lucid spiritual activity mediated by the content of reality. 
Reflection without action is only ideas without reality. Reflection 
22 
and action isolated from each other are only "submersion" but not 
"integration." Praxis is integration in reality, which means "inter-
23 
vention" to change reality. The process of praxis involves the 
coincidence of these factors which after the first step of reflection-
action upon reality generate the next step of praxis in a more lucid 
way and generate a more critical intervention in reality. 
c) The Overcoming of the Contradiction 
Freire explains that the contradiction oppressor-oppressed is 
based on a situation of violence. There is violence in the exploitation 
of people, in the domination of all aspects of life --in the economic, 
social, cultural, and political order-- and in irrational repression. 
When the oppressors want to have more, always more, they try to 
obtain new possessions no matter the cost to the oppressed. In other 
words, their possessions are a result of the exploitation of the 
oppressed. When the oppressors exploit people in order to satisfy their 
tendencies to have more, they exert violence against the oppressed. This 
22 
Freire uses the word "submersion" to express the idea of one's 
being in the midst of reality without consciousness of it and without the 
possibility of changing it. 
23 
Cf. Ibid., pp. 52, 53, 119. 
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violence has its roots in a materialistic concept of existence. "Having" 
is the measure of all things and having is the principle of all things. 
"To be is to have". This· conception the oppressors impose as a condi-
24 
tion for being human. The violence of exploitation results in the op-
pressed always having less and less, and sometimes nothing. 
The oppressors feel they have possessions because they work. In 
order to have these things they take risks, and they are skillful in 
making things. As a result, they contemn the oppressed people; they 
consider them lazy people who never take risks, who are invariably incom-
petent, and who are always ungrateful for the "generosity" of the 
oppressors. The oppressed are envious and potential enemies. The 
oppressors consider themselves unique people who control the economic, 
social, cultural and political order. They consider that they have the 
right of leadership because they have merit and competence. They are 
good people. However, when the oppressors contemn the oppressed people, 
when they do not permit the oppressed to have equal opportunity, when 
they convert the oppressed into a dependent and submissive people, the 
oppressors are reacting violently against the oppressed. 
Oppressors tend to be sadists; they experience pleasure in 
dominating and controlling others. If they are to control all areas 
of life, they must subdue and convert the oppressed into "things" or 
24 
Cf. Ibid., p. 44. 
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Freire does not consider the "generosity" of the oppressors 
as an authentic expression of love but as a way to dominate and exploit 
the oppressed without their protest. 
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objects. They "de-animate" human beings. They want people who obey, 
are quiet, and never talk about their rights. They have a necrophiliac's 
26 
view of the world. In order to dominate the oppressed, the oppressors 
stop all attempts at investigating new things and put obstacles in the 
way of creative tendencies. Two effects of the violence of domination 
and control are that the oppressed become objects and that their most 
elemental human rights are denied them. 
The system in which some people exploit others, dominate others, 
and repress others is a violent order. This system violates the most 
elementary rights of human beings and denies the historical and onto-
logical vocation of everyone, i.e., to become "more human". The contra-
dietary system of oppressor-oppressed obstructs the realization of this 
vocation and the exercise of the human rights in behalf of the interests 
of a few people, the oppressors. All science, all technology, all ed-
ucation, all religion, and all social institutions are used to maintain 
this violence. This system carries in its nature a violence which is 
perpetuated through generations. 
This system explains why social violence in history always has 
been initiated and exercised by the oppressors. The oppressed always 
have been the victims of the violence. Oppressors do not love others 
because they love only themselves. Seizing the economic, social, cul-
tural, and political control, oppressors generate conditions of re-
26 
Freire uses the term "necrophilia" in the sense in which 
Erich Fromm employs it, i.e., the fascination of converting living 
persons into things. 
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pression. Oppressors protect and maintain their control even if des-
potism, repression, and terror are necessary. Those who exploit, 
contemn, and dominate others hate the objects of their exploitation. 
The oppressed respond naturally to the initial violence of 
the oppressors by rebelling. The violence of rebellion is grounded 
in the necessity of being treated as human beings. The oppressed want 
to have a system without repression; that is, they want to have a more 
rational, just, and peaceful order. For this reason Freire says that 
the act of rebellion of the oppressed can generate love and overcome 
hatred. 
The contradiction between the violence of the oppressors and 
the act of rebellion of the oppressed has its-solution in the struggle 
of the oppressed. That is so because the violence of the oppressors 
dehumanizes the oppressed and, in the exercise of oppression, op-
pressors dehumanize themselves. Yet the struggle of the oppressed for 
liberation can restore not only the humanity of the oppressed but also 
the humanity of oppressors lost in the exercise of their oppression. 
Oppressors never can revolt because they are the beneficiaries of the 
oppressive system. They cannot struggle for liberation because they 
cannot fight to destroy themselves. They cannot liberate either them-
selves or the oppressed. Humanization can only come from the op-
pressed because unlike the oppressors they do not wish to be other 
oppressors but simply to be human. 
However, there are some members of the oppressors who join with 
the oppressed; they cease to be exploiters, contemners, dominators, and 
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controllers; they cease to be indifferent to this oppression or to be 
the heirs of it. There are some oppressors who move from the pole of 
the oppressors to the other pole of the contradiction, the side of the 
oppressed. The risk they constantly have is to be in favor of the 
struggle of the oppressed for liberation, while at the same time they 
are prejudiced against and distrust the oppressed. They usually fall 
into a false generosity; they begin to believe that they must be the 
executers of change. The oppressors who move to the side of the op-
pressed desire to transform the unjust order; however, they have to 
remember that they are not proprietors, givers, or imposers of change. 
They must choose to be in "comunion" with the oppressed and to trust 
them. This is a precondition for participation in the struggle. To 
move to the side of the oppressed is like a re-birth. 
But the oppressed people also have their problems in the ful-
fillment of their liberation. In addition to the different forms of 
violence imposed by the oppressors, the oppressed have internalized 
the contradictions of the social structures. The oppressed people are 
not only socially oppressed; they are also psychologically oppressed. 
Their psychological oppression is one of the greater limitations on 
their own liberation. Six aspects of this condition are: 
First, the oppressed have internalized "the image of the op-
pressor" as an ideal model of a human being. So, they feel an irresis-
tible attraction towards the lifestyle of the oppressors. 
Second, with the image of the oppressor in the oppressed's 
consciousness, the oppressed become a people in contradiction. On the 
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one hand they are oppressed and desire to be free from their oppression; 
but, on the other hand, they want to resemble the oppressors, to imi-
tate them, and to follow them. So they internalize the contradiction of 
the social structures. 
Third, they are alienated from their own social reality; i.e., 
they are strangers to their social system which originates their op-
pression. They interpret their oppression not as a consequence of a 
violent system or as the exploitation, disdain, and domination of the 
oppressors but as a result of "the will of God" or the power of 
destiny. So, they assume a docile attitude when they face their de-, 
pendence, domination, disdain, and exploitation. They cannot perceive 
the "organized disorder" which is called "order" and is imposed by the 
oppressors for what it is. 
~ourth, they put too low a value on themselves. Oppressed 
people internalize the opinion of the oppressors. The oppressed feel 
they know nothing, are unfit, are incapable of learning anything, are 
unproductive and lazy. They feel their role is to be listeners because 
they are ignorant. In other words, they lack confidence in themselves 
and feel incapable of resisting their oppressors. So, they are reluc-
tant to struggle. 
Fifth, they feel that the oppressor is invulnerable. They 
accept their exploitation with fatalism because they feel disheartened, 
fearful, and beaten. So, they submit in a passive manner even though 
they wish to affirm and liberate themselves. 
Sixth, they feel like "things" owned by the oppressors. If the 
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oppressors feel that to be is to have, the oppressed people feel them-
selves that to be is to be had, to be is to be under the oppressor, to 
be is to be in dependence. 
These characteristics lead to a necrophilic behavior, to one's 
own destruction. Oppressed people cannot live as humans if one or 
more of these conditions are met: they have internalized the image of 
the oppressors; they live "schizophrenic" lives --divided feelings--; 
they are alienated, self-depreciating, disheartened, fearful, and 
beaten; or they feel owned by someone else. Thus, the social contradic-
tion cannot be overcome until the moment when the oppressed people over-
come the psychological contradictions.· When'"does this moment occur? 
The oppressed overcome these contradictions when: 
First, the oppressed people discover the image of the oppressor 
inside of their own consciousness and they tlrscover the real oppressor 
outside of themselves. 
Second, they discover their own contradiction as a simple re-
flection of the social contradiction and they recognize the real con-
tradiction outside of them. 
Third, they identify the contradiction oppressor-oppressed as 
the first principle and the cause of their exploitation, disdain, and 
domination, a contradiction which exists really in the structure of 
the society. 
Fourth, they wake up from self-depreciation and discover that 
they are capable of resisting oppressors, that they can organize the 
struggle of their own liberation, and that they can be free. 
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Fifth, they believe that the power of the oppressor is vulner-
able and that it is possible to be destroyed; they recognize that their 
exploitation is not a divine mandate. 
Sixth, they discover themselves as human beings who are like 
any other human being; they feel free of psychological oppression; and 
they recover their self-confidence. 
Thus, the real overcoming begins with the discovering --at a 
psychological level-- of the interiorization of the image of the op-
pressor in the consciousness of the oppressed, the reflection of the 
social contradiction inside of the oppressed, and the identification 
of the real causes in the social structure. If the oppressed people 
discover this reality, the hope of change of their own situation is 
born, and self-depreciation ceases. 
However, the principle which begets oppression must be super-
seded. This is the only way to overcome the contradiction. The 
principle of the two poles as a framework of reference must be replaced 
by a new point of reference: the search of a human principle for a new 
society. This new principle is the new concept of the human being as 
itself. That is the challenge of both the oppressors and the op-
pressed. 
In summary, the contradiction oppressor-oppressed maintains a 
situation of violence through all aspects of life: the exploitation of 
the oppressed to satisfy the tendencies of the oppressors to have more; 
the disdaining of the oppressed as lazy, incompetent, envious, ungrate-
ful, and hostile; the domination of the oppressed as an object; the vi-
143 
olation of the most elemental human rights, and the denial of the onto-
logical vocation of the oppressed, i.e., to be always human beings. In 
the context of this violent contradiction, hatred and violence always 
are generated by the oppressors. They use extreme measures such as 
imposing despotism, repression, and terror whenever they consider them 
necessary. 
The oppressed, despairing in their oppression and repression, 
react against the oppressors with rebellion and violence. With a high 
level of urgency, they employ violence to gain humanization and free-
dom. In spite of the fact that the oppressors never will be able to 
liberate the oppressed, some oppressors, knowing what the struggle is 
about, do join with the oppressed. However, these oppressors have many 
prejudices and much distrust. The real overcoming of the contradiction 
comes from the struggle initiated by the oppressed. However, the op-
prPPeed could be deflected into prompting a reversal of roles. Such 
inversion only strengthens and supports the contradictory system. 
The real challenge of the oppressors is not to have at the 
cost of the exploitation of others; it is not to consider a few people 
better and the others lower to the point of contempt, underestimation, 
and hate. The real challenge of the oppressors is to be human, the 
ontological vocation of all human beings; it is to recognize others as 
fully equal human beings; it is to be human "with" other human beings 
in the struggle for a continuing humanization; it is to be free "with" 
all human beings who also have to be free. 
The real challenge to the oppressed is not to improve one's 
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own status in the system of social stratification while others are 
left behind, suffering the consequences of the progress of the few; 
it is not to be the only ones free by violating the elementary rights 
of others, oppressing and repressing them; it is not to adapt the 
individualistic and egoistic ideal of the oppressors. The real chal-
lenge of the oppressed is to be human, to liberate themselves, and in 
the process of this liberation, to liberate the oppressors. If it is 
true that liberation comes from the struggle initiated by the op-
pressed; the purpose is not to be another oppressor which will simply 
invert the terms. The struggle of the oppressed is only the starting 
point in pursuing the real challenge of all humanity; i.e., to be fully 
human. The real overcoming of the contradictions eliminates the two 
poles of oppressors and oppressed and invokes the new concept of the 
truly human. 
Therefore, the principle of new men and new women --not those 
of either the oppressors or the oppressed-- will provide the basis for 
the overcoming of the contradiction. The new principle means a kind 
of ndenying oneself" as the Bible says (Mark 8:34). Freire calls this 
denying the "Easter" of everyone: the death and resurrection of op-
27 
pressors and oppressed. The oppressors must do two things: refuse to 
oppress others and commit themselves to the struggle of the oppressed. 
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Paulo Freire, "Education, Liberation and the Church," Study 
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Salaam, Tanzania (September 15, 1971):3. 
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Otherwise, they will be under attack by the oppressed when they rebel. 
The oppressed must refuse to be "hosts" of the image of the oppressor. 
Otherwise nothing will change. Freire says: 
Only the oppressed can liberate their oppressors. But if they 
themselves become an oppressing class, they will never liberate 
either themselves or anyone else. They have to struggle in such 
a way as to resolve the contradiction they are caught in; and it 
can be resolved only with the appearance of a "new man," neither 
oppressor nor oppressed, but a man in the process of being lib-
erated.28 
The first principles of Freire's philosophy are, basically, 
three: the present social reality with its contradictory two poles: the 
oppressor and the oppressed; the dialectical method of praxis to over-
come such a contradiction; and the overcoming of the contradiction in 
response to an anthropological imperative to create a new man, a new 
woman, and a new society. 
The first principle is his terminus a quo which arises from his 
understanding of his social reality, the everyday experience. This con-
tradiction which maintains the power of the oppressor and the weakness 
of the oppressed is the structure of the social organization in Brazil 
as well as in the rest of Latin America. 
The second principle is the way in which this contradiction is 
overcome. The two poles of contradiction exist in a dialectical rela-
tionship creating consequences such as subjectivism and objectivism. 
Praxis is the dialectical method which will break down and overcome this 
contradiction. Praxis --action and reflection-- not only explains re-
28 
Paulo Freire, "A Key Idea of Paulo Freire: Oppression," LADOC 
(September-October, 1975): 17. 
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ability but transforms it. 
The third principle is the overcoming of the contradiction. The 
contradictory social reality maintains a situation in which the violence 
of the oppressor who is against the oppressed denies the ontological vo-
cation of the oppressed, i.e., to be fully human. The system of vio-
lence generates in the oppressed the act of rebellion. This rebellion 
is a violence arising out of the desperation which the oppressed feel. 
They want to overcome the contradiction and to create a new society. 
The contradiction of the social structure is reflected in the conscious-
ness of the oppressed people. This reflected "image" I:'Olll(Lmake them 
passive or could distort their struggle. The overcoming of the contra-
diction begins when the oppressed people discover their own distortions, 
identify real causes outside of themselves in the social structure, and 
understand the main objective of their struggle as the change of such 
a structure. The challenge is to reject the contradiction oppressor-
oppressed, to reject the human ideals of that system, and to replace 
them by a new principle, the concept of the new human being. This new 
principle is the kind of human who is capable of struggling for freedom 
and who is able to create a new society. 
The social contradiction is the terminus a quo of the Freire's 
philosophy of praxis and the overcoming of such contradiction in his 
terminus ad quem of such philosophy. The dialectical way between them 
is praxis, the via ad to overcome the contradiction. 
3, THE_ ANTHROJ?OLOGY 
As I have said, whatever the explanation of the world, of the 
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social world in the case of Freire, it has implicit anthropological prin-
ciples which explain its world-view. Freire's anthropology begins when 
the fundamental questions arise, the terminus a quo of his anthropology. 
At this point, Freire's anthropology becomes the keystone of his 
philosophy as a whole and especially of his philosophy of education. 
The first philosophical principles of Freire generate a re-
conceptualization of the human being in the context of a society which 
Freire considers in transition. This reconceptualization is the via ad 
of Freire's anthropology. 
Freire will put the political freedom of humans as the summit of 
his anthropology. Freedom will be the terminus ad quem of Freire's 
anthropology as well as of his philosophy as a whole. 
a) Anthropology as a Keystone 
Freire discusses his world-view based on his experiences in 
Brazil and later on his experiences in other parts of the world. In 
his view human beings are central. Freire discusses broadly the basic 
anthropological question: What is man? Beyond the conception of society, 
there is a conception of man, his special place in the cosmos --in 
relation to the world of things and other human beings-- and his exis-
tence as a being who knows and acts upon the world. Consequently, the 
principal questions are: Who is man? Where is he? What shall he 
do? These questions suggest the three basic points in Freire's an-
thropology. 
The first question asks for a new conceptualization of what 
it is to be human. The question is related to men and women who in 
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the closed society are unhappy, in the transitional society are in the 
process of liberation, or in the open society are free. First of all, 
the first question permits Freire to posit the human being as a prob-
lem, an act of "being at a distance," in order to.visualize what is 
the nature of the human being. In the second place, the first question 
permits Freire to reconceptualize the human being as a "located and 
29 
dated" human, as Gabriel Marcel says. Freire says that "once again 
we have to go back ••• not ••• to an abstract human, but to the concrete 
30 
one, who exists in a concrete situation." Freire is interested in 
the clear understanding of what it is to be a man or a woman, in the 
radical sense of the human condition. In the third place, the first 
question permits Freire to avoid a simple intellectual curiosity and to 
create an anthropology motivated by the need of action in the world. 
The second question asks: What is the place in which human beings 
are presently located? Given Freire's understanding of the social 
structure in Brazil and the rest of the Latin American countries, the 
question is related to the man who has the capacity to relate "with" his 
own world and to humanize himself in the relationship. This relationship 
takes place in the context of a society in transition between the closed 
and open society. In other words, the "situation" in which humans are 
29 
"situado y fechado." Paulo Freire, "La Concepcidn 'Bancaria' 
de la Ensenanza.'' Boledn HOAC 588/589 (marzo 1972}: 13. 
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Paulo Freire, Cambia, p. 42. 
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located is a contradictory reality. The social reality provides 
tnhuman conditions as well as opportunities of humanization. So, the 
answer to the question about the place of humans in the cosmos is 
an: 
Answer which considers the problem of economic development and of 
the participation of the people in this development, and of the 
critical insertion ••• in the process of "fundamental democrati-
zation" which used to characterize us [when we were in Brazil]. 
An answer which ought not to neglect the signs of our lack of 
inexperience in the ways of democracy, our historical-cultural 
roots which are in contradiction with the new position which that 
process of change demands pf the Brazilian.31 
The third question asks for the transformation of the world by 
the "new" human being. The question is related to the man who has the 
capacity to know his world and who is able to change it. This question 
is related to the bringing into existence of the fully human person. 
Freire says: 
Throughout history men have attempted to overcome the factors 
which make them accommodate or adjust, in a struggle --constantly 
threatened by oppression-- to attain their full humanity.32 
b) Anthropology as Reconceptualization 
The social contradiction has in its roots a deformed conception 
of the human being; it is an anthropological contradiction. Freire 
31 
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ci6n cr:!tica ••• en el proceso de "democratizacion fundamental" que nos 
caracterizaba. Que no descuidase los signos de nuestra inexperiencia 
democratica, de ra:!ces historico-culturales en contradiccion con la nue-
va posicion que el proceso exige del hombre brasileno". Paulo Freire, 
La Educacion como Practica de la Libertad, p. 99. 
32 
Paulo Freire, Education for Critical Consciousness, p. 5. 
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seeks to reconceptualize the human being. Therefore, he responds to 
the above questions by giving the anthropological bases of his entire 
philosophical system which I want to summarize: 
In the first question --Who is man?-- Freire reconceptualizes 
man on the basis of his personal history, the terminus a quo of his 
anthropological reconceptualization. The Differencia Specifica of 
33 
the human being 
34 
is to be "with" in addition to being "in" the 
world. To be "with" means to have relationships and not simple 
contacts; to face challenges and not mere stimuli, to have responses 
and not reactions; to be. rational and not mechanical; and to be crit-
ical and not naive. To have a "semi-intransitive," fanatical, naive, 
mythical, or irrational consciousness is to be dehumanized. To be hu-
man is to be temporal but also transcendent. A human being is temporal 
because he is inserted within history. He is transcendent because he 
overcomes his ontological limitations. These limitations put in danger 
the humanness of human existence; they reduce the human alternatives 
to only two: to be or not to be. To be human is to have the capacity 
to objectify, to act, and to change the world. To be human is to change 
oneself because one always is in the process of completing and human-
izing oneself. 
33 
Charles Isaacs, "The Praxis of Paulo Freire: a Critical 
Interpretation." Critical Anthropology II, 2 (Spring, 1972): 113. 
34 
Cf. Paulo Freire, Education for Critical Consciousness, p .• 3. 
Also Paulo Freire "La Concepcion Bancaria de la Ensenanza." Boletfn 
~. 588/589 (Marzo 1972): 13, 14. Also Paulo Freire, Cultural Action 
for Freedom, pp. 27-32. 
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To be human is to be historical, with an inheritance of the past, a 
perception of the present, and a project for the future. That is the 
Differentia Specifica of humans distinguishing them from animals. 
Paulo Freire says: 
Animals, submerged within reality, cannot relate to it; they are 
creatures of mere contacts. But man's separateness from and 
openness to the world distinguishes him as a being of relation-
ship. Men, unlike animals, are not only in the world but with 
the world.35 
In the second question --Where is man?-- Freire points out what 
the situation of humans is in the world. To be "in" the world, of course, 
means to be under the permanent and powerful impact of the physical, 
cultural, and social forces of the world. In this sense, humans as well 
36 
as animals are "in" the world. The difference is that animals are 
only "in" the world while humans are "in" the world and go beyond being 
"in" it by being "with" it. To be "with" the world means not only to be 
immersed "in" the world but to emerge and acquire distance from the world 
in order to relate "with" it. To be "with" the world means to detach 
oneself from the world, to objectify, analyze, and change it. The human 
being is a subject, not an object. Humans put at their disposal all the 
resources of their world, adapt their world to their needs, and produce 
35 
Paulo Freire, Education for Critical Consciousness, p. 3. 
36 
Animals are simply "in" the world, subject to physical condi-
tions (e.g., temperature), to cultural conditions imposed by humans 
(e.g., domestication), and to social conditions (e.g., living conditions 
that correspond to the social class of the owner). Humans are likewise 
subject to the same forces of the world, yet they go beyond mere adapta-
tion to those conditions. 
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new things. Through their reflection --which is their objectivization 
of their world-- and their action upon their world they create new 
things and new conditions, they create culture and make history, they 
humanize their world. To be a subject is to be integrated with but not 
adapted to the world. To be integrated is to have a dialectical rela-
tionship with the world in which the subject and the object are modi-
fied. To be integrated means to be located in the world through praxis. 
Integration is the process of making a provisional home in a world 
which is always changing. Freire says: 
Man becomes a subject through reflection on his situation, on 
his concrete environment. At that moment the more he reflects 
on his reality, on his concrete situation, the more he "emerges" 
fully conscious, committed, and ready to intervene in his real-
ity in order to change it. 
If the ontological vocation of a human being is to be a subject 
and not an object, such a vocation cannot be fulfilled except in 
the measure in which one ••• reflecting on the limitations of 
space and time in which he finds himself submerges himself 
within them, and measures them critically.37 
In response to the third question --What shall man do?-- Freire 
points out the dynamic transformation of the human's own reality. The 
nature of humans is to know their own reality by perceiving phenomena 
and their causal links. However, the human mind always can while 
37 
"El hombre llega a ser sujeto mediante una reflexion sobre su 
situaci6n, sobre su ambiente concreto. Mientras mas reflexiona sobre 
la realidad, sobre su situacion concreta, mas "emerge", plenamente 
consciente, comprometido, dispuesto a intervenir respecto a la realidad 
para cambiarla." 
"Si la vocacion ontologica del hombre es la de ser sujeto y no 
objecto esta no puede realizarse sino en la medida en que .•• , reflexio-
nando sobre las condiciones espacio-temporales, uno se sumerge en ellas 
Y las mide con esp1ritu cr{tico". Paulo Freire, El Mensaje de Paulo 
Freire, Teor1a y Practica de la Liberaci6n (Madrid: Editori~l Marsiega, 
1976), pp. 48, 49. 
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perceiving some things, ignore others; knowledge is never absolute. 
Knowledge has a close relationship with action in two ways. First, peo-
ple grasp a challenge and try to understand its factors and causal link~ 
in order to act. Second, their action not only transforms the world 
but provides the primary sources of knowing. Freire says: 
We know when we transform. It is a fact in the history of 
consciousness that in the process of evaluation theory never 
precedes praxis. Marx was and is absolutely right. First of 
all I have to transform. Secondly, I can theorize my actions 
--but not before ..• All my books are mere reports of what 
I did. I never wrote a book before praxis. I was saying 
earlier that I cannot write letters discussing, for example, 
the sex of angels. I am not interested in the sex of angels, 
I am interested in knowing my reality with the people.38 
Human knowledge and human action are obstructed by a "semi-
intransitive consciousness" which grasps facts but not causal links, by 
a "naive-transitive consciousness" which grasps facts and causal links 
but considers links as static; and by a "fanatical consciousness" which 
grasps only the knowledge of others who manipulate people. "Critical 
consciousness" is the only one which grasps facts and causal links as 
they exist. 
c) Freedom as the Highest Anthropological Realization. 
Three conceptual nuclei support the practical implications of 
Freire's anthropology: the historical, cultural, and political. These 
interrelated nuclei could be the three levels of the anthropological 
explanation of Freire in which the political level is the highest 
~ealization of the human being. The political nucleus corresponds to 
38 
Paulo Freire, "By Learning They Can Teach." p. 2. 
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the tenninus ad quem of Freire's anthropology. 
In the first place, the historical nucleus incorporates two 
39 
principles: man as praxis and man as subject; both are related by 
40 
the conception of man as historical being. To be human is to be 
historical. "There is no man in the void," Freire says. Each man and 
woman is situated "in" space and time. "Men live, and their lives 
41 
are historical," he says; the "here" and "now" is not only the 
physical space-time but the historical one. Humans live "in" a precise 
place and epoch. Each of them is "in" a specific social and cultural 
context. Freire says: 
When I speak about men and women I am referring to historically 
situated human beings, not to abstract ideas. I am referring to 
people whose consciousness is intimately linked to their real 
social lives. 42 
So, to be human "in" the world is to grasp one's own reality, to under-
tand it, and to transform it. Humans are beings of praxis. Freire 
says: 
Furthermore: man is praxis and because he is so he cannot be 
reduced to a mere spectator of reality nor to a mere accident 
of the directive action of other men who transform him into a 
"thing". His ont-ological vocation, which he must fulfil, is 
39 
Cf. Paulo Freire, El Mensaje de Paulo Freire, pp. 47-52. 
40 
The concept of history here is used to refer to the succession 
of events through which pass human beings and everything else. 
41 
Paulo Freire, "Cultural Liberty in Latin America, 11 p. 4. 
42 
Paulo Freire, 11Are Adult Literacy Programmes Neutral?" 
Persepolis, September 1975, p. 5. (Mimeographed.) 
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to be a subject who operates upon and transforms the world. 
To be human is also to be a subject and not an object of history, to be 
"with" and not only "in" the world. Humans "are not only capable of 
having their own activity, but of being conscious of themselves and of 
44 
the world in which they live." To be a subject is to be "a conscious 
45 
being." The human being acquires consciousness of himself, an idea 
which reminds us of Hegel, consciousness of "the other," which could 
be the physical, social, or cultural other, and consciousness of his 
46 
own transforming action upon the world. 
So, man as praxis and as subject are the two principles closely 
united in the historical reality of man. They are the factors which 
make human beings unique in the world. 
In the second place, the cultural nucleus incorporates the two 
43 
"Mas aun: el hombre es praxis y porque as{ es no puede redu-
cirse a mero espectador de la realidad ni tampoco a mera incidencia de 
la accion conductora de otros hombres que lo transformara'n en "cosa" 
Su vocacion ontologica, que el debe existenciar, es la de sujeto que 
opera y transforma el mundo." Paulo Freire, "La Concepcion 'Bancaria' 
de la Educacion y la Deshumanizaci6n. La Concepcion Problematizadora 
de la Educaci6n y la Humanizacion." Cristianismo y Sociedad, Suplemen-
to (Setiembre 1968): 18 • 
44 
Paulo Freire, "Cultural Literacy in Latin America." ICS News 
VII, No. 1. (January-February 1979): 4. 
45 
Paulo Freire, Cultural Action for Freedom, p. 27. 
46 
Cf. Carlos Alberto Torres Novoa, La Praxis Educativa de Paulo 
Freire. (Mexico: Ediciones Gernika, 1977), pp. 59-61. 
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47 
fields of history and education. Culture arises as an effect of the 
kinds of men who are conscious of themselves, who are praxis and who are 
subjects in relation to "the other." In addition to being conscious, a 
subject is a dynamic agent of transformation, which involves decision 
making, action, creation and re-creation, in one word, work. With the 
human response, humans add something which is specifically human, i.e., 
culture. 
Culture is --in opposition to nature, which is not the creation 
of man-- the contribution which man makes to nature. Culture is 
the grand sum of human activity, of the creative and re-creative 
effort of man, of his work to transform and to establish relations 
to other men. Culture is also the systematic acquisition of human 
experience, but a critical and creative acquisition and not a 
juxtaposition of information stored in the intelligence or in the 
memory, and separated from the total being and from the full life 
of man.48 
The human praxis. transforms and creates things like goods and 
objects, social institutions and politics, philosophy and ideologies, 
science and technology, art and religion •... All of these creations as well 
as other actions of humans not only create culture but also history. 
47 
The concept of history here is used to refer to the explanation 
and interpretation of historical events. Cf. Paulo Freire, El Mensaje de 
Paulo Freire, pp. 52-56. 
48 
"Cultura -por oposici6n a la naturaleza, que no es creacion del 
hombre- es la aportacion que el hombre hace a la naturaleza. Cultura es 
todo el resultado de la actividad humana, del esfuerzo creador y recrea-
dor del hombre, de su trabajo por transformar y establecer relaciones 
con los otros hombres. La cultura es tambien la adquisici6n sistematica 
de la experiencia humana, pero una adquisicion cr1tica y creadora, y no 
una yuxtaposici6n de informaciones almacenadas en la inteligencia o en 
la memoria y no "incorporadas" en el ser total y en la vida plena del 
hombre". Ibid., p. 53. 
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Freire says: 
Through his ongoing task of transforming objective reality, man 
simultaneously creates history and becomes a historical-social 
being. He appears as a subject of history which turning upon 
him, marks him. Unlike the animal, man can tridimensionalize 
time in past-present-future which, however, are not unrelated 
compartments of time. Human history, by reason of these very 
creations, develops in a permanent flux in which its "epochal" 
unities become concretized.49 
In the measure humans create and re-create, historical epochs 
are formed and re-formed. History is made when humans identify "epochal 
themes," recognize their obstacles, and fulfill the tasks that history 
imposes on them. History is made when humans propose new aspirations, 
new concerns, and new values; when they formulate new "epochal themes." 
History is the effect of human responses given to nature, to other 
·people, and to social structures. History is the consequence of the 
intention to be more and always more human. Freire is thinking of the 
history of all people, not of the history of an elite, the army, or the 
governments. 
If a human being wants to be situated in space and time, if he 
wants to be a subject, with the capacity to transform his world, to 
create culture, and to make history, he has to be educated with this 
purpose in mind. This education must be for freedom, never for adapta-
49 
"A traves de su permanente quehacer transformador de la reali-
dad objetiva, el hombre, simultaneamente crea la historia y se hace un 
ser hist6rico-social. Aparece como sujeto de la historia que, volvien-
dose sobre el, lo marca. Porque, al contrario del animal, el hombre 
puede tridimensionalizar el tiempo pasado-presente-futuro que, sin em-
bargo, no son departamentos estancos, su historia, en funcion de sus 
mismas creaciones, se va desarrollando en permanente devenir, en que se 
concretizan sus unidades "epocales". Paulo Freire, "A Proposito del 
Tema Generador y del Universo Tematico." Cristianismo y Sociedad, Su-
plemento (Setiembre 1968): 58. 
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tion, domestication, or oppression. This goal suggests a deep even a to-
tal reviewing of the traditional systems of education, their programs 
and methods. Freire's anthropology forms and informs this pedagogical 
reasoning and gives the foundations for educative action. 
But why education and no other aspect of culture? Freire be-
lieves that human being relates to the world through education from his 
early years; he believes that humans always conceptualize their world, 
find their place in the world, and control the world through education. 
Our next chapter (Chapter IV) will analyze Freire's concept of education. 
The political conceptual nucleus is the third anthropological 
reconceptualization, the terminus ad quem, of his anthropology and his 
philosophy as a whole. Freire's anthropology is a political one which 
generates a political education and a political freedom. 
In the first place, Freire's anthropology proposes a political 
commitment which requires human to have, at least, the following char-
acteristics: 1. Either to be in a project of life as subjects or to be 
converted to objects of this project. 2. To be located in the midst of 
history which can humanize or dehumanize, liberate or oppress. 3. 
Either to be in the midst of the "epochal themes" which humans can grasp 
and use to solve their problems or to be on the periphery, in the margin 
of history. 4. Either to have a critical attitude or assume an ingen-
nuous, magical, mythical, and semi-intransitive consciousness. 5. 
Either to assume a praxiological attitude or to be merely activist or to 
be merely idealist. 6. To transform the world which is to discover the 
real world which is to discover the real possibilities of human nature or 
to surrender under the human limitations. 7. To be in relationship with 
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the other which will provide dialogue and communication or to be alone 
50 
in an individualistic way. These alternatives are political. But 
what does "politics" mean? Carlos Torres, explaining Freire, says: 
Politics, the rational direction of human action, is the encoun-
ter par excellence of the individual and collective expectations. 
In politics all efforts to support or transform reality effectively 
are synthesized. Only politics is the "art of the possible."51 
Education is the "place" in which humans relate directly to the 
world, the place in which they reflect and find their vocation as sub-
jects. However, education also has a political commitment: education 
cannot be neutral or aseptic. Freire says: 
It is impossible for me to ask you to think about neutral education, 
neutral methodology, neutral science or even a neutral God. I 
always say that every neutrality contains a hidden choice. It is 
impossible for neutrality to exist in the human praxis. Because of 
this we have education in the human praxis. Because of this we have 
education that is for domestication or domination as well as educa-
tion for liberation. So, I cannot use the same methods and tech-
niques which are used to dominate if my choice is to liberate.52 
Education assumes all the human limitations, which means all 
alienations, and assumes all human potentialities, which means all pas-
sible projects. To accept the human being as a project is to be in 
50 
Cf. Carlos Alberto Torres Novoa, La Praxis de Paulo Freire, 
pp. 63-70. 
51 
"La pol:ltica; la direccion racional de la accion humana, es 
el encuentro par excelencia de las espectativas individuales y las es-
pectativas colectivas, en ella se sintetizan todos los esfuerzos de 
sosten o transformacion efectiva de la realidad, solo ella es el 'arte 
de lo posible' ." Ibid., p. 61. 
52 
Paula Freire, "By Learning They Can Teach," p. 1. 
160 
"the rational direction of human action," and expectations, i.e., the po-
litical strength which gives to all humans their future and their destiny. 
Fausto Franco says: "The educational vision which Freire discovers impels 
us to recognize that it is necessary to take a decisive step: the task is 
53 
to 'construct man' continuously." 
Freedom is constructed in the context of human limitations and 
human potentialities. Freedom is not a gift; it is a task to be ful-
filled. When humans reflect on their limitations, they act upon them to 
transform those limitations; when humans transform them through their 
action, they acquire more lucid reflection and thus are able to act more 
lucidly in the future. In each action humans are open to new reflection; 
and in each reflection humans are open to new action. The dialectical 
relationship between action and reflection --which is praxis-- makes 
humans the subjects of their history. Praxis is the anthropological 
foundation of the political project of all human beings. 
54 
Freedom is created through praxis, which is the human exercise 
of being the subject of the political project. It is a political freedom 
because it is the goal of all human beings collectively as well as of 
them personally, because all humans are subjects of history and culture, 
because the actualization of human vocation to be subjects and free 
53 
"La vision educativa que Freire descubre nos empuja a recono-
cer que hace falta dar un paso decisive: se trata de 'construir al hom-
bre' continuamente." Fausto Franco, El Hombre: Construccion Progresi-
~, La Tarea Educativa de Paulo Freire, fn. 1, p. 147. 
54 
ciety. 
Freire frequently uses this sentence to refer to a free so-
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coincides with the individual and collective expectations, concerns, and 
values to create a humane and rational project. Our fifth chapter will 
discuss broadly Freire's concept of freedom. 
Here is a brief summary of the last section. The reconceptuali-
zation of the human being can have three conceptual nuclei: 1. The 
historical nucleus which incorporates two principles: the human as 
subject and as praxis; 2. The cultural nucleus which incorporates two 
areas of knowledge: history and education; 3. Political freedom as the 
major aspiration, concern, and value of all people, the anthropologi-
cal and philosophical terminus ad quem of Freire. 
As we have seen there are close relationships between the 
Brazilian experience of Freire and his criteria by which he differenti-
ates societies, between his understanding of society and his philosoph-
ical thought, and between his philosophical thought and his conception 
of human being. 
Here is a brief summary of the entire chapter. The world-view 
(Weltanschauung) is the social universe, the order of human relations 
and the terminus a quo of the Freire's thought. There are three kinds 
of societies which are the principal columns of the social structure: 
the closed society --the terminus a quo of Freire's social theory-- which 
in Brazil was in decline; the transitional society --the via ad of 
Freire's social theory-- which moved from the closed to the open society; 
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and the open society --the terminus a quem of Freire's social theory--
which in Brazil was emerging but which was defeated. 
The closed society reigned during the "reflected," slavocratic, 
and antidemocratic centuries of the Brazilian colony. Economy, commerce, 
and social organization were defined by the center (Portugal) and were 
creating a "series" of aspirations, concerns, and values in the periph-
ery (Brazil). These series were based on social contradictions which 
could be identified in many ways such as dominator-dominated, land-
owners- peasants, masters-slaves, rich-poor, Europeans-Africans, bour-
geqisie-natives, subjects-objects, oppressors-oppressed. The dominant 
clas~.~s used an elite to maintain this contradictory system, even at 
the spst of a rigid, authoritarian, and repressive regime. These series 
of aspirations, concerns, and values were expressed by "epochal themes" 
which also had their "obstacles" to be removed and their "tasks" to be 
fulfilled. Ordinary people could not grasp such series, epochal themes, 
obstacles, and tasks; they were living at a level of a "semi-intransi-
tive consciousness" which was a vision limited to biological survival. 
The open society arises when new aspirations, new concerns, new 
values, new habits, and a new mentality arise. The open society begins 
when some sectors of the society --some intellectual groups in the case 
of Brazil-- integrate themselves in their own reality and refuse accom-
modation to the closed society. "Semi-intransitive," fanatic, and "na-
ive-transitive" consciousnesses are overcome, and critical conscious-
ness recognizes old "series" and "epochal themes," old obstacles and 
tasks, and their dangers and possibili-ties. Critical consciousness is 
rational and lucid, receptive and optimistic, dialogic and creative. 
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The open society is an order of critical consciousness, freedom, and 
equality. It is without contradictions. It is a transitional society 
~r excellence because it always looks for new series, epochal themes, 
obstacles, and tasks. The open society is an order of democracy, 
' . . 55 Freire s utop1an soc1ety. 
The transitional society was the Brazilian situation in which 
the original contradiction of the closed society was polarized. This 
polarization appeared when the closed and old society, which always 
looked for stability, co-existed with the open and new society, which 
always looked for change. Polarization existed when the closed society 
was supported by the oppressors and the open society was supported by 
the oppressed, when the closed society was about to collapse and the 
open society about to emerge. Then, there were two alternatives: to be 
"progresista" which means to be in favor of change in order to have an 
open society or to be reactionary which means to be against change and 
j,n favor of a closed society. "Progresistas" can be the subjects of 
history because they are "with" the oppressed, they are critical and 
radical, i.e., they take roots in their own reality and in their own 
option. Reactionaries think they are the only proprietors of history. 
They are sectarians and acritical; they depend on the reflections and 
interpretation of somebody else. The polarization produced a transition 
55 
I am using the term utopia as "the best conceivable order 
of social and political arrangements." Cf. Hartin A. Bertman, Research 
Quide in Philosophy (Morristown, New Jersey: General Learning Press, 
1974) p. 243. 
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with "flux" and "reflux," a transition from the closed to the open so-
ciety. 
Then, the Philosophy of Praxis --the via ad of the Freire's 
philosophical thought-- is at least the basic contradiction of the social 
reality which arises in the transitional society --the terminus a quo 
of Freire's Philosophy of Praxis--; the dialectical way to overcome 
such contradiction --the via ad of Freire's Philosophy of Praxis--; 
and the overcoming of the contradiction --the terminus ad quem of Freire's 
Philosophy of praxis. These are principles of Freire's philosophy which 
I have called Philosophy of Praxis. 
Freire's social reality rests on the contradiction oppressor-
oppressed. Oppressor-oppressed are two poles of the same contradiction 
which cannot exist one without the other. They are an antithesis one to 
the other, and they relate to each other in a dialectical way. The ec-
onomic contradiction determines the social contradiction in which upper 
classes always oppress, exploit, and rape and in which the lower classes 
always are oppressed, exploited, and raped. The socioeconomic contradic-
tions also determine the cultural and political contradictions. When 
the oppressors suspect the possibility of the open society, they react 
against the oppressed in a paternalistic way to domesticate them or with 
repression to stop them. When the oppressed discover they can change 
the social contradiction, they speak about their rights, they act to 
make some changes, and they try to participate in power. Technology, 
education, and all social institutions are used either in favor of the 
oppressor to maintain the power of the oppressor and to maintain the 
weakness of the oppressed or in favor of the oppressed to liberate them 
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and to create the new society. 
Praxis is the method to overcome the economic, social, cul-
tural and political contradictions. Praxis is reflection and action upon 
these realities in order to change them. Praxis is the dialectical rela-
tion between reflection and action which breaks all dehumanizing contra-
dictions and creates new things. Inauthentic praxis reflects without 
action (subjectivism) or acts without reflection {objectivism). Authen-
tic reflection always emerges from action upon reality, and authentic 
action always is illuminated by reflection. This dialectic not only 
explains reality but transforms it. It is not obi,ective or subjective 
but the relationship between them. For Freire, praxis overcomes the 
contradiction in a historical sense, his ethical foundation; it corre-
sponds to the nature of the human being, his anthropological foundation; 
and it is the method by which one comes to know the world, his episte-
mological foundation. Freire says: 
If men produce social reality {which in the "inversion of the 
J?J;axis" turns back upon them and conditions them), then trans-
forming that reality is an historical task, a task for men.56 
When the process of praxis begins, oppression increases. This 
growing of oppression shows violence to be an important part of the 
contradictory system. There is violence not only in the exercise of 
despotism, domestication, and discrimination against the oppressed. This 
violence also violates the most elemental rights of humans and denies 
the ontological vocation of all people, i.e., always to be human. The 
56 
Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, p. 36. 
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rebellion of the oppressed is a consequence of the violence generated by 
the oppressors. This rebellion is grounded in the necessity to be 
treated as humans and to create a more rational, just, and peaceful or-
der. The oppressors, who are the beneficiaries of the oppression, never 
will generate a struggle against themselves to humanize all people. 
Humanization can only come from the act of liberation of the oppressed. 
The historical overcoming of the contradiction will come through praxis. 
But such overcoming begins with the overcoming of the psycho-social 
obstacles in the oppressed, i·.e., the social contradiction and "the image 
of the oppressor" in the consciousness of the oppressed people, their 
blindness to their own alienation, their docility, self-depreciation, 
fanaticism, and dependence. The obstacles generate a necrophilic be-
havior and lead to the oppressed's own destruction. The overcoming of 
the social and psychological contradiction comes when the point of 
reference given by the two poles of contradiction are superseded by a 
new concept of the human being. 
The Anthropology of Freire's philosophy is the terminus ad quem 
of the Freire's philosophical thought. The basic anthropological 
questions are the keystone, the terminus a quo of Freire's anthropology. 
Freire reconceptualizes the human being, the via ad of Freire's anthro-
pology. He proposes freedom as the maximum goal, the terminus ad quem 
of Freire's anthropology and his philosophy as a whole. 
Freire discusses broadly the anthropological questions: Who is 
man? is the question about the concept of being human. Where is man? 
is the question about the place of the human being in the world. What 
shall man do? is the question of the human capacity to act. 
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The reconceptualization of human nature begins with the differ-
entiation between animals and human beings, the Differentia Specifica. 
Humans are "with" in addition to being "in" the world. To be "in" is 
to be under the permanent and powerful impact of the physical, cult-
tural, and social world. To be "with" is to be the subject, not the 
object, especially of man's cultural and social world. Such a position 
in the world makes humans know the world and give them the possibility 
of transforming it. Such knowiedge and transformation is possible only 
with a critical consciousness. 
There are three conceptual nuclei which support the practical 
implications of Freire's anthropology: first, the historical nucleus 
which considers man as a being in space and time, i.e., man as histori-
cal being. Man is the subject in his own world, i.e., he is conscious 
of himself and his world. He is praxis, i.e., he acts and reflects to 
transform his world. Second, the cultural nu~leus which considers the 
reconceptualization of the human being. That means that man, as a being 
of praxis, is a being of work and creation, i.e., he is a cultural 
being. He is not only a historical being but a being who makes history, 
i.e., man creates historical epochs. He can be educated for adaptation 
or for freedom. Third, the political nucleus which considers the his-
torical and cultural reconceptualization that puts human in a political 
commitment, i.e., to be oppressed or to be free. Education cannot be 
neutral, i.e., humans can be educated to be domesticated or to liberate 
themselves, to alienate themselves or to assume human limitations and 
potentialities. Freedom is a political construction, the most important 
task of a human being. 
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So, the philosophical thought of Paulo Freire has three "first 
universal principles." First, the social view of his world which, 
given his experience in Brazil, differentiates three kind of societies: 
the closed, transitional, and open society. Second, the anthropological 
contradiction of this social reality, the dialectical method to over-
come such contradiction, and the real overcoming of it. Third, the 
redefinition of human nature as the keystone of Freire's philosophy 
and the postulation of freedom as the major goal of his philosophy. 
These principles will determine Freire's philosophy of education which 
I will discuss in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER IV 
FREIRE'S PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 
Cada epoca, al crear su cultura, va dise-
ffando un tipo humano, una imagen especial 
del hombre. Esta imagen genera una teo-
ria de la educacion, y de cada teor{a 
educativa fluye un sistema pedagogico de-
rivado.1 Juan Mantovani 
The relevance of Freire for us is not the philosophy he con-
structs as a universal, rational, and unitive system but the relation-
ship he establishes between philosophy and educational practice. His 
philosophy of education is not a "verbalism" disconnected from concrete 
experience; nor is his educational experience an "activism" disconnected 
2 
from critical reflection. Freire's philosophy of education, as well 
as his philosophy as a whole, is a result of his dialectical relation~ 
ship. The subjects in his educational "laboratory" were illiterate peo-
ple such as the peasants of the state of Pernambuco in Brazil or the 
illiterate of Guinea-Bissau in Africa. 
Now, an educational practice is not valid if it does not have 
1 
"Each epoch, upon creating its culture, tries to bring about 
a type of human, a special image of man. This image generates a the-
ory of education, and from each educational theory flows a derived peda-
gogical system." Juan Mantovani, Educaci6n y Plenitud Humana (Buenos 
Aires: "El ATENEO" Editorial, 1968), p. 18. 
2 
Cf. Paulo Freire, "Sobre la Accion Cultural, La Practica del 
Metodo Psicosocial," Boledn HOAC, 584-585 (Enero, 1972): 28,29. 
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a clear philosophy of what it is to be human, the central subject of 
educational activity. The anthropological foundation is the education-
al terminus a quo of Freire's philosophy of education. 
If Freire needed --at the philosophical level-- to rethink the 
traditional conception of the human being, it is clear that he needed 
also to reconceptualize education, the via ad of his philosophy of ed-
ucation. The educational reconceptualization is made in the light of 
the educational practice which deals with a human being ever in process. 
If education functions as the maintainer of oppression, depend-
ence, and marginalization, then it obstructs freedom. If it works 
against these social situation, then it helps create freedom. The 
construction of a free human is the educational terminus ad quem of 
Freire's philosophy of education. 
1. THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS 
The anthropological foundations are the terminus a quo of 
Freire's philosophy of education as a whole which I want to discuss in 
three different steps. The so-called "culture of silence" which is 
the terminus a quo of Freire's anthropological foundations of educa-
tion; such culture is an anthropological contradiction. The educa-
tional dialectical method, his concept of conscientization, which is 
the via ad of Freire's anthropological foundations of education. The 
culture of freedom, which is the terminus ad quem of his anthropo-
logical foundations of education. 
a) The Cultural Contradiction 
Cultural oppression was characteristic of Brazil and the rest 
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of Latin American countries in colonial times (the closed society). 
"The prevailing kind of economic domination," Freire says, "deter-
mined a culture of domination which once internalized, meant the con-
3 
ditioning of submissive behavior." In Brazil, the only voice one 
could hear was the voice of the pulpit. Freire remembers a homily of 
Rev. Antonio Vieira who said, "The worst crisis faced by Brazil during 
4 
its illness was the silencing of its speech." The people of coloni-
al Brazil lived in a "culture of silence." 
From the gaining of independence in the last century until the 
present time, it has been common to say that Latin American countries 
have been in transition between underdevelopment and development • 
. Peo.ple who believe that this transition has been occurring use as exam-
ples Venezuela and Brazil. However, there is a misunderstanding in 
the conception of development and modernization. Freire says, "Al-
though development implies modernization, modernization is not, in 
5 
itself, development." If modernization is imported or developed in-
side an underdeveloped country without a global development of the 
entire country, methods and techniques are used to maintain the 
status quo and to control the order of domination. The only way to have 
3 
Paulo Freire, "Cultural Freedom in Latin America," in Human 
Rights and the Celebration of Man in the Americas, ed. Louis M. 
Colonnese (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1970), p. 171. 
4 
Ibid., 171. 
5 
Ibid., 172. 
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development is to break the structures of dependence. Freire says: 
Development is achieved only when the locus of decision for the 
transformations suffered by a being is found within and not 
outside of him. And this does not happen with dependent socie-
ties, which are alienated and, as such, are "object societies." 
When the sources of decision-making, including the political, 
economic, and cultural aspects, continues [si~ to be outside, 
in the metropolitan society upon which the common people depend, 
only a modernization process is achieved.6 
The con?itions of oppression, dependence, and marginalization 
have made possible a "culture of silence" which has survived the co-
lonial times and whose conditions are also the reasons that such cul-
ture survives today. Now, according to Freire, when we are living 
in a transitional society, cultural freedom will never take place if 
the basic contradiction is not eradicated. 
Isofar as they are "closed societies" predominantly dependent, 
going through a process of modernization but not of development, 
their power elite, separated from the masses and afraid of struc-
tural changes, does nothing but invade the value frame of the 
popular classes in order to impose its options and frustrate 
their action and under these circumstances it is not possible to 
speak about cultural freedom.7 
"Culture of silence" is understood only as part of a greater 
whole. There is a culture which determines the voice of the culture 
of silence. Culture of silence is not created in a laboratory nor by 
spontaneous generation. Freire, quoting Jose Luio Fiori, says: 
It is not the dominator who constructs a culture and imposes it on 
the dominated. This culture is the result of the structural rela-
6 
Ibid. 
7 
Ibid., p. 175. 
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tions between the dominated and the dominators." 
Again, we are confronted by the contradiction of oppressor-op-
pressed, the anthropological contradiction which generates a culture 
of the oppressor and a culture of the oppressed. Both pole oppose 
each other but each of them exists in function of the other. 
The culture of the oppressor has the following characteristics: 
1. It exists in the center, the "director society," and outside of the 
oppressed culture. 2. It is convinced of its infallibility and of the 
excellence of its thought and language. 3. It is certain that it will 
be followed by the dependent culture. 4. It thinks of itself as free 
and not alienated. 5. It prescribes and imposes its knowledge and 
language on the dependent culture. 
The culture of the oppressed has also the following characteris-
tics: 1. It exists in the periphery and outside of the oppressor cul-
ture. 2. The culture of the oppressor does not give existence to the 
culture of the oppressed; alongside of the culture of the oppressor but 
in a silent way. It is a "culture of silence" not because it is less 
a culture but because the oppressed culture has subjected it to si-
lence. 3. The culture of the oppressed is dependent on the culture of 
the oppressor. 4. Its thought and language are alienated: they do not 
correspond to their reality and are inauthentic. The reality in which 
the oppressed culture lives is an imagined one. Its thinking and words 
are expressing and reflecting the thought and language of the culture 
8 
Paulo Freire, Cultural Action for Freedom, pp. 32,33. 
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of the oppressor. 5. It is irresistibly attracted to the culture of 
the oppressor even if it is never heard by the oppressor. 
The man of the oppressed culture is the same as the oppressed 
of the closed societies. The oppressed person is nostalgic. He is 
never truly committed to the world and he always wants "to appear like 
the oppressor" rather than "to be" a human being. The oppressed cul-
ture is dehumanized. It is dependent and marginalized society. It is 
controlled by a regime imposed by an elite which is external to the 
local reality, whether they are regimes outside of a specific country 
or domestic regimes. Freire says: 
The dependent society is by definition a silent society. Its 
voice is not an authentic voice, but merely an echo of the 
voice of the metropolis --in every way, the metropolis speaks, 
the dependent society listens.9 
When the "culture of silence" emerges to break its submissive 
silence, elites react violently and repression occurs. If the op-
pressed think and speak by themselves, this is considered a crime. In 
these conditions, the contradictions are evident and the transitional 
times are at hand. 
Freire begins his philosophy of education in the midst of the 
"culture of silence," not as a member of the culture of the oppressor 
but as someone refusing to be an oppressor. His commitment is with 
the oppressed and his pedagogy is a "pedagogy of the oppressed." He 
says: 
9 
Paulo Freire, Cultural Action for Freedom, p. 34. 
175 
f\t a time in Brazil when the "culture of silence" was being 
exposed for what it is, I began, as a man of the Third World, 
to elaborate not a mechanical method for adult literacy 
learning, but an educational theory generated in the womb of 
the culture of silence itself --a theory which could become 
in practice not the voice of the culture, but one of the 
instruments of that still faltering voice.10 
''The pedagogy of the oppressed," Freire says, "must be forged with, not 
11 
for, the oppressed." 
A pedagogy made "for" the oppressed presupposes verticality in 
which at the top are the people who educate and at the bottom are the 
people who are educated, i.e., a contradictory relationship. Content, 
methods and objectives are designed by specialists or technicians, and 
all the process is managed by educators. If specialists, technicians, 
and educators are not committed "with" the oppressed, they choose a 
content which is imposed on the "ignorants," a method which "domesti-
cates" them, and objectives which are not their objectives. The two 
poles of the social contradiction are evident in this kind of educa-
tion. 
Specialists, technicians, and educators who are not committed 
to the oppressed are members of the cultural ghetto of the oppressors, 
and for this reason, members of the social "center." They come from 
the center to save the people who are in the "periphery." If they 
are not identified with the oppressed, they are with the oppressors, and 
10 
Ibid., p 4. 
11 
Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, p. 33. 
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they fulfill oppressive objectives. Educators "for" the oppressed 
transform students into "objects" just as the oppressors do in other 
areas because specialists, technicians, and educators are also op-
pressors. Agronomists, for instance, are oppressors and invaders when, 
without taking into account the human presence of peasants, they trans-
12 
fer techniques and knowledge from the center to the periphery. 
The crucial fact for Freire is that he has had his most 
important educational experiences among peasants and in a literacy 
project. Peasants are the peripheral past of the social structure, and 
the illiterate are the most oppressed people in all societies. A most 
"Restless Man" in the task of literacy, Frank C. Laubach, has de-
scribed what it means to be illiterate: 
The real tragedy is that they have no voice in public affairs, 
they never vote, they are never represented in any conference, 
they are the silent victims, the forgotten men, driven like 
animals, mutely submitting in every age before and since the 
pyramids were built. It is a human weakness not to become aware 
of suffering unless we hear a cry. The illiterate majority of 
the human race does not know how to make its cry reach us, and 
we never dream how this millions suffer.13 
As we have seen in the Second Chapter, Latin American countries, 
including Venezuela and Brazil, have had very high rates of illiteracy. 
Freire's practical education with the illiterates, who socially are at 
12 
Cf. Paulo Freire, Extension o Communicacion? La Concientiza-
cion en el Media Rural. (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI Argentina Editores, 
S.A./Tierra Nueva, 1973), pp. 17-24. 
13 
Frank c. Laubach, Forty Years With the Silent Billion, 
Adventuring in Literacy. (Old Tappan, New Jersey: Fleming H. Revell 
Company, 1970), p. 13. 
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the lower cultural point of emergence, was the terminus a quo of his 
philosophy of education. Illiterates are the "culture of silence" of 
the "culture of the oppressors". They have not had access to the 
center, and they have not even been permitted to create and re-create 
their own culture. 
b) Conscientization, the Dialectical Method 
The cultural contradiction exists as a consequence of a contra-
dictory society. However, social as well as cultural realities exist 
as a result of human creation. As I have said, neither social nor 
cultural realities exist by chance. They do not have a natural and 
deterministic origin. Praxis is the way of creation, a point fully 
discussed in the Third Chapter of this work. But what is the cultural 
method to deal with an anthropological contradiction? The discussion 
of man becomes crucial. 
Freire begins his discussion of the human being by differenti-
ating him from animals while trying to clarify the uniqueness of human 
nature. Animals live "in" the world and humans exist "in" and "with" 
the world. To be "in" involves contacts and to be "with" involves 
relationships; to be "in" means to knock without connnunications and to 
be "with" means to be "open". This exclusive characteristic I have 
called Differentia Specifica. 
However, to be "with" is not the negation of to be "in". Of 
course, to be human is to be "in" the world just as animals are in 
the world. To be human is to be indissolubly connected to the world, 
environment, and context. It is to be connected to one's biological 
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inheritance. Humans need to find their food such as nature offers, 
just as other beings need to. Human beings have to find shelter from 
the storms, protection from the extreme cold or extreme heat, and 
special treatment for illness. To be human is to be under the power-
ful forces of the physical world. 
What Freire says is that humans, in addition to being "in" the 
world, are "with" the world. To be "with" is that which differentiates 
human beings from other living beings in the world. Human have a plu-
rality of relations motivated by a variety of challenges unlike animals 
which face only stimuli. Challenges do not permit pre-established 
rPsponses even if people face only one and the same challenge. Chal-
lenges always demand rational organization to bring the best response. 
In addition, humans test their response, change their answers if nee-
essary, and act according to their own judgment. Animals "react" to 
stimuli and are satisfied with simple reaction patterns. In other 
words, humans are rational (Homo Sapiens) and animals are "reactive." 
Humans respond reflectively to challenges perceived, and animals react 
reflexively and automatically to stimuli. 
To reflect upon the world means "to gain objective distance 
from it" and to take reality as object. Humans can sever their ad-
herence to the natural world and transcend it through their reflec-
tion. To reflect is to objectivize human existence "in" the world and 
one's own reflection. As Charles Isaacs says: 
"Not only can I reflect on the world but I can reflect on roy 
reflections. I can use reasoning in roy reasoning. I am 
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consciousness, and I know that I know." 
This capacity, without which humans cannot operate intellectu-
ally, enables humans to be temporal and, at the same time, transcendent. 
Humans have consciousness of yesterday, today, and tomorrow; 
they are immersed in history. They inherit from the past, incorporate 
from the present, and modify the future. With their action humans are 
"in" time and emerge from it. Humans emerge from time because they are 
"with" time, inside of it but objectivizing it. When they objectivize 
their own time, they discover their own temporality, i.e., they are not 
imprisoned by a permanent "today" --as the cat, Freire says-- with an 
unidimensional present. 
When humans emerge from reality and objectivize it, they iden-
tify their limitations, their obstacles, and their tasks, which are 
what Freire calls "limit-situations." But their limitations are not 
the final frontiers in which the action of human beings cannot be ful-
filled but challenges for new actions, challenges to transcend real-
ity. Humans have consciousness of their world and transcend the world 
and themselves through their action. 
Thus, to reflect is not just a vague and uncommitted think-
ing. Humans ahrays "reflect upon" specific problems in order to 
"act upon" them. To reflect is never, Freire says, "a mere reflec-
14 
Charles Isaacs, "The Praxis of Paulo Freire: A Critical 
Interpretation." p. 114. 
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15 
tion of, but a reflection upon, material reality." When humans re-
fleet, they try to act; when they act, they try to transform. The 
most immediate way to realize a human intention is action and the 
final point of such action is production. Before humans act, they 
decide what they wish to do, according to a plan of action which 
specifies what would be the most adequate tools. Before humans act, 
they anticipate their work and the product of their work. 
The intentional character of the human being gives sense to 
the world. When humans grasp data from the world, analyze all the data 
which has been grasped, and plan their action, they see their r,,m,rJd not 
16 
only as a "set of parameters" but as a problem to be solved. The 
world is not a given, and humans are not in a world without sense: 
world and humans are with a purpose, the purpose which humans elabo-
rate. Humans are intentional beings who always "project" that which 
they are expecting to be, to do, or to have. Quoting Marx, Freire says: 
"At the end of every labor-process, we get a result that already ex-
isted in the imagination of the laborer at its commencement." Humans 
are a force of action, i.e., a force of transformation, of work, and of 
creation. Action as transformation means that humans act upon the 
world to adapt it to their needs. They refuse to be adapted. Action 
15 
Paulo Freire, Cultural Action for Freedom, p. 29 
16 
Charles J.:saacs, "The Praxis of Paulo Freire: a Critical 
Interpretation." p. 114. 
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as work means that humans act in the light of their reflection. "Only 
men work," Freire says. The so-called work of animals lacks reflec-
tion and intention. Sometimes, the work of animals only reflects the 
work of men, as in the circus, or only serves men. Action as creation 
is a force of production. Humans transform their world, invent and 
re-invent, create and re-create, make culture, and determine history. 
Freire summarizes his concept of action in the following paragraph: 
Action is work not because of the greater or lesser physical ef-
fort expended in it by the acting organism, but because of the 
consciousness the subject has in his own effort, his possibility 
of programming action, of creating tools and using them to medi-
ate between himself and the object of his action, of having pur-
poses, of anticipating results. Still more, for action to be 
work, it must result in significant products, which while dis-
tinct from the active agent, at the same time condition him and 
become the object of his reflection.17 
Human beings have the vocation to be subjects because they have 
consciousness of being unfinished, they feel they have not been made 
complete, they are always in the process of being made. So, they mod-
ify the world because they want to be more. They have a necessity 
--an ontological necessity-- to fulfill themselves, to humanize them-
selves. When they do not do it, they fossilize and immobilize them-
selves. Freire says: 
Man is an unfinished being, and conscious of being unfinished. 
This is not the case with "beings in themselves" which are also 
unfinished. Animals and trees do not know themselves as unrin-
ished. Man is a being who permanently seeks. Man could not 
exist if he did not search. Just as there could be no search 
17 
Ibid., pp. 31,32. 
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if there were not a world. 18 
Humans are subjects because they "separate" themselves from 
(reflect upon) their world, their activities, and even themselves; but 
they are subjects also because in this separation they remain within 
their world in order to act, to transform, to work, to create, and to 
produce. These are the anthropological foundations of praxis (action-
reflection) which I have discussed in Chapter Three. In each action-
reflection humans fulfill their own humanity, and in each praxis hu-
mans humanize their own world and their own existence in the world. 
If humans lack one of the two components of praxis, they dehumanize 
themselves and become adapted and objects without capacity to live 
humanely in the world. Action without reflection is only activity 
without orientation and intentionality. Reflection without action is 
only words without the power of transformation. Humans cannot be sub-
jects without praxis, because praxis is the dialectical way of relation-
ship between humans and their world, a relationship which Freire calls 
integration, not adaptation. 
Integration is the continual relationship between man and his 
world and between the world and man, one affecting the other. In this 
integration, the world is modified by the human being and the human 
18 
"Como un ser inconcluso y consciente de ser inconcluso (lo 
que no pasa en los "seres en s:!." que, inconclusos tambien, como los 
animales, los arboles, no se saben inconclusos) el hombre es un ser 
de la busqueda permanente. No podrfa haber hombre sin btisqueda, de 
la misma forma como no habr:!a busqueda sin mundo." Paulo Freire, 
"La Concepcion 'Bancaria' de la Educacion y la Humanizacion; laCon-
cepcion Problematizadora de la Educacidn y la Humanizacion." Cris-
tianismo y Sociedad, Suplemento (Setiembre 1968):18. 
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being is modified by the world. When action-reflection takes place, 
the world is modified; but when the world is modified, human action-re-
flection is modified also. Action and reflection, which are the ex-
elusive characteristics of humans, create a human world; and the world, 
which provides limitations to the creation of humans, modifies the re-
flection and action which makes human the human being. There is a 
dialectical relationship between human beings and their world. 
These relationships occur in a physical and historical context. 
The physical context is the here of the human praxis. The historical 
reality is the before, now, and after of the human praxis. The con-
cept of praxis, like the concept of the human being, is not an ideal 
concept but expresses a real relationship between humans and their 
world. 
Up to this point, I have pointed out the anthropological faun-
dations of praxis which is the dialectical method human beings use to 
deal with the historical-social contradiction of oppressor-oppressed, 
which is according to Freire the specific world of the human being. 
But, what specific method can or should be employed to deal with the 
cultural contradiction? Freire postulates the process of 
"conscientizacao" (conscientization) as a cultural method which will 
, 
overcome this contradiction. But what does conscientization mean? 
Basically, the root of conscientization is the concept of praxis. How-
ever, conscientization has a more specific connotation as a cultural 
~ethod. Conscientization is praxis, but praxis which leads from a naive 
consciousness to a critical one. In this process transformation is the 
nature of action, and consciousness is the nature of reflection. Both 
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of them have a dialectical relationship which is found in praxis. 
Transformation and consciousness are the constitutive elements of 
the cultural method. 
c) The Overcoming of the Cultural Contradiction 
The cultural contradiction, as well as the social contradic-
tion, has its roots in an anthropological contradiction. Such con-
tradiction exists because human actions create alienation. If it is 
true that human action transforms the world, it is also true that the 
transformation of the world does not always humanize people. "The 
process of transforming the world," Freire says, "can lead to his 
{man's] humanization as well as his dehumanization, to his growth 
19 
or domination." Humans, in contrast to animals, are the only beings 
who can transform the world and, in transforming it, impregnate it 
with their curiosity and invention, i.e., they can humanize the world. 
In other words, humans are the only beings who can dehumanize or hu-
manize themselves through their own action. Humanization and dehumani-
zation are two options which humans cannot 2void. Freire says: 
Animals cannot "animalize" the world. "Animalization" of the 
world would be intimately linked to the "animalization" of 
animals ••. However, while they [bees] skillfully construct 
their lives and "manufacture" honey, bees remain bees in their 
contact with the world, they do not become more or less bees.20 
The people of Latin America have lived in a system of oppression, 
19 
Paulo Freire, Cultural Action for Freedom, p. 31. 
20 
Ibid., p. 30. 
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in the anthropological contradiction of oppressor-oppressed, which has 
generated the "culture of silence" in opposition to the culture of 
those who "have a voice," i.e., the culture of the oppressors. The cul-
ture of the contradiction is a dehumanized culture. Conscientization 
is the method of praxis which overcomes the contradiction and leads 
from dehumanization to humanization. We can observe here that the 
"culture of silence" --the most dehumanized culture-- is the cultural 
terminus a quo. The culture of freedom, not the culture of the op-
pressors, is the cultural terminus ad quem. 
But a culture of freedom will not come into being without the 
insertion of humans in their social and anthropological contradiction. 
People cannot have cultural freedom unless they insert themselves in 
the struggle to overcome the social and anthropological contradiction. 
To try to be free without changing the infrastructure is to be 
condemned to oppression. Freedom is the common objective of both infra-
and superstructure. For this reason Freire affirms: 
Conscientization implies, then, that when I realize that I am 
oppressed, I also know I can liberate myself if I transform 
the concrete situation where I find myself oppressed. Obviously, 
I can't transform it in my head: that would be to fall into the 
philosophical error of thinking that awareness "creates" reali-
ty, I would be decreeing that I am free, by my mind. And yet, 
the structures would continue to be the same as ever -- so that 
I wouldn't be free. No, conscientization implies a critical 
insertion into a process, it implies a historical commitment to 
make changes.21 
21 
Paulo Freire, "Conscientization as a Way of Liberating," in 
Cultural Action for Freedom by Paulo Freire, p. 5. 
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Conscientization is, in strict cultural terms, the process by 
~hich one goes from a naive to a critical consciousness. Naive con-
sciousness as a distorted ~ay of being is a dehumanized consciousness. 
Critical consciousness is the normal way of being; it is the humanized 
consciousness. But such a process does not happen at the subjective 
level. Conscientization is, as praxis, the dialectical relationship 
between subjectivity and objectivity, between reflection and action, 
between consciousness and reality, between man and the historical 
world. 
The process of conscientization begins with the identification 
of the so-called "semi-intransitive consciousness," the lowest level 
of being human. Freire, talking about this consciousness, says: 
In its quasi-immersion in concrete reality, this consciousness 
fails to perceive many of reality's challenges, or perceives 
them in a distorted way. Its semi-intransitiveness is a kind 
of obliteration imposed by objective conditions. Because of 
this obliteration, the only data which the dominated conscious-
ness grasps are the data which lie within the orbit of its 
lived experience.22 
Semi-intransitive consciousness is so dominated by the social 
structures that it cannot have the distance from reality necessary to 
objectivize, perceive, analyze, and know such reality. People with 
semi-intransitive consciousness do not understand their own situation 
in daily life and the structural level of reality, i.e., the causal 
links of the historical-cultural phenomenon. They are not able to 
perceive causality. What they do is attribute all facts and situa-
22 
Paulo Freire, Cultural Action for Freedom, p. 36. 
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tions to superior powers or to their own "natural" incapacity. In 
other words, the causal links are thought to be outside of reality, 
and consciousness turns fatalistic, defensive, and magical. Their 
action is not oriented towards the transformation of reality but 
towards themselves or the superior powers, generally through different 
kinds of rites. 
Semi-intransitive consciousness is adapted to its world, has 
narrow areas of interests, is impermeable to challenges outside of 
its sphere, is easily prey to magical explanations, and is generally 
illogical. Because such consciousness blocks out many aspects of re-
ality or cannot discern all elements existing in what it perceives, 
it disengages human beings from their own reality and from their own 
existence "in" and "with" the world. Even if these humans do perceive 
some problems, they distort them. The semi-intransitive consciousness 
is a "quasi-inunersion" in reality, a dehumanized way of being in the 
world. 
Semi-intransitive consciousness is the lower level of con-
sciousness. The so-called "naive transitive consciousness" is the 
first level of transition of the human consciousness, Freire says: 
The transitive consciousness emerges as a naive consciousness, 
as dominated as the former [semi-intransitive consciousness]. 
Nevertheless, it is now indisputably more disposed to perceiving 
the source of its ambiguous existence in the objective condi-
tions of society.23 
23 
Ibid. 
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Naive transitive consciousness is a contradictory consciousness. On 
the one hand, it maintains semi-intransitive characteristics, but on 
the other hand, it emerges to a new stage of existence. 
First of all, the semi-intransitive consciousness has four 
characteristics: the condition of domination, the susceptibility to 
the myths of the oppressors or their elites, the condition of "quasi-
immersion," and the gregarious life. So, it is not strange that the 
naive transitive consciousness carries with it a magical interpreta-
24 
tion, a nostalgia for the past, and fanciful explanations. People 
with naive transitive consciousness oversimplify problems, unders-
timate their own capacity, lose a spirit of investigation, use frag-
ile arguments and an emotive style, and adapt a polemical attitude. 
Their dialogue is distorted. These people usually react mechanically 
to stimuli and become sectarian, irrational, and fanatical. 
But the naive transitive consciousness is the consciousness 
emerging from silence. Something new happens. Consciousness is able 
to objectivize and analyze elements which were not perceptible before. 
Thus, people who have naive consciousness begin to be actively pres-
ent in their historical process, desiring to overcome their silence, 
applying pressure to the elites who have the power, and anxious for 
freedom. The naive consciousness comes to grips with its social real-
ity, rejects imported schema, demonstrates the existence of contradic-
tions, demands solutions to their problems, is dynamic, and provokes 
24 
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conflicts. The people with naive transitive consciousness want to know, 
in spite of their naivete. They want to create ways of overcoming their 
state of oppression, dependence, and marginalization. 
However, the expectations of overcoming silence and the anxiety 
for freedom produce in the elites not only surprise but also the anxie-
ty to maintain the status quo. Taking advantage of the naive transitive 
consciousness, the elite may make a superficial and paternalistic trans-
formation, may give a "political opiate" to maintain the naive con-
sciousness and the habit of being directed, or may accelerate intention-
ally the process of manipulation, such as has been the case with popu-
list governments. 
The consciousness which emerges from a naive transitive con-
sciousness tends to grow in one of two possible directions: toward an 
"irrational consciousness" or toward a "critical consciousness." 
The movement from naive transitive consciousness to a critical 
consciousness is not spontaneous. It is mediated by an active and 
dialogical education focused on social and political responsibility. 
When such education does not occur, naive consciousness moves towards 
a "fanatical" or "irrational" consciousness. This distortion of con-
25 
sciousness acquires a "pathological form." This distortion is more 
disengaged from its own reality than was semi-intransitive conscious-
ness. People with irrational consciousness are socially adapted and 
25 
Cf. Ibid., 19. Also Paulo Freire, Cultural Action for Free-
dom, pp. 49,50. 
190 
dominated; they are converted en masse. People act on the basis of 
emotions --they have an irrational mystique and never dialogize. They 
follow prescriptions as if they were their own; they are manipulated 
and treated as objects. 
Freire explains broadly the populist governments as a system 
which manipulates consciousness. However, another example could be 
technological manipulation. In spite of the fact that he considers 
technology as the natural phase of a creative process toward man's hu-
manization, he says that the technological system could result in the 
creation of a robot human being: 
They do not have to think about even the smallest things; there 
is always some manual which says what to do in situation "a" or 
-'Jb". Rarely do men have to pause at a street corner to think 
which direction to follow. There's always an arrow which de-
problematizes the situation. Though streets sign are not evil 
in themselves, and are necessary in cosmopolitan cities, they 
are among thousands of directional signals in a technological 
society which, introjected by men, hinder their capacity for 
rrUical thinking. 26 
Technological systems dehumanize people by manipulating them. 
Specialists are, for instance, generally incapable of critical think-
ing because they lose their vision of reality as a whole. "They 
cannot even think correctly in the area of their specialization," 
Freire says. People react to prescriptions received from the mass 
media. All things are prefabricated; all behavior is automatized. 
Critical consciousness arises when some basic distinctions ap-
pear. I will point out at least five of them: 
26 
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First, when humans discover their own nature. The nature of 
the human being assumes that being human is the only necessary condi-
tion for the perception of phenomena which are presented by the human 
reality and for the perception of the causal links of those phenomena. 
Second, when humans discover the nature of the world. The na-
ture of the world shows that all phenomena and causal links are in a 
constant process of change. Freire says with Heraclitus of Ephesus 
(544-483 B.C.) that everything is in continuous flux and permanent 
27 
change. Panta rei was the expression of Heraclitus. 
Third, when humans know that their perceptions and knowledge 
are not absolutes. They analyze constantly all phenomena and their 
cultural links because reality always is changi~g. The factors pres-
ent in a specific moment are different from those in another moment, 
especially if they are economic, social, political, or cultural fac-
tors. 
Fourth, when humans see their perceptions and analysis not as 
an intellectual exercise with a purpose in itself but as one which 
corresponds to an intention, i.e., to a specific action. Once humans 
recognize a challenge, they grasp it; they try to understand it in its 
phenomena and in its causal links; as humans they look for possible 
ways of responding. They act. 
Fifth, when humans discover that the nature of action corre-
27 
Cf. Julian Marias, Historia de la Filosof{a (Madrid: Revis-
ta de Occidente, 1962) pp. 26-2. 
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sponds to the nature of understanding. If humans have a magical or 
naive understanding, their action will be magical or naive also. If 
they have a critical understanding, their action will be critical too. 
Critical consciousness begins when consciousness is modified 
by the knowledge and experience of human action upon reality. This 
critical consciousness is a dialectical process which is acquired 
inevitably in the dialectical relationship between reflection and ac-
tion, perception and transformation, knowledge and creation. Critical 
consciousness deepens one's interpretation of problems, looks for the 
facts and their causal links, tests and reviews all findings, avoids 
distortions in the process of grasping, avoids preconceptions in the 
process of analysis, and assumes responsibility for the consequent 
action. Critical consciousness is active, dialogical, and open. It 
is not polemical; it does not reject the old because of its oldness; it 
accepts whatever is valid of the old and the new. Critical conscious-
ness is a transitive consciousness which makes people receptive to 
outside influences and creates beings with the possibility of relating 
with their own world. People with critical consciousness make a 
strong commitment to their own existence and always are ready to opt 
in favor of that which provides for their own humanization. 
Semi-intransitive consciousness is typical of closed struc-
tures. It corresponds to the closed societies which generate the con-
tradiction between the culture of those who "have a voice" and the 
"culture of silence" of those who have no voice. Talking about this 
consciousness, Freire says: 
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This mode of consciousness is still found to be predominant in 
Latin American rural areas where large property holdings (lati-
fundios) are the rule. The rural areas constitute "closed 
societies" which maintain the "culture of silence" intact.28 
According to Emilio Monti, in the decade of the nineteen sev-
enties, the rural areas oscillated between 14% to 80% of the entire 
29 
population of Latin America. The culture of silence with a semi-
intransitive consciousness is, if not the majority of the Latin American 
population, a significant percentage. 
Naive transitive consciousness is typical of transitional so-
cieties. Their principal characteristic is the evident contradiction 
of oppressor-oppressed in the struggle for power. Talking about this 
consciousness, Freire says: 
The passage of the masses from a semi-intransitive to a naive 
transitive state of consciousness is also the moment of an 
awakening consciousness on the part of the elites, a decisive 
moment for the critical consciousness of progressive groups.30 
Critical consciousness is typical both of a society in the proc-
ess of opening, and of an open society. Freire says that critical con-
sciousness is typical of pre-revolutionary times in which the natural 
reaction of the oppressors is a coup d'etat, i.e., the violent reaction 
of the oppressors to reduce people to a culture of silence again. But 
28 
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Cf. p. 67. 
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Paulo Freire, Cultural Action for Freedom, p. 40. 
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Freire says that critical consciousness is typical also of revolutionary 
31 
times; it is the consciousness of a free people. Here, an open socie-
ty is a revolutionary society. I will discuss the concept of revolution 
in my next chapter (Chapter V). Jerez and Hernandez Pica, talking about 
the critical consciousness, summarize: 
Critical consciousness .•. implies a questioning of the relationship 
between men and the structural world in which they live, a heigh-
tened sensitivity to sloganizing, and ideologizing. that is, to 
any kind of manipulation. To grasp with the mind the truth of re-
ality, to engage in praxis (i.e., thought-action upon one's world), 
are the creative postures that critical consciousness makes possi-
ble and in which it finds a propitious climate for its growth. 
Ultimately, only by critical consciousness can men and the socie-
ties they live in become the source of their own decision.32 
In summary, we can see how the culture of oppression, domination, 
or silence, --the terminus a quo of the anthropological foundations of 
education-- inherits the anthropological contradiction of society: op-
pressor-oppressed. Freire locates himself on the side of the oppressed. 
The culture of the oppressed emerges when the oppressed discover their 
own nature: to be "in" and "with" their world. Humans are beings of 
plurality of relations, challenges, and responses. Submerged in time, 
they emerge from it, objectivizing, reflecting, and transcending their 
limitations. Humans are subjects, not objects, of reflection and ac-
tion which transform their world. They humanize themselves by trans-
forming their world. Praxis (action and reflection) is the method of 
31 
Cf. Ibid., pp. 42-52. 
32 
Cesar Jerez and Juan Hernandez-Pica. "Cultural Action for 
Freedom." p. 35. 
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relating humans and their world. Conscientization --the via ad of the 
anthropological foundations of education-- is cultural praxis. 
Conscientization overcomes cultural contradiction. Conscientization 
emerges from the culture of silence, the culture of the semi-intransi-
tive consciousness, and goes from the naive-transitive consciousness 
to the critical consciousness, the consciousness of the culture of 
freedom, the terminus ad quem of the anthropological foundations of 
education. Such cultural action necessarily demands a reconceptualiza-
tion of education. 
2. THE RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF EDUCATION 
The anthropological contradiction of society and culture. the 
method of praxis and conscientization which overcomes such a contradic-
tion, and the necessity of reconceptualizing the human being·as a point 
of reference, determine the reconceptualization of education. Freire 
sees the contradiction of society generating an educational contradiction 
which he calls "banking" education, his terminus a quo of the reconceptu-
alization of education. There is a new method to overcome such contradic-
tion, the via ad of the reconceptualization of education. This method 
will propose the so-called "problem posing" education, the terminus ad 
guem of the reconceptualization of education. I will discuss these 
three points. 
a) The "Banking" Concept of Education 
One of the basic characteristics of education as banking is 
its anthropological contradiction. The relationship between teacher 
and student is antithetical. The teacher justifies his own existence 
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in the "absolute ignorance" of students and recognizes himself as the 
proprietor of knowledge. Students, on their part, accept the "abso-
lute knowledge" of teachers and accept also their own "ignorance." 
Teachers are necessary because they know everything students need to 
know. Students are necessary also because they do not possess the knowl-
edge that only teachers have. Each of them survives in function of the 
other and each of them has a dialectical relationship with the other. 
This contradictory relationship is mediated by a narrative 
method. "Education", Freire says, "is suffering from narration sick-
33 
ness," another characteristic of the banking education. This educa-
tion considers teachers as those who use narration to perform their 
instruction. This method makes the teacher the subject of education, 
a person who fills up students with the contents of his narration. 
"The more completely he fills the receptables," Freire says, "the 
34 
better a teacher he is." The teacher has no concern about communi-
eating with his students; what a teacher wants is to send communiques 
and to make deposits. Freire says: 
According to this conception, the student is like a "vessel" in 
which the "educator" is making his deposits. A "vessel" which 
is filled by "knowledge" as if knowing were the result of a 
passive act of receiving gifts or prescriptions of others."35 
33 
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Traditional education considers students as those who receive 
the content of what teachers narrate. Students are listeners. They 
collect information and catalogue knowledge. They memorize and repeat 
content mechanically. Students are the passive "receptacles" who have 
to be filled. They do not participate in a process of communication; 
they are receivers of communiques. The students are objects, not 
subjects of education. "The more meekly the receptacles permit them-
36 
selves to be filled", Freire says, "the better students they are." 
Summarizing this contradiction, Freire says: 
The teacher 
the teacher 
the teacher 
the teacher 
the teacher 
The content of the teacher's narration is disconnected from the 
dynamic process of reality and is explained without "life," in a "petri-
fied" way. This is a third characteristic of education as banking. 
This content is completely alien to the existential experience of 
36 
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students. It is also isolated from the totality in which such content 
is engendered and from which it receives its significance. With this 
kind of content, teachers isolate the student's consciousness from the 
world causing an alienation in which the student acquires a fatalistic 
perception at best of his own situation. Teachers prepare their lessons 
in their study and, in a second moment, they expound their knowledge. 
However, students have not the experience of cognition because here 
knowledge is content, a "private property" of teachers, which is 
brought as a "gift." Education as banking is a vertical relationship 
in which teachers always have the academic authority. Teachers resist 
dialoguing with students and, when they talk with them, they assume a 
paternul.istic attitude. Lessons are "verbalisms" and the words used 
are alienated and empty of concreteness. "Teacher talks about reali-
ty," Freire says, "as if it were motionless, static, compartmentalized, 
38 
and predictable." 
When students consider themselves empty beings to be filled, 
they not only consider themselves passive entities but are easily 
"domesticable." Domestication is the fourth characteristic of educa-
tion as banking. This education not only begins with a false under-
standing of men as passive objects but maintains them in such passiv-
ity. Still more, education as banking strengthens passivity and adap-
tation. The task of teachers is to regulate the way in which students 
will be filled. The method with which they will better "fit" in the 
38 
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world is that which will make them well behaved, domesticated like ani-
mals. Freire says: 
The more students work at storing the deposit entrusted to 
them, the less they develop the critical consciousness which 
would result from their intervention in the world as trans-
formers of the world. The more completely they accept the 
passive role imposed on them, the more they tend simply to 
adapt to the world as it is and to the fragmented view of re-
ality deposited in them ••. The more the oppressed can be led 
to that situation, the more easily they can be dominated.39 
Education as banking is "necrophilic," the fifth characteristic 
of this education. The term "necrophilia" is used by Freire in the 
sense in which Erich Fromm uses it. Fromm says that this world is 
traditionally used "to denote a sexual perversion." However, in a 
general sense, he says that necrophilia refers to the people who are 
40 
"fascinated by all that is not alive, all that is dead." In a para-
graph that Freire quotes, Fromm explains: 
The necrophilous person loves all that does not grow, all that is 
mechanical. The aecrophilous person is driven by the desire to 
"transform the organic into the inorganic, to approach life mecha-
nically, as if all living persons were things. All living pro-
cesses, feelings, and thoughts are transformed into things ..• The 
necrophilous person can relate to an object --a flower or a per-
son-- only if he possesses it ••• if he loses possession he loses 
contact with the ·world. That is why we find the paradoxical re-
action that he would rather lose life than possession, even though 
by losing life he who possesses has ceaserl to exist. He loves 
control, and in tie act of controlling he kills life.41 
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Education as banking is necrophilic because it transforms stu-
dents into objects, passive recipients, domesticated persons. Teachers 
control thinking because students are obligated to receive the infor-
mation of teachers, who are academic authorities, in an acritical way. 
They must accept the partial view of reality which teachers narrate 
and avoid causal links. In a few words, students are kept from having 
a critical consciousness; they are condemned to a naive or, still more, 
a semi-intransitive consciousness. Teachers control action also because 
students are maintained in ignorance of their reality and isolated from 
making relevant inquiry. Teachers do not permit praxis (reflection and 
action) which means that teachers do not permit their students to be 
human. As we have seen, praxis is part of the essence of human nature. 
Teachers love death when they convert students into objects. They love 
students who are adjusted and are manageable. Education as banking is 
a dehumanized education. 
Education as banking is an exercise of domination, the sixth 
characteristic of this education. It is a subtle indoctrination by 
which students are conditioned to adapt to the world of oppression. 
Banking education stimulates credibility in the oppressors. Op-
pressors react against a free education when fundamental questions 
arise and students respond with praxis. There is no freedom for 
questioning the system of oppression. Education is, for oppressors, 
an act of transmission of deposits which will preserve a culture and 
not an inquiry to change inhuman situations and alienated knowledge. 
Education must look for permanence and, in looking for it, education 
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"becomes reactionary." The basic problem for education is not to 
change the world of oppression but to change the consciousness of stu-
dents, to avoid "mal-adjusted" people. Education as banking is an 
intentional effort to subdue. 
The structure of the education as banking is the anthropologi-
cal contradiction of the closed society, the contradiction of oppressor-
oppressed, the Freire's terminus a quo of the reconceptualization of 
education. This education considers educators as those who know and 
students as those who do not know, educators as those who transmit con-
tents which they have chosen and students as those who only receive 
those contents, educators as those who are the owners of an alienated 
content and students who are alienated from their reality. In this 
education, educators love "well-behaved" students (necrophilia) and 
students are dominated; educators are subjects of education and stu-
dents are objects of it; educators are the oppressors sent to be the 
"Messiahs" of the "ignorant" and students are the oppressed who are 
the grateful "redeemed." Banking education stimulates the anthropo-
logical contradiction and reduces students to beings who are "in" the 
world without power to create, transform, think, or even have real 
knowledge, as we will see. 
b) Dialogue, The Dialectical Method 
Freire proposes dialogue as the dialectical method --the 
via ad of the reconceptualization of education-- which overcomes con-
42 
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tradiction. When he analyzes dialogue, he finds that one of its es-
sential elements is the word. However, word is not only an instru-
ment to make dialogue possible. What it really is appears when we 
find the two basic elements of its essence. Every true word has the 
components of action and reflection; in one word, praxis. To have 
a word without the dimension of action is to minimize automatically 
reflection. The word becomes "idle chatter," a "verbalism," and an 
alienated word. "It becomes an empty word," Freire says, "one which 
43 
cannot denounce the world." To have a word without the dimension 
of reflection is to minimize action automatically. The word becomes 
"activism," i.e., action without the watchfulness of reflection. 
Wheti1'et" as verbalism or activism, word loses its power of transforma-
tion and does not generate dialogue. In both cases praxis is negated: 
a word without action generates inauthentic thinking and a word with-
out reflection generates inauthentic action. 
44 
Freire says that "word is praxis" which means that word is 
part of the essence of human nature. The negation of praxis is the 
negation of the word as well as the negation of the human being. Ver-
balism and silence deny word: firstly, because verbalism is a distor-
tion of the authentic word, and, secondly, because nobody can live 
dolog:!a 
ciedad, 
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without words. When humans confront their world, they name their world 
and convert it into a problem. When the world is converted into a prob-
lem, the word enriches itself and the world is renamed. There is a dia-
lectical relationship between naming the word and the world. Word is 
praxis because a word pronounces the world and, in pronouncing the 
world, announces it. When a word denounces the world, it transforms 
the world. The authentic word exists because reflection and action upon 
the world exist. The authentic word exists because praxis is the human 
work which transforms the world. 
If praxis is part of the essence of human nature, to speak the 
word is the right of every man and woman. In other words, word is not 
the privilege of the few. The authentic word cannot ignore the word of 
others who also have the imperative of praxis, i.e., to transform the 
world, to humanize it, and to humanize themselves. If the world trans-
forms the world, dialogue is an existential necessity of everyone. 
Still more, dialogue is the only situation in which the word exists 
authentically in relation to the word of others. 
"Dialogue is the encounter between men," Freire says, "mediated 
45 
by the word, in order to name the world." That means that dialogue 
cannot happen between those who want to name the world --the people 
who cannot name their world-- and those who do not wish to name the 
world --the people who deny others the right to speak. The people who 
do not want to name the world are those who want to say the word for 
45 
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others, as a deposit from one to another. However, dialogue is neither 
a "deposit" of words and ideas, nor an exchange of ideas. This deposi-
tory kind of "dialogue" Freire calls "antidialogue." Dialogue is not 
vertical --from one who is superior to one who is inferior. It is not 
hostile, polemical, imposed, naming the world on behalf of others, an 
instrument of domination. These characteristics go counter to an au-
thentic dialogue; they are the characteristics of antidialogue. Dia-
logue is the encounter of dialoguers who, through reflection and ac-
tion, transform the world, humanize it, and humanize human beings. 
Thus, the authentic word generates authentic dialogue, and 
the inauthentic word generates antidialogue. What are the charac-
teristics of an authentic dialogue? Freire proposes seven character-
46 
istics: 
First, dialogue is an act of love: love for the world, love 
for pPople, love for life (biophilic). Dialogue is the task of people 
who love others as subjects. Love is commitment to others in the cause 
of their humanization. Love is an act of courage and responsibility. 
Love is not sentimentalism but a realistic attitude. It is not bigotry 
but a rational attitude; it is not a form of manipulation but a way of 
liberation; it is not a one-sided relation of domination but a mutual 
relation of freedom. For Freire, domination is a pathology of love; 
it creates sadism in the dominator and masochism in the dominated. It 
is impossible to have an authentic dialogue without an authentic love, 
46 
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a communion among people. 
Second, dialogue is a humble act. To name the word is not an 
arrogant or self-sufficient act. To learn from the world and to act 
upon it (praxis) shows one's own possibilities and limitations. All 
people are in the same conditions, no one is the exclusive owner of 
truth or knmvledge; there are no elites; no one is offended by the 
contribution of·another; and no one is afraid of being displaced. Peo-
ple who lack humility cannot generate dialogue to name the world. 
Third, dialogue is an act of faith, faith is one's own power of 
creating and re-creating, of transformation of the \vorld, and of one's 
own capacity to follow one's vocation to be fully human. Faith is an 
a priori before one meets another man. When obstacles block the way 
of faith, it is reborn. However, faith is not a bigoted and naive 
attitude but an ontological necessity for man as a subject, i.e., as 
a human being. Without faith, dialogue is false and becomes paternal-
48 
istic manipulation. 
Fourth, dialogue is an act of mutual trust. It is a horizontal 
relationship in which all dialoguers are in close partnership. False 
love, false humility, and false faith cannot create trust. Trust is 
that which generates trust. Thus, mutual trust is generated by true 
47 
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love, true humility, and true faith. 
Fifth, dialogue is an act of hope. Hope is generated by 
human incompleteness. Humans search, fight, and hope, because they are 
moved by the imperative to become more fully human. If people fight 
without expectations, their efforts are "empty and sterile, bureau-
cratic and tedious." There is no dialogue without a communion of 
hope. But Freire says also that hope is not a mere passive waiting 
and wishing that things will turn out for the best; rather, hope is 
49 
achieved through active participation in the struggle. 
Sixth, dialogue is a critical act, i.e., a communitarian ex-
pression of praxis. When Freire affirms that dialogue is critical 
thinking he means that dialogue perceives reality as a process, hu-
mans as related dialectically with reality, and humans as trans~ 
formers of reality. If dialogue is critical, it is critical thinking; 
if it is critical action, it is the action of transformation in a 
necessary relationship with critical thinking. In short, dialogue is 
praxis in the political dimension. Critical dialogue is opposed to a 
naive dialogue, i.e., the antidialogue. 
Seventh, dialogue is an act of communication. Dialogue is the 
"space" in which one subject relates to another subject, mediated by 
the word. Dialogue is intersubjectivity. Freire says: "without dia-
logue there is no communication, without communication there can be 
49 
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no true education." 
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In summary, dialogue is based on the word which is praxis. If 
praxis is part of the nature of the human being, the word is also an 
inseparable part of human nature. Word is praxis, i.e., action and 
reflection to transform the world. The word is the right of all human 
beings and takes place in communion with others. If the word is the 
transformation of the world, dialogue is an existential necessity of 
all people. Dialogue is the encounter of people mediated by the word. 
However, in order to have an authentic dialogue, the word has to name 
the world. That means that people who do not want to name the world 
cannot dialogue. That which they do is distorted dialogue which 
Freire calls antidialogue. Antidialogue uses the word against or, at 
least, for others, as a deposit to impose a word on others in a vertical 
way. But people do not need only to name the world but to name the 
world together. That means that the people who want to name the world 
see the necessity of facing the world with others. The characteris-
tics of an antidialogue are hostility, polemic, the use of the word to 
oppress and dominate others. Dialogue is, on the contrary, an act of 
love, humility, faith, trust, critical thinking, and communication. 
Dialogue is the act which makes possible real education, the over-
coming of the banking contradictions. Dialogue is a horizontal rela-
tionship which eliminates the banking concept of education and provides 
a new concept of education, education for freedom. 
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c) The "Problem-posing" Concept of Education 
Problem-posing education breaks with the vertical patterns of 
communiques, authoritarianism, and, overall, the anthropological con-
tradiction of teacher-student. No one has "absolute knowledge" and 
no one is "absolutely ignorant." Nobody is superior or inferior. 
There is no opposition between teachers and students. They each know 
something and, at the same time, are ignorant of other things. Both 
of them are teachers and students at the same time. In this horizontal 
relationship, there is communication rather than communiques and mutual 
cooperation rather than an authoritarian relationship. 
Narration is overcome by dialogue, transference of information 
is superseded by a real cognition, and "deposit-making" is replaced by 
posing problems. Through dialogue there are neither "teacher-of-the 
students" and "students-of-the-teacher" nor "one-who-teaches" and "the 
51 
other-who-is-taught." Teachers are taught in the process of teach-
ing, and students teach in the process of learning. Freire has a fa-
mous expression which summarizes this horizontal principle, an expres-
sion which is commonly quoted through all Latin America: 
a) Not an educatee of the educator; 
b) not an educator of the educatee; 
c) but an educator-educatee with an educatee-educator. 
That means: 
1) no one educates anyone; 
51 
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2) nobody is educated alone; 52 
3) men are educated among other men, mediated by the world. 
The teacher-student is no longer "cognitive" in a first moment 
and "narrative" in a second moment. What Freirean teachers do is to 
present to their students material, which is a piece of the students' 
and teachers' own reality, in order to investigate (the content). 
Teachers and students draw a plan for what they are about to study. 
In other words, teachers do not narrate their findings but present the 
problems of reality. This material is common motivation for both, 
teachers and students. Both are "critical co-investigators" of the 
knowledge desired and both are "cognitive actors" in the learning sit-
uation. Both know something about the subject; both act upon the con-
tent, which is their own reality, to transform it; both modify their 
earlier knowledge in the light of their experimental action; and both 
teach to each other their findings. They are not disconnected from 
their content, from their real problems, or from their own reality. 
t'roblem-posing education prevents the formation of abstract men iso-
lated from their world. 
Problem-posing education launches teachers and students on a 
52 
"a) No mas un educador del educando; 
b) no mas un educando del educador; 
c) sino un educador-educando con un educando-educador. 
Esto significa: 
1) que nadie educa a nadie; 
2) que nadie tampoco se educa solo; 
3) que los hombres se educan entre s{, mediatizados por el 
mundo." 
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permanent unveiling of reality. Their world challenges all the time 
and brings new understandings. But the early understandings uncover 
new but related challenges which again bring new understandings. 
Thus, teachers and students are involved in a gradual coming to know 
in which their findings are grasped in their interrelations, in 
their causal links, in their total context, and in their dynamic 
"life." Teacher and students increase their critical consciousness 
because they are not only "submerged in" their world, as passive ob-
jects, but they are "integrated" in it as "emerged" consciousness, as 
knowing and transforming their world. 
Problem-posing education considers humans as subjects of their 
world, i.e., innnersed in it and historically connnitted "with" it. 
This education leads teachers and students to consciousness about their 
relationship "with" their world, i.e., their action and reflection upon 
it. This means that teachers and students are not "domesticated" in 
their world. They are in their "here and now" but they emerge from 
it and "intervene" in it. Reality is a world of posing problems which 
are not unalterable. They are only limits which teachers and students 
convert into challenges, subjects of their study, objects of their 
knowledge, and objects of their action. Teachers and students are 
intentional transformers and creators. When they transform their world, 
they humanize it and, in the fulfillment of this task, they humanize 
themselves. In problem-posing education, teachers and students confirm 
their own vocation: to be always more human, to transcend themselves. 
Problem-posing education does not suppose submissive and "well-
211 
behaved" students nor a predetermined future. It presupposes dynamic 
and creative students because they are beings of praxis (action and 
reflection), of critical consciousness (knowing and transforming), and 
of dialogue. Problem-posing education does not presuppose "a static 
53 
reality, but ••• a reality in process, in transformation." Thus, 
education is constantly remade. "In order to be," Freire says, "It 
54 
must become." It is an education of change and for change, a revo-
lutionary education. 
Problem-posing education is "prophetic" in the sense that edu-
cation is hopeful, moves forward, and looks ahead. It constructs the 
future, which is an open future; it corresponds to an open society, 
i.e., a revolutionary society. The students who had formerly been 
passive "turn against their domestication and attempt to domesticate 
55 
reality." Any kind of oppression would be irreconcilable with their 
vocation, i.e. to be fully and free human beings. Thus education has 
as its terminus ad quem humanization and freedom. 
Problem-posing education overcomes anthropological contradic-
tion, narrative method, alienated information, the tendency to 
necrophilia, domestication, and the domination of the banking educa-
tion. Problem-posing education posits that men under any domina-
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tion must fight for their liberation. Problem-posing education 
demythologizes reality, "dialogizes" method, dynamizes the search, 
eliminates resignation, and gives the priority to freedom to know the 
truth. Problem-posing education does not serve the oppressor but 
rather the oppressed who want to be free and who want to create the 
new human being and the new society. 
In summary the new anthropological foundations of culture 
demand a reconceptualization of education. Education as banking is 
based on the structural contradiction of teacher-students --the 
terminus a quo-- mediated by a narrative method. This contradiction 
corresponds to the anthropological contradiction of oppressor-oppressed. 
Teachers are the subjects and the students the objects of education. 
Teachers are necrophiliacs and dominators. They convert students 
into objects, passive recipients, domesticated and adapted. The 
anthropological contradiction of education as banking is overcome by 
dialogue as the dialectical method in which the word is praxis, part 
of the essence of human nature. It establishes a dialectical relation-
ship with the world. Word is the naming and the transformation of the 
world. Inauthentic dialogue is antidialogue; it is vertical, hostile, 
polemical, and imposed. Authentic dialogue is an act of love, humil-
ity, faith, mutual trust, hope, critical consciousness, and communica-
tion. Dialogue overcomes education as banking and makes possible prob-
lem-posing education. Problem-posing education supersedes the educa~ 
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tiona! contradiction, narration, verticality, and deposit-making. 
Teacher-students are co-investigators mediated by posing problems, cog-
nition, and dialogue. They have a horizontal relationship. Both are 
teachers and students; both are subjects of education. Both have 
critical consciousness of their content, their real problems, their re-
ality. They are conscious of themselves "in" the world, of their re-
lationship "with" the world, and of their praxis. Teachers and stu-
dents are transformers and creators. Students are not domesticated, 
passive and adapted objects. Education is biophilic and prophetic; 
it is for change and for freedom. It is the terminus ad quem. 
3. EDUCATION FOR FREEDOM 
As I have said, Freire makes his option in favor of the op-
pressed who are in the culture of silence. Freire rejects the educa-
tion as banking because it is a practice leading to domination, be-
cause such domination is part of the structure, content, and method of 
education. He proposes problem-posing education because it is a 
practice of freedom, because freedom is part of the structure, content, 
and method of education. Problem-posing education is set in the con-
text of the oppression, domination, and marginalization of human beings 
in order to change such situations. Freire's education favors the op-
pressed, the terminus a quo of an education for freedom. 
The option for an education for freedom involves a dynamic 
method which is directly related to the dynamic relationship between 
men and their world. This method has different expressions at dif-
ferent levels: it is praxis at the social level, conscientization at 
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the cultural level, and dialogue at the educational level. This meth-
od presupposes a man who, being conscious of his world and with the ca-
pacity to know his world, transforms his immediate world and is cog-
nizant in the process of his transforming action. Reflection and ac-
tion are the dialectical method through which the world is known. 
Kno,vledge is the process which relates dialectically all aspects of 
education, it is the via ad of education for freedom. 
In the educational process "generative themes" of the place 
and people in which education takes place are selected. Generative 
themes are codified. Then, these coded themes must be "decodified." 
Such selection, codification, and decodification are the basic moments, 
not only of an education for freedom but of an education of free pea-
ple, which is the terminus ad quem of the education for freedom. 
Education for freedom is a "Pedagogy of the Oppressed," the 
terminus a quo of such education; it is an epistemological method, the 
via ad of the education for freedom; and it is a pedagogy of the free 
people, the terminus ad quem of the education for freedom. 
a) A Pedagogy of the Oppressed 
"Education cannot be neutral," Freire says, "Education ..• will 
always be in the service either of the 'domestication' of men or of 
56 
their liberation." So, the real alternatives for educators are two: 
education as banking or problem-posing education. There is no third 
way. 
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A third way supposes an education without obligations and an 
education outside of history. Education, however, is a practice made 
inside of a social context and dynamically relates to the context. 
No education is autonomous, no education is isolated. Education al-
ways expresses a society and is always an instrument of such a society. 
It is organized on the basis of prevailing structures. Freire says: 
Neutral education cannot, in fact exist. It is fundamental for 
us to know that, when we work on the content of the educational 
curriculum, when we discuss methods and processes, when we plan, 
when we draw up educational policies, we are engaged in political 
acts which imply an ideological choice; whether it is obscure or 
clear is not important.57 
The relationship between education and society brings up the 
question of the relationship between infrastructure and superstructure. 
Education is the superstructure which functions as an instru-
ment of the infrastructure in which education is embedded. The infra-
structure is the social structure created by the relationship between 
58 
men and their world mediated by their work. Motionless social struc-
tures are "sacralized," and education is used to serve that system and 
to control all inappropriate change. 
Freire has opted for the oppressed. When he refers to education 
of the oppressed, he is referring to the social context in which 
education takes place, the infrastructure of education. According to 
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Freire, the social structure is based on the anthropological contradic-
tion of the oppressors and the oppressed. He notices that such an op-
pressive context generates a banking education. If the structures of 
society are vertical and generate oppression, domination, and margina-
lization, the culture and education of such a society are also vertical 
and oppress, dominate, and marginalize the oppressed. Given the infra-
structure of education as banking, it is necessarily an education of 
domination and "domestication." 
Freire did not make his option in favor of the oppressors be-
cause, according to his social philosophy, change never comes from the 
oppressors. It is impossible for the oppressors, or for the elites who 
serve the oppressors, to change education. That is so because, if they 
were to try to change education, they would inevitably call into 
question the structure of the social system in which they live, and as 
59 
I have pointed out earlier, "they cannot fight to destroy themselves." 
For this reason Freire says: "their real desire, on the contrary, must 
be ••• to 'recuperate' the educatees, which is as much as to say, to 
60 
adapt them to the system." 
Freire's option is in favor of the oppressed. But the ulti-
mate objective of the oppressed is not to help the oppressed become 
another oppressor. Thus, this option is not within of the system of 
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oppression in which his alternatives like the present system would 
share these two poles of contradiction, i.e., the option between the 
oppressor and the oppressed. Freire opts for the oppressed to liber-
ate themselves from the structure of oppression. Thus, Freire opts for 
an education for freedom. The alternatives are either education for 
domination or education for freedom. In liberating the oppressed, the 
contradiction is overcome and both oppressed and oppressors become 
free. Education for freedom tries to change the structure of soci-
ety. 
However, it is an illusion to think that education has the 
power to change society. Freire discusses clearly this fact. For 
instance, it was not the "bourgeois education" which changed the feu-
dal system but the French Revolution. The bourgeoisie in power es-
tablished the "bourgeois system of education" to implement their 
61 
system. Thus, we should not overestimate the power of education. 
Freire says: 
It is not systematic education which somehow molds society, but 
on the contrary, society which, according to its particular struc-
ture, shapes education in relation to the needs and interests of 
those who control the power in this society."62 
What is clear is that, if we want a change of education, such 
change cannot take place without the transformation of society. The 
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fundamental problem of educators who want to change the present educa-
tional system, which Freire calls education as banking, is to change 
the social structures --the infrastructure of education-- which de-
termine the contradictory education. To think of a new education is to 
think a priori of a new society. But, how is it possible? 
Freire says that a naive conception of the relationship between 
education and society can lead to two misconceptions: on the one hand, 
the overestimation of education, thinking that education has the power 
to change society and, on the other hand, the underestimation of educa-
tion, thinking that education has nothing to do with the changing of 
society which also is false. Freire does not assume a naive concep-
tion of the education-society relationship. His method is dialectical 
and critical. Thus, he says: "The relations between the educational 
system and the total society are dialectic in nature and not mechan-
63 
ical." If there is a dialectical relationship between education 
and society, this relationship is reciprocal. Society as an infra-
structure molds education but society is also transformed by practical 
actions not of education but of human beings with certain levels of 
education. In other words, the transformation of society as well as 
the transformation of education are not mechanical nor spontaneous. 
Both of them can be changed by human beings through human praxis. 
Freire says: 
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It is true that infrastructure, created in the relations by 
which the work of man transforms the world, gives rise to su-
perstructure. But it is also true that the latter, mediated 
by men, who introject its myths, turns upon the infrastructure 
and "overdetermines" it. If it were not for the dynamic of 
these precarious relationships in which men exist and work in 
the world, we could speak neither of social structure, nor of 
men, nor of a human world.64 
The option of Freire for the oppressed makes sense only if his 
new education --problem-posing education-- includes the dialectical 
relationship between education and society. As we have seen, praxis 
is the dialectical method between men and their world in which world, 
in Freire's thought, is society. Conscientization is the dialectical 
method between superstructure and infrastructure, in which infra-
structure is also society. Dialogue is the dialectical method between 
teachers-students and their content, which is also part of the human 
world. To be in favor of the oppressed is to be with them in this 
dialectical relationship, in other words, to struggle with them for 
their own freedom. The oppressed are unique in their capacity to 
transform their social structure because their purpose "is not to be 
65 
another oppressor but to be human." 
When Freire opts for the oppressed he opts for the illiterate 
who in Latin America are the most oppressed of the society. Although 
Freire's educational experiences were not only with illiterate people, 
his most important concepts about education were acquired fran an edu-
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cation of the oppressed, i.e., in a literacy project in which people 
could supersede their magical or naive perceptions of reality. His 
terminus a quo was the contradictory structure of society his cul-
tural action was to demythologize the contradiction which affected peo-
ple at all levels of life. His educational practice was for freedom. 
He says: 
We wished to design a project in which we would attempt to move 
from naivete to a critical attitude at the same time we taught 
reading. We wanted a literacy program which would be an intro-
duction to the democratization of culture, a program with men as 
its subjects rather than as patient recipients, a program which 
itself would be an act of creation, capable of releasing other 
creative acts, one in which students would develop the impatience 
and vivacity which characterize search and invention.66 
b) Knowledge, The Dialectical Method 
Raising the possibility of two opposed alternatives of educa-
tion, education for domestication and education for freedom, involves 
two different methods which I have discussed: the method of "deposit-
making" and the method of dialogue. These methods have different but 
important epistemological presuppositions. 
In the first place, knowledge as a fact given by teachers 
corresponds to education as banking. To transfer knowledge presup-
poses a naive relationship between men and their world and brings 
merely opinions (doxa). Freire says: 
Here fact, natural phenomena, things are preserves of which peo-
ple are aware, but which are Dot revealed in their own true inter-
relationships. Within the sphere of "doxa" in which human beings ••• 
are ingenuously aware of the presence of things, and of objects, 
66 
Paulo Freire, Education for Critical Consciousness, p. 43. 
221 
perception of this presence does not mean "entering into" 
them.67 
Whether we are dealing with pure "doxa" or whether we are 
dealing with magic thought, we find ourselves faced with in-
genuous forms of aprehending objective reality. Are are faced 
with simple forms of prescientific knowledge.68 
This knowledge creates an "anaesthetising" or "de-dialectising" 
69 
thought. It is a "focalistic" vision of reality which ignores the 
dynamic relationship in which reality is located. It lacks the vision 
of totality and consequently the vision of context, for all aspects 
of reality are contained in the totality. As a result if one part is 
affected, a reflection occurs in the other parts. The presence of new 
elements produces reactions in the other parts of the totality. There-
fore, learners in an education of banking lack the possibility of a 
genuine act of transformation upon reality. For them reality is a 
70 
"kind of blind alley, whose contradictions they cannot perceive." 
These students learn about reality through the information of teach-
ers who give them that which students then consider complete knowl-
edge. Thus teachers are the authorities who transfer, bring, give, 
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and hand on knowledge. The knowledge of students is an "extension" of 
71 
the knowledge of teachers. In a few words, knowledge as given facts 
is an alienated knowledge. Such knowledge has made impossible an in-
tegrated practice of education. Freire says that his alienated knowl-
edge creates a split in crucial aspects of education. 
Education for domestication divides teaching and learning, 
kpowing and working, thinking and doing, informing and 
forming, re-knowing existing knowledge and creating new 
knowledge.72 
To know is reduced to a mechanical dualism expressed in the 
transference-reception of given facts.73 
The second epistemological presupposition is that knowledge is 
a permanent process and corresponds to problem-posing education. Every-
one who is involved in the process of education, teacher and student, 
knows something. Everybody has a relative knowledge also. There is 
no complete and absolute knowledge. It is obvious also that knowledge 
is not an exclusive possession of anyone because all people have access 
to the process of knowledge. 
This knowledge is a permanent process which arises from the per-
manent relationship between the human being and his world. That means 
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that both the educator as well as the educatee assume the posture of 
"cognitive subjects": subjects because the human nature of both 
educator and educatee consists of being conscious of themselves, their 
world, and their action and reflection upon their world, and cognitive 
subjects because they always "intend" their world and always think 
their world. That means also that the world is a reality of "knowa-
ble objects." The world is susceptible·of being known. The relation-
ship between the cognitive subjects and the knowable objects is dia-
lectical. It is a situation in which "one of the poles is the person 
74 
and the other the objective world." 
Knowledge is a permanent process which arises from a permanent 
double relationship. The·basic relation is between men and their 
world, as I have said. The second relationship is between educator 
and educatee. This relationship is mediated by the knowable objects, 
i.e., their world. In other words, knowledge does not arise as a fact 
first discovered by teachers and then received passively by students. 
Knowledge arises in the confrontation of both of them with the objects 
of knowledge. The class is not a place-situation in which somebody 
transmits knowledge but a meeting-place in which knowledge is sought 
by everybody. Freire says: 
The educator must "die" as exclusive educator of the educatee in 
order to be "born" again as educatee of the educatee. At the 
same time, he must propose to the educatee that he "die" as 
exclusive educatee of the educator in order to be "born" again 
as educator of the educator. This is a continual passage back 
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and forth, a humble, creative movement, which both have to 
make. 75 
Knowledge is a search made jointly by teachers and students. 
There are not two moments of knowledge in which teachers are the pro-
prietors of it, having come to know and now trying to transmit. Knowl-
edge is a permanent process of teachers and students, and "education 
76 
is a permanent act of cognition." The task of teachers is to create 
conditions of knowledge in which teachers and students reconstruct the 
act of knowing. Freire says: 
The task of the educator is to present to the educatees as a 
problem the content which mediates them, and not to discourse 
on it, give it, extend it, or hand it over, as if it were a 
matter of something already done, constituted, completed, and 
finished.77 
To put the content as a problem is the point of divergence 
with the epistemological understanding of education as banking. 
Instead of narrating the findings of teachers, both students and teach-
ers confront the knowable object and "re-enter into" it, think it, ana-
lyze it, and grasp it. The task of the educator is to create a prob-
lem-situation which, in the dialectical relationship between teacher-
students and the content, becomes a learning-situation. The task of 
the educator is to "re-make" the whole effort of cognition. Freire 
says: 
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Remaking the effort does not, however, mean repeating it as it 
was. It means making a new effort, in a new situation, in which 
new aspects which were not clear before are clearly presented to 
the educatee. New ways of access to the object are opened to him 
or her.78 
When the knowable object is taken as a problem, both the edu-
catees as well as the educators are problematized. Problematization 
is a dialectical process which nobody can avoid. Problematization has 
two poles: the human being involved in the process of knowledge and 
the "problem-content" taken from the world. When teacher-student act 
and then reflect on the "problem-content," or the action, teachers and 
students are problematized. When teacher-student act upon the "prob-
lem-content" in order to know it, the content is problematized. 
Problematization in the dialectical process between reflection and 
action, i.e., praxis, the "spinal cord" of the Freire's thought. 
Thus, there is no true knowledge without a direct relati.;;:1ship 
between students and teachers, both of whom are the cognitive subjects 
of education, and the knowable objects that are taken from the world. 
The content is not a gift distorted, inmobilized, and isolated from 
reality. On the contrary, content is taken in its reality, such that 
it remains in its complexity of relationships, in its dynamic presence 
in the world, and in its temporality. Knowledge is the process of 
understanding knowable objects as "sub-wholes" of the greater total-
ity. 
Knowledge is neither a discourse which somebody transmits nor 
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something which is necessary to memorize. Knowledge is the process 
which arises in the axis of the relationship between cognitive subjects 
and knowable objects. Knowledge arises as a progressive perception of 
reality, a process in which such perception becomes each time more lucid 
(conscientization). Knowledge is not the transmission of information 
which keeps education at the level of opinion (doxa). Knowledge is the 
critical perception of reality. Freire says: 
The act of knowing .•• cannot stay at the level at which men under-
stand merely the doxa of reality. 79 
Only when it is possible for men to penetrate the very "essence" or 
nature of phenomena, through the act of splitting their knowable 
object, can they overcome doxa by logos. This implies the exer-
cise of critical reflection on their existential experience. "80 
Knowledge is the process which arises in the bosom of the 
relationship between educator and educatee. The mind has in its nature 
the imperative to express its knowledge through linguistic signs. That 
happens because humans are made for relationships, not only "in" but 
"with" their world. The knowable objects are not the last objective of 
human knowledge. The last objective is to be more human, the common 
vocation of everybody. The knowable objects are only mediators of 
communication between thinking subjects. Freire says: 
3/3. 
The thinking Subject cannot think alone. In the act of thinking 
about the object s/he cannot think without the coparticipation of 
another Subject. There is no longer an "I think" but "we think". 
79 
Paulo Freire, "Cultural Action: A Dialectical Analysis," p. 
80 
Ibid., pp. 1/3, 1/4. 
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It is the "we think" which establishes the "I think" and not the 
contrary.81 
Communication is the interrelationship between thought, language, 
and content (the knowable objects). There is no thought without refer-
ence also. The language in which each subject expressess its thought 
is possible only with a content provided by reality, a content which 
is common to a plurality of subjects. For this reason dialogue is the 
method par excellence in problem-posing education. 
Dialogue is an "I-thou" relationship, a relation between subjects. 
When subjects become objects, dialogue is converted into anti-dialogue, 
and education into domination. Dialogue means communication and inter-
82 
communication, unlike anti-dialogue which imposes communiques. Dia-
logue is thus the encounter of people mediated by the content expressed 
by linguistic signs (words). 
Knowledge is a process which relates dialectically all aspects 
of education: teaching-learning, knowing-working, informing-forming, 
theorizing-practicing. Freire says: "Here [in education for liberation} 
there is no split between knowing and doing; there is no room for the 
separate existence of a world of those who know, and a world of those 
83 
who work." 
81 Paulo Freire, Education for Critical Consciousness, p. 137. 
82 
Ibid., pp. 45,46. 
83 
Paulo Freire, "Unusual Ideas About Education," p. 8. 
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c) The Pedagogy of the Free People 
Education is a practice of freedom. However, how should it be 
implemented? The way which Freire suggests is through the preparation 
of the educational content, the didactical materials, and the function 
of his classes (his "cultural circles"). 
We have to remember that the "series" of concepts, aspirations, 
concerns, values, doubts, and challenges, are generated by the social 
reality. Such series have their "obstacles", i.e., their limit-situa-
tions which contradict them. Series and obstacles are expressed by 
the so-called "epochal themes" which also are problematized by new 
themes which emerge. Epochal themes propose "tasks" to be carried out 
and fulfilled. The whole and complex interaction of the epochal themes 
constitutes that which Freire calls the "thematic universe." 
On the educational level, Freire considers the epochal themes 
as "generative themes" because they "contain the possibility of un-
folding into again as many themes, which in their turn calls for new 
84 
tasks to be fulfilled." The generative themes are constituted by 
concentric circles: areas, sub-areas, units, sub-units, and fragments. 
Each exists in a dynamic interrelationship with the rest of the whole. 
Thus, to apprehend an area without seeing the relations is to not know 
reality. Knowledge begins with a vision of totality in which a spe-
cific phenomenon is located. 
Freedom begins when such epochal themes --i.e., the thematic 
84 
Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, p. 92, fn. 19. 
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universe or generative themes-- are understood. The problem with the 
oppressed people is that they cannot grasp such themes, obstacles, and 
tasks; they cannot move from the "prison" in which such themes hold 
them. 
There are two kinds of themes: the themes which maintain the 
social structures, such as the themes generated by landowners, bour-
geoisie, nobles, and their elite in power, and the themes which try 
to change the structures such as the themes generated by the reality 
of the oppressed who have discovered their vocation of being fully 
human. For this reason, there is no ontological necessity for under-
standing these themes. All themes always express the social reality. 
As we can see, if the social reality is contradictory, it is natural 
that the themes which express such reality show this contradiction. 
The problem for education is how to know such themes. What is the 
practical process which will convert education into an education for 
freedom? I will not explain the practical implications of Freire's 
educational philosophy. What I will do is to explain the foundations 
of such practice. 
For didactical reasons, Freire explains broadly how the 
"generative themes" can be "coded" in different ways in order to make 
possible knowledge of such themes and the reality which they reflect. 
Given the complexity of reality, the themes could appear dense, impene-
trable, and "enveloping." Codification is the representation of a 
concrete and existential situation, "showing some of its constituent 
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elements in interaction." Such representations could be visual 
(pictorial or graphic), tactile, or auditory, or could be all of these 
simultaneously. Some coded situations could be sketches, photographs, 
86 
slides, filmstrips, posters, reading texts, and so on. These co-
difications are the knowable objects of education. 
Codification is the result of a process of investigation about 
the moments of life of the geographical and cultural area in which edu-
cators will teach. The investigators could be the educators and vol-
unteers from the area studied, working as a team. This investigation 
has four moments: 
First moment. Data must be collected under differing circum-
,, .• stances such as types of work, the meetings that people have, the role 
of women, the activities of young people, the use of leisure hours, 
games and sports, conversations, apparently unimportant items such as 
"the way people talk, their style of life, their behavior at church and 
work ••• their expressions, their vocabulary, their syntax (not their 
incorrect pronunciation, but rather the way they construct their 
87 
thought)." 
Second moment. The collection of information must then be 
evaluated in a series of meetings. The investigators should divide all 
85 
Ibid., p. 96, fn. 21. 
86 
Cf. Ibid., p. 115. 
87 
Ibid., p. 103. 
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the data according to the principal and derivative contradictions. 
These contradictions are constituted by limit-situations, themes, and 
tasks. Investigators select some of the most appropriate contradic-
tions to be used in the thematic investigation of the process of educa-
tion. The contradictions selected should be organized as a "thematic 
fan" open to the directions of other themes. The purpose is to 
communicate to the students their own reality in its totality. Freire 
says: "Individuals who were submerged in reality, merely feeling their 
88 
needs, emerge from reality and perceive the causes of their needs." 
Third moment. "Decoding" takes place through dialogue. Decoding 
is the process of search, identification, and apprehension of the "ex-
istential situations," such as social conditions of life, significant 
actions, systems of thoughts, and all aspects related to the whole sit-
uation. It is the critical analysis of the existential coded situation 
and the discovery of the interaction among the parts of the whole. De-
coding is an analysis which goes from the abstract to the concrete, from 
the situations to the elements present in these situations, and from the 
whole to the parts. In all the stages of decoding, the subjects of 
education (students-teachers) know the situation in which they find 
themselves, they find other subjects, and they discover their own reality. 
In the process of decoding, the subjects of education exteriorize the way 
in which they see their world: fatalistically, dynamically, or statically. 
rhe group of educators-educatee decodes through dialogue in a dynamic 
88 
. Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, p. 110. 
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communication which Freire calls "thematic investigation circles." 
These circles are led by a co-ordinator (the educator) with the help 
of two specialists: a psychologist and a sociologist. The coded exis-
tential situations are not narrations nor solutions but problem-posing 
situations to be discussed. Dialogue is mediated by the existential 
situations. Cordinators must challenge educatees, posing as prob-
lems the coded existential situations. The answers the educatee gives 
to the coded situations must also challenge the answers themselves. 
The two specialists have to provoke such dynamic and critical dia-
logue. 
Fourth moment. The themes explicit or implicit in the affir-
mation made during the decoding process are listed. The themes should 
be classified according to the sciences. Once the identification of 
themes is complete, each specialist presents a "breakdown" of each 
theme identifying fundamental nuclei and dividing them in learning 
units. The themes suggested by people usually do not provide the so-
called "hinged themes." These connectional themes will be suggested by 
the educators. 
These four moments are necessary to propose a curriculum of 
"instruction," to chose the content of the curriculum, and to develop 
such programs. I want to give two examples of how this education func-
tions for freedom of the oppressed. The first one is related to a 
89 
By "thematic investigation circle" Freire means the investi-
gators who, after the search made in the area of study, meet in order 
to put in common their findings. 
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generative theme. The second one is related to the content and func-
tion of a specific "subject." 
First example: the coding of the theme "culture." It was 
coded in ten existential situations, each situation represented by 
90 
pictures containing elements to be "decoded" by "cultural circles." 
Each representation corresponds to the existential reality of the 
groups. Freire was working with the peasants of Brazil. The ten pic-
tures make two basic distinctions: first, the distinction between na-
ture and culture. Nature is the world which people do not make. Cul-
ture is the world which people have made and make everyday. On the 
basis of nature which is common to them, all people relate and commu-
nicate among themselves. Culture is that which people make and add to 
their reality. If people understand this differentiation, people 
change their attitudes. They see themselves as subjects of their cul-
ture. When they work, they create culture because they modify nature; 
they acquire experience; they improve their actions; and they feel that 
they have the impulse to create and re-create. Second, the distinction 
between a literate culture and an unlettered culture. To acquire lit-
eracy is not only to master reading and writing techniques but to 
understand and to communicate graphically. It is not to memorize se-
tences, words, and syllables but to connect them, to create and recre-
90 
Freire calls "cultural circles" the "classroom" in which 
teachers and students teach and learn. Freire says: "A cultural circle 
is a live and creative dialogue, in which everyone knows some things 
and does not know others, in which all seek, together, to know more." 
Paulo Freire, "To "the coordinator of a 1 cultural circle"' (Mimeographed). 
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ate connections between them and the existential universe. Literate 
students relate themselves to this content, transform themselves in 
order to transform their universe and become free people. Words are 
91 
not donations from teachers but creations of students. 
Second example: the content of literacy class. Freire uses the 
so-called "generative words," ~vords with syllabic elements capable of 
offering, through combinations, the creation of new words. Thus, peo-
ple do not come to the culture circles to memorize words but to dis-
cover the way in which words are formed. The investigation of the 
generative words and the process of education have five steps. First, 
research on the vocabulary of the groups in which the educator is 
working. The words selected have existential meaning, emotional con-
tent, words linked with the experience of the groups. Second, the 
words were selected according to three criteria: phonetic richness, 
phonetic difficulty, and pragmatic tone. Third, the "codification" of 
words (17) in graded order, from least difficult to most. Fourth, e-
laboration of tentative agenda to be discussed in the culture circles. 
Fifth, the preparation of "discovery cards" to "break down" each word 
in phonetic families. Through these cards, students discover phonetic 
combinations. In making these combinations, students express themselves 
graphically through familiar speech patterns. Students are free, sub-
91 
Cf. Paulo Freire, Education for Critical Consciousness, pp. 
61-82. 
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jects of their own education. 
-------------------------
Summarizing the whole chapter, the terminus a quo of Freire's 
philosophy of education is the anthropological foundation of culture 
and education. The via ad of his philosophy of education is the 
reconceptualization of education. The terminus ad quem of Freire's 
philosophy of education is the option for freedom. 
Cultural contradiction is a characteristic of the transitional 
society in which is visible, with real conflict, the two poles of the 
anthropological contradiction: oppressor-oppressed. The closed society 
has created, as a result of the structural relations between the op-
pressor and the oppressed, the culture of silence which is the culture 
of the oppressed. The closed society has created also the culture of 
those who "have a voice" which is the culture of the oppressors. 
Freire's philosophy of education begins with the culture of silence, in 
solidarity "with" the oppressed. Freire refuses to be an educator of a 
cultural ghetto of the oppressors. Instead he decides to be "with" the 
peasants, especially with illiterate people who are the most oppressed 
of the closed society. 
People from the culture of silence emerge when humans find their 
own Differentia Specifica, their distinction from animals. They are 
"in" and above all "with" their world, open to the other, with a plural-
92 
Cf. Ibid., pp. 49-52, 81-84. 
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ity of relationships, challenges, and responses. They are rational in 
their confrontation with the world. They objectivize it and reflect 
upon it. They are also temporal because they are not only submerged 
"in" time but they emerge from it in their objectivization. They 
transcend their limitations. They reflect upon the world in order to 
act upon it, and they act upon the world enriching their reflection. 
Action and reflection have the intention of transforming the world and 
of producing something they are hoping for. Humans are beings of 
"projection." The intention of humans gives sense and purpose to the 
world. Humans are subjects who feel themselves unfinished, as people 
who need to be more, to humanize themselves. The imperative behind 
human praxis lies in the human ontological necessity to be more. 
Praxis is the tool of human self-realization. It is the method of 
relating men and tbeir world; it is the method of integration, not 
adaptation, in the physical, historical, and cultural context. 
Conscientization is praxis at a cultural level. It is the cultural 
method which overcomes cultural contradiction. Conscientization is 
praxis with all its anthropological foundations. 
A dehumanized culture is a cultural contradiction, and 
conscientization is the method which leads from dehumanization to hu-
manization. This method is a process which moves from a naive to a 
critical consciousness. It is the dialectical relationship between 
culture and historical-social reality, superstructural and infra-
structural dimensions, subjectivity and objectivity, consciousness 
and reality, reflection and action. In a few words, conscientization 
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is the method through which man relates to the cultural world. 
Conscientization emerges from the semi-intransitive consciousness, 
the consciousness which grasps the most immediate reality but not 
its causal links. This consciousness attributes the causal links to 
a superior power and is a fatalistic, resigned, and adapted conscious-
ness. The process of conscientization begins with the naive transi-
tive consciousness which is contradictory: on the one hand it keep 
its semi-intransitive characteristics and, on the other hand, it 
assumes the characteristic of its critical emergence. Critical con-
sciousness is the process of lucidly distinguishing between humans and 
theL: own world, the lucid grasp of facts and causal links, and the 
test.i,ns and review of findings. It avoids distortions of preconcep-
tions in its analysis. People with critical consciousness know that 
their perceptions and knowledge are not absolutes. They know their 
limitations and the appropriate place to act effectively. They know 
that all their knowledge relates to their action. Critical conscious-
ness is the principal characteristic of a culture of freedom. 
The new anthropological foundations of culture demand a re-
conceptualization of education. This reconceptualization is made in 
contrast to the education as banking. The structure of the education 
as banking is the closed society of oppressor-oppressed and the cul-
ture of oppression. The anthropological contradiction of the banking 
education is mediated by a narrative method between teacher and stu-
dent. In this education teachers are the subjects of education and 
students are its objects. Content is alienated from its reality. it 
' 
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is "petrified," and isolated from the context which engenders it and 
explains it. Education as banking is an education of domestication 
and domination. It is "necrophilic" because it transforms students 
into objects. Students become passive recipients, domesticated, and 
adapted. The basic problem of education as banking is to change the 
consciousness of students and adapt them to a world of oppression, not 
to humanize the world. 
The anthropological contradiction of education as banking is 
overcome by dialogue which is a dialectical method. One of the es-
sential elements of dialogue is the word. A true word is composed by 
action and reflection. The word without action is verbalism; the word 
without reflection is activism. The true word is praxis, part of the 
essence of human nature. It is the complex dialectical relationship of 
the word naming the world in light of the reality of a reflection upon 
the world and the human action upon it. True word is the annunciation 
of the world as well as the denunciation of it. If word means denun-
ciation to transform the world, dialogue is an existential necessity of 
everyone. The authentic word exists with others, in dialogue, to name 
the world. The authentic dialogue is an act of love, humility, faith, 
mutual trust, hope, critical consciousness, and communication. Dia-
logue is the method of overcoming education as banking and the meth-
od of a new education, the problem~posing education. 
The problem-posing education breaks the anthropological contra-
diction teacher-student. Narration is superseded by dialogue, vertical 
information by cognition, and "deposit-making" by posing problems. 
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Teachers and students are co-investigators; both confront problems, 
act upon them, and solve them. Teachers and students are mediated by 
the content; both converse in a horizontal relationship. Each teaches 
the other. No one is disconnected from the content; which is his real 
problem, his own reality. Teachers and students are involved in a 
gradual coming to know in which the content is grasped in a critical 
way. Both teachers and students are subjects of education. They are 
conscious about being "in" their world and about their relationship 
"with" it. They are conscious about their praxis upon their world. 
They are not domesticated; they are intentional transformers and 
creators. In this transformation they humanize their world and human-
ize themselves. Problem-posing education is biophilic for it loves 
life, it is prophetic for it builds future; it is for change and for 
freedom. Problem-posing education is a revolutionary education. 
The alternatives of educators today are the banking or the prob-
lem-posing education. There is no third way. Neutrality is impossible. 
Freire opts for the problem-posing education, the education of the op-
pressed. The practice of a "Pedagogy of the Oppressed" is not to make 
another oppressor but to liberate the oppressed from the oppressive con-
tradiction. The alternatives are education for domination or education 
for freedom. However, a danger does exist when the power of education 
to change society is overestimated; but it is equally dangerous when 
the power of education to change society is underestimated. The option 
for an education of the oppressed is an option in favor of the illiter-
ate. Illiteracy is not a natural problem but a "phenomenic-reflex" of 
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the social structure. Literacy education is not to incorporate the 
illiterate into the system but to train them to participate in the trans-
formation of the system. 
The two alternatives of education involve two different methods: 
"deposit-making" and dialogue. Each of them has two different epistemo-
logical presuppositions. Deposit-making education has the characteris-
tic of knowledge as something possessed, as a given fact, and omits the 
perspective of totality. This knowledge dichotomizes teacher and 
learning, knowing and working, thinking and doing, informing and 
forming, and re-knowing and creating. This knowledge is the transmis-
sion of the teacher's knowledge, a doxa. 
Dialogue implies knowledge as a permanent process of the sub-
jects of education, i.e., teachers and students. Nobody has absolute 
knowledge or ignorance. Knowledge is a process which arises in the 
permanent relationship between human being and his world, and between 
teachers and students. Teachers and students are cognitive subjects 
confronting together the knowable objects. The task of teachers is to 
create conditions which are conducive to shared acquisition of knowl-
edge, to put content as problem in order to problematize teachers and 
students, to "re-enter" the content, to analyze it, and to grasp it. 
This knowledge is at a scientific level; it does not dichotomize the 
process of education. 
Education for freedom is an education of free people. The 
practical process of this education begins when teachers investigate 
the "thematic universe" of the area in which they will teach. Such 
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investigation is made with the participation of people of the area. For 
educational purposes the "epochal themes" found are taken as "genera-
tive themes" because they unfold in new themes and new tasks. The 
generative themes are coded in different ways to make easy the process 
of knowledge. Education for freedom takes place when the "decoding" 
through dialogue takes place by students in the "culture circles." 
The principal themes emerge from these dialogues. The themes are the 
basis for making the plan of studies. These fundamental steps of edu-
cation for freedom are a process in which teachers and students partic-
ipate. The education for freedom is an education for free people. 
Then, the cultural contradiction is a reflex of the social 
contradiction, the terminus a quo of the educational thought of Freire. 
The anthropological contradiction present at the infrastructural level 
is present also at the superstructural level, i.e., culture. This 
contradiction is overcome by the necessary reconceptualization of edu-
cation, the via ad of the educational thought of Freire. This method 
formulates an education for freedom, the terminus ad quem of the educa-
tional thought of Freire. Education for freedom is a pedagogy of the 
oppressed which through the process of knowledge enables people to be 
free. However, what does Freire understand by freedom? This is the 
problem that I will discuss in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER V 
FREEDOM AND LIBERATION 
The problem we are confronted with today 
is that of the organization of social 
and economic forces, so that man --as 
a member of organized society-- may be-
come the master of these forces and 
cease to be their slave.l Erich Fromm 
Freedom is the major imperative of human beings, the terminus ad 
quem of the entire system of Freire's thought. If oppression of the 
closed society is the terminus a quo of his social theory, freedom of the 
open society is the necessary terminus ad quem. If the contradiction op-
pressor-oppressed is the terminus a quo of his philosophical principles, 
the free human being is the necessary terminus ad quem. If the culture 
of oppressjnn is the terminus a quo of his cultural analysis, the culture 
of freedom is the necessary terminus ad quem. If banking education is 
the terminus a quo of an education for domination, problem-posing educa-
tion is the terminus ad quem of an education for freedom. The concept 
of freedom permeates the complete thought of Paulo Freire. 
However, freedom is not an idealistic formulation in which there 
are no external constraints. Freire conceives freedom in the midst of 
the physical, economic, social, political, and cultural circumstances. 
1 
Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom (New York: Hlt, Rinehart and 
Winston, 1976) p. 271. 
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Hence, to talk about freedom is to talk also about its circumstances. 
In other words, the discussion of Freire's concept of freedom is located 
in the inevitable discussion of freedom and its limitations. This is 
the terminus a quo of Freire's concept of freedom. 
As a consequence, freedom is not an ahistorical concept, iso-
lated from the dynamic development of history and culture. Freedom is 
not acquired all at once. Freedom is a process, a dialectical creation 
which Freire calls liberation. Liberation is the dialectical method of 
freedom, the via ad. 
Thus, freedom is a revolutionary, dynamic, and social concept. 
It is a historical project to be created, but, at the same time, a 
reality which is lived at the moment in which the strategic actions 
for freedom are put in practice. Freedom is a historical reality in 
permanent search; it is the terminus ad quem of the concept of freedom 
and of Freire's thought as a whole. 
1. FREEDOM AND LIMITATIONS 
Freire locates the limitations of freedom in the social world. 
There are three kind of societies: the closed, the transitional, and the 
open society. Hhile Freire explains these societies in chronological 
order, they are simultaneously present in Latin America today and they 
relate to each other. The characteristics of the closed society are 
the limitations of the open society, and the characteristics of the 
open society are the continual overcoming of the limitations of the 
closed society. The transitional society is the "place" in which 
freedom, as the principal characteristic of the open society, comes 
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into conflict with the characteristics of the closed society. The char-
acteristics of the closed society can be summarized in three words: op-
pression, dependence, and marginalization. Oppression involves social, 
economic, and political limitations, the terminus a quo of the limita-
tions of freedom. Dependence involves the economic-social-political 
limitations in dialectical relationship with the cultural limitations, 
the via ad of the limitations of freedom. Marginalization involves the 
economic-social-political limitations in dialectical relationship with 
the educational limitations. Marginalization is the terminus ad quem 
of the limitations of freedom. 
a) The Social Limitations 
In colonial times, the colonizer was the exploiter and domi-
nator. The landowners, the proprietors of immense tracts of lands, were 
the accomplices of the colonizer and oppressed their workers. The colo-
nies were in the hands of landowners, nobles, governors, captains, and 
viceroys who followed the policy of the colonizer countries (Spain and 
Portugal). If any change took place, it was only a change in the style 
of oppression. In the early years of colonization, the contradiction 
was between masters and slaves or between landowners and workers. Later, 
the contradiction was between rich and poor, Europeans and Africans, 
bourgeoisie and natives. These contradictions were different expressions 
of the same contradiction of oppressor-oppressed. 
National power was in the hands of an elite who obeyed prescrip-
tions of the oppressors. The elite were superimposed upon their people; 
they did not govern "with" their people. Ordinary people were used as 
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objects of their own history and did not participate as subjects in 
their historical process. The social organization was rigid and author-
itarian; there was no upward and downward social mobility. Society was 
static. The dominated classes could never participate in the privileges 
of the dominant people. The dominant people also never wanted to par-
ticipate in the dominated life. Economic, social and political status 
was acquired by inheritance and not by skills and values. 
The colonial age inherited a society of oppression in which the 
oppressed were so immersed that they could not see how oppressed they 
were. What is important for Freire is that this condition is still 
present in the social composition of Latin American society today. The 
oppressed people have not discovered their true humanity; they are not 
able to recognize themselves as persons; and they refuse to admit that 
they are members of the oppressed class. They have interiorized ',tbe 
image of the oppressors, and they resemble the oppressor, imitate him, 
and follow him. Freire says: 
If they long for an agrarian reform, for instance, it is not in 
order to become free men, but to get their hands on land, to be 
owners themselves, or more exactly, to be the bosses of other 
workers ... The context of the peasant's situation --i.e., op-
pression-- remains unchanged: the new foreman feels he has to 
be as harsh as the owner, and maybe more so to protect his job.2 
From the three levels of oppression, the economic, social and 
political, also emerge three main contradictions. Firstly, the eco-
nomic contradiction generates inequality of distribution of wealth. 
2 
Paulo Freire, "A Key Idea of Paulo Freire: Oppression," LADOC 
lSeptember-October 1975): 17. 
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Such contradiction is between the exploiter and the exploited. The op-
pressors exploit the oppressed using "their power to gain from the weak-
3 
ness of the oppressed." In those conditions, the oppressed lack confi-
dence, the ability to think, and the desire to transform their own situa-
4 
tion. 
Second, the social contradiction is generated by the social 
stratification of a society of inequality. The contradiction is be-
tween dominators and dominated. High economic status gives prestige, 
lifestyle, and power. Lower economic status gives loss of reputation, 
scarcity, and weakness. The upper classes are the dominant sectors, 
and the lower classes are the dominated sectors. 
Third, the political contradiction is generated by socio-eco-
nomic status. The contradiction is between the elite who have the 
power and who essentially repress the rest of the people, and the rest 
of the people who have no power and always are repressed by the elite. 
People with high income and high social class generate their own elite 
who run for public office to control the political power. They make 
all the most important decisions which are imposed upon the rest of 
the people. People with low income and low social class have no access 
to the public arena nor have they any possibility to participate in 
political decision making. They have always been expected to be sub-
3 
Dec Stull, "Analysis of Terms used in The Pedagogy of the Op-
pressed by Paulo Freire," Winter 1972 (Mimeographed), p. 4. 
4 
Cf. Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, pp. 28, 40-41. 
46-51. 
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missive, and, when they protest or revolt, inevitable repression fol-
lows. 
Economic exploitation is the terminus a quo of oppression. It 
provides freedom with one of its fundamental limitations. The contra-
dictory relationship between exploiter-exploited is the "limit-situa-
tion" to be overcome. Social domination is the via ad of oppression. 
Freedom is limited by the social structure. The contradictory rela-
tionship between dominator-dominated is another "limit-situation" to be 
overcome. Political repression is the terminus ad quem of oppression. 
Freedom is limited by this irrational behavior. The contradictory re-
lationship between repressor and repressed is another "limit-situation" 
to be overcome. 
Freire explains the levels and extent of oppression. Oppression 
is a limit-situation not only at the economic, social, and political 
level --the infrastructural reality of everyone-- but also at the cul-
tural, psychological, and educational level-- the superstructural real-
ity. These contradictions determine limit-situations in everyday life. 
One example of these contradictions is provided by Freire: 
A sociologist friend of mine tells the story of a group of armed 
peasants in Latin America who took over a latifundio. For some 
reason, they decided to hold the owner as hostage. But no one 
had the courage to stay and guard him. His very presence cowed 
them, and maybe they had some sort of guilt feelings. In any 
event, the boss was certainly "in them."5 
5 
Paulo Freire, "A Key Idea of Paulo Freire: Oppression," p. 29. 
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b) The Cultural Limitations 
During the colonial years a society of dependence flourished. 
Latin American societies grew, existed, and developed outside of the 
economic, social, and political center. The closed society was a re-
flection of another economy, of another society, and of political 
decision-making by outsiders. The closed society was on the periphery 
of the center on which it depended. 
A dependent society is that which "is merely [an} object of 
what another society or another people does to it: Hegel would say it 
6 
is a 'being for another'." Colonial economy depended on an external 
economy and did not respond to national interest. The raw materials 
were produced to satisfy external demands. Internal production and 
international markets were controlled by the center. Laws and decrees 
were to favor the center or the local government which was representing 
the center. Press, schools, foreign relations, and other aspects of 
life were restricted and controlled by the center. 
As I have said, the center of authority was located outside of 
the country and the local authorities were serving such a center. Still 
more, the sugar aristocracy, the powerful landowners, the highborn, and 
the wholesalers were tributaries not only to the economy of the center 
but to the social prestige generated in the metropolitan society. De-
pendent society was constituted by the cheaper manpower who had to 
work and obey. The closed society was a servile society. 
6 
;Paulo Freire, "A Key Idea of Paulo Freire: Dependence," LADOC 
(September-October 1975): 20. 
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The colonial age inherited a situation of dependence which re-
mains present in Latin American today. Freire says: 
Latin American societies have been closed ever since the days of 
the conquest by the Spaniards and Portuguese, when the culture 
of silence first took shape. And all these societies, with the 
exception of Cuba's, are still closed. They are dependent socie-
ties, for whom the only thing that changed down the centuries were 
the metropolises that made the decisions for them: Portugual, Spain, 
England, and now the United States.7 
Based on the contradictions discussed above, there are three 
levels of dependence: economic, social, and political dependence. 
Firstly, the economic dependence based on the contradiction of exploiter-
exploited. Such contradiction produces a dependence in the exportation 
of local products (generally raw materials) and the importation of 
manufactured goods. The oppressors control all importations and expor-
tations according to their own interests. At the national level, the 
distinction between center and periphery is also evident'. The ex-
ploiters who are in the center control the lifestyle of all the society 
and reduce the exploited to a dependent and submissive condition. Sec-
ond, social dependence based on the contradiction of dominator-dominated 
produces a rigid and hierarchical social structure. The upper classes 
have all kinds of opportunities and the lower classes have few op-
portunities or none at all. The upper classes have a culture charac-
teristic of those who "have a voice," the culture of domination; the 
lower classes have the culture of silence, the culture of the dominated. 
Third, political dependence controls all areas of life through the 
7 
Ibid., pp. 22,23. 
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mechanisms of government. This dependence is maintained on the basis 
of power and, as a last resort, on the basis of irrational repression. 
In its roots, political dependence has the violent contradiction of 
repressor-repressed. All the social institutions are used to maintain 
dependence. Freire will especially analyze education as a selective 
system in which schools are instruments to preserve the status quo. 
A dependent and submissive society is silent. But "being si-
lent doesn't mean not having one's own word to speak, but following 
the orders of those who talk --and who impose their voice, their 
8 
world." People do not use their voice in crucial situations. Still 
more, in virtue of long years of dependence, the oppressed assimilate 
the cultural myths of the metropolitan society, are attracted to its 
aspirations, concerns, and values, and reject their own aspirations, 
concerns, and values. The closed society sees its own reality through 
the eyes of the center. People of the periphery ignore what is going 
on in their own reality; they do not know their own themes, obstacles, 
and tasks. To be Brazilian --Freire says-- was to try to be more like 
the Portuguese in the colonial years or to be like the European or 
North American in later years. People regret they were born in their 
own country; they have become ashamed of their own society and yearn 
for another society. They live in their own country but think in 
terms of another country and imitate it. To be educated is to be less 
Brazilian --Freire says-- and more European; to be moral is to follow 
8 
I.bid., 20. 
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the moral values of other people. The people always look with contempt 
on their own values. For instance, they value foreign techniques more 
than their own simply because they are foreign. 
Dependence is a limit-situation not only at the economic, social, 
and political level --the infrastructural reality of everyone-- but at 
the psychological, cultural, and educational level-- the superstructural 
reality of everyone. The limit-situations for freedom are: first, the 
dependent and submissive people of the periphery are in contradiction 
to ·the dominant and directing people of the center. Second, the lower 
class has been subjected to a culture of silence, a culture which de-
pends on the culture of the oppressors. This contradiction has promoted 
the imposition of the culture of the oppressors upon the culture of si-
lence, the culture of the oppressed. Third, the condition of those who 
are controlled through political ways is in contradiction to those who 
are considered to have the capacity to alienate others. These contra-
dictions are the cultural limitations of freedom. 
c) The Educational Limitations 
The colonial.years inherited a situation of marginalization. 
Marginalization refers to the society which was --and still is-- outside 
the borders of the colonizer country, the economic center. In the time 
of colonization, Portugal in the case of Brazil and Spain in the case of 
the rest of Latin America were the real economic centers. The economic 
periphery --the closed society-- was only an object of exploitation. 
Marginalization refers also to that part of society which does 
not have the economic capacity to live and sustain human life under 
minimum conditions. This part of a society is the periphery of the 
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economic center in contradistinction to the people who have enough ec-
onomic resources and at times a high rate of income. The wealthy people 
are the center of the economic structure at a local level; they are the 
exploiters of the exploited. 
Marginalization refers to the lower classes which have no op-
portunity for education, medical care, and appropriate housing. TheY 
do not have the-capacity to solve their problems. These classes are 
dependent on the mercy of those who have real options and the capacity 
to solve the daily problems. The lower classes are always the domioated 
while the upper classes are always the dominator. 
Marginalization refers also to those people who do not have ca-
pacity and opportunity to make political decisions. They react by 
reflex. As satellites, they receive orders to be followed and they do 
not participate directly in public affairs at national or local levels. 
The political center is always the subject, and the periphery is al~ays 
the object of action. 
Marginalization does not refer to people who are "outside of" 
the system. On the contrary, marginalized people are "inside of" th-e 
system. Marginalization is defined as the periphery in relation to the 
center, as the oppressed to the oppressor, as the dominated to the 
dominator, and as the repressed to the repressor. Marginalization 
refers to the people who constitute the wide "bank of the river" in 
which the majority is the marginalized and the minority the marginali-
zer. 
But who has decided to put people on the periphery? Have the 
marginalized people decided their own marginalization? To think of 
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marginalization as a free decision of the marginalized, Freire says, is 
"against common sense." He says: 
Is marginalization, with all its consequences --hunger, debility, 
disease, pain, mental deficiency, death, crime, promiscuity, 
desperation, the sheer impossibility of going on living --a 
deliberate choice? No, indeed.9 
The center, which has been composed by people who have the eco-
nomic, social, and political power, has maintained people with less power 
in the periphery. In doing so, people of the center reject people of 
the periphery. Such rejection is an act of repression; it is an act 
of violence, whatever form such rejection may take. An example of 
this violence on the level of education is the condition of the illit-
erate people, Lhe most marginalized, most exploited and most dominated 
people of the society. Freire refers to this violence by using sta-
tistical data of illiteracy, data which give a worse picture than the 
10 
data of Emilio Monti which I quoted. Freire says: 
It is difficult to accept that 40% of Brazil's population, almost 
90% of Haiti's, 60% of Bolivia's, about 40% of Peru's, more than 
30% of Mexico's and Venezuela's, and about 70% of Guatemala's 
would have made the tragic choice of their . own marginality as 
illiterates. ·If, then, marginality is not by choice, marginal 
man has been expelled from and kept outside of the social system 
and is therefore the object of violence.!! 
9 
Paulo Freire, "A Key Idea of Paulo Freire: Marginalization," 
LADOC (September-October 197?): 28. 
10 
Cf. p. 6 7. 
11 
Paulo Freire, Cultural Action for Freedom, p. 10. 
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However, the illiterate people have not been expelled from "the 
social system." What they suffer is the violence of being placed a-
gainst their will in a position of dependence and exploitation. They 
are dependent on those who wrongly think they are independent, and they 
are exploited by those who wrongly think they are free to exploit, domi-
nate, and repress them. Marginalization is part of the system which 
maintains the contradiction between the center and the periphery. 
Freire interprets illiteracy as the peripheral side of society whose 
center is literate. 
For this reason, he calls attention to the ways in which 
he understands illiteracy. He says that illiteracy can be understood 
12 
from a naive or a critical perspective. The naive understanding, 
considering illiteracy as an "absolute problem" which will never 
disappear, assumes a natural determinism on the cultural level, hence 
the accusation of an "innate apathy" in the illiterate people. Consid-
ering illiteracy as a cultural "undernourishing," it also assumes a 
lack of the "bread of the spirit;" hence the accusation of a low in-
telligence in the illiterate. Considering illiteracy as a "poison 
herb" which must be eradicated, it assumes an intrinsic wickedness; 
hence the accusation of negligence in the illiterate. Considering 
illiteracy as a "contagious illness" to be cured as soon as possible, 
it also assumes a natural indisposition; hence the accusation of 
12 
Cf. Paulo Freire, "La Alfabetizacidn de Adultos: Cr{tica de 
su Vision Ingenua, Comprension de su Vision Cr:ltica," Cristianismo y 
Sociedad, Suplemento, (Setiembre 1968): p. 7, 8. 
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incompetence in the illiterate. The natural consequence of this naive 
conception is a mechanical theory of literacy: education is reduced to 
a complex technique, to a standard style, and a bureaucratic opera-
13 
tion. To educate is "to feed" the "hungry" and "thirsty" of spirit. 
Words are "deposits of vocabulary," "the bread of the spirit which 
the illiterates are to 'eat' and 'digest 1 ." 14 Here "to know is to 
eat." Literacy campaigns are "the medicine" to cure illiterates, to 
"return" them to the "healthy" structure of society. For this reason 
Freire says that literacy is an act of "domestication." 
The critical understanding in contrast discovers illiteracy as 
"the phenomenal-reflexive explanation of the structure of a society 
15 
in a given historical moment." Oppressors see illiteracy not as 
something the system develops but as a "choice" made by the illiterate. 
But Freire says that illiteracy is an internal phenomenon of the system. 
It is a consequence of marginalization· Illiteracy is outside of the 
center but not outside of the system. Illiteracy is at the periphery. 
To be illiterate does not mean to lack culture, neither does it 
mean to lack cultural capacity. The illiterate transform their world 
13 
Paulo Freire, Cultural Action for Freedom, p. 1. 
14 
Ibid., p. 8. 
15 
"La explicitacio'n fenomenico-refleja de la estructura de una 
sociedad en un momenta historico dado". Paulo Freire, "La Alfabetiza-
cio'n de Adultos: Cr!tica de su Vision Ingenua, Comprensio'n de su Vision 
Cr!tica," p. 7. 
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with their work; they express themselves with their words; and they 
communicate their thought. In spite of their marginalization, they 
create their own techniques; they know how to deal with illness without 
modern medical care; they have particular customs and habits; they 
have the capacity to create a culture which Freire calls the culture 
of silence. 
Illiteracy is a good example of marginalization. But illiteracy 
not only refers to the people who do not know how to read and write; 
illiteracy has a broad sense. Freire relates the conception of illit-
eracy --traditionally understood as the inability to read and 
write-- with the inability to read and write one's own reality. 
Freire has expressed many times his sorrow because all traditional 
schools (education as banking), from the lowest to the highest levels, 
graduate good technicians, well-educated people, and scientists who 
do not have the capacity to read and rewrite their own reality. They 
know many things about their own speciality, but they have no idea about 
the problems of their own people, even if the problems directly affect 
them. Literate and equcated people cannot read the economic, social, 
and political reality. In this sense, they are also illiterate. 
At this level, Freire again calls to our attention the way in 
which systems of education are understood. In the same way in which he 
understands illiteracy, he also understands education as a whole. There 
are two understandings: the naive and the critical. Naive education 
consists in a practice to oppress, dominate, and marginalize students. 
This education corresponds to education as banking. Freire says: 
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Systematic education reflects necessarily the ideas and the system 
of ideas of those who have the power to establish the system of 
education. It's something obvious, nevertheless many times we don't 
recognize it. And if you analyze the activities of schools around 
the world, with some exceptions of course, you can perceive easily 
that schools are above all instruments for social control.16 
Traditional 'education alienates students by making them more op-
pressed, dependent, and marginalized. Critical education is a process 
in which students not only know how to read and write words or know a 
specific area of knowledge but also know how to read and rewrite the 
reality in which they are immersed. Critical education consists of 
a practice for freedom. Freedom here confronts the limit-situations 
provided by marginalization, i.e., the contradiction of the center and 
periphery. 
In summary, the unequal distribution and exploitation of e~onom-
ic resources determine the first fundamental limit-situations of freedom. 
These limitations are different expressions of the oppressor-oppressed 
contradiction. Economic stratification determines the second and social 
fundamental limit-situations of freedom. These limitations are the 
different expressions of the contradiction of dominant-dominated social 
classes. The socio-economic status determines the third and political 
fundamental limit-situation of freedom. These limitations are different 
16 
David Brandes, "Education for Liberation: An Interview with 
Paulo Freire." An interview for Canadian Broadcasting Corporation TV 
Show , "Something Else," Ottawa, June 18, 1971, P• 5. 
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expressions of the contradiction between repressor and repressed. Op-
pression generates economic, social, and political dependence, and 
dependence generates economic, social, and political marginalization. 
Oppression is the historical limitation, the terminus a quo of limita-
tions; dependence is the historical-cultural limitations, the via ad; 
and marginalization is the historical-educative limitation, the 
terminus ad quem of these limitations. Historical limitations are the 
infrastructure while cultural and educative limitations are the super-
structure. Freire discusses cultural dependence as the limit-situations 
of freedom; i.e., cultural contradictions. He also discusses educational 
marginalization as the limit-situation of freedom; i.e., the educational 
contradictions. These contradictions are challenges to freedom. 
2. LIBERATION, THE DIALECTICAL METHOD 
There are three principal meanings of liberation as a dialectical 
method of freedom: liberation as a historical and revolutionary proc-
ess, the terminus a quo; liberation as a praxiological method to ful-
fill the task of freedom, the via ad; and liberation as humanization, 
the terminus ad quem. 
a) Liberation, a Revolutionary Process 
The concept of freedom as liberation is correlated with the tran-
sitional society which, according to the social theory of Freire, has 
three principal characteristics: first, there is a struggle between the 
closed and open societies; second, there is repression by the closed 
society; and, third, there are advances and retreats in the continuing 
struggle. 
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The closed society is based upon a series of aspirations, con-
cerns, and values which justify its way of life. They and their con-
tradictions are expressed in epochal themes. Epochal themes are con-
tradictions which have to be overcome and are tasks which demand ful-
fillment. Freire's contradictions of oppression, dependence, and 
marginalization are epochal themes. These themes have different expres-
sions at the infrastructural level --the economic, social, and polit-
ical-- as well as at the superstructural level --the cultural and 
educational. His themes and contradictions have particular and 
specific expressions in a given place and time. 
When people separate themselves from their world and from their 
own activity (objectivization), they recognize a particular expression 
of epochal themes. The epochal themes of the closed society are con-
tradictions which Freire recognizes as limit-situations. All people 
,are, consciously or unconsciously, served by limit-situations in a 
direct or indirect way. Situations constitute ''limits" because they 
can be a frontier at which people are discouraged or at which people 
are challenged. However, Freire says that human nature always finds 
everything a challenge, an occasion of transcendence, an opportunity to 
change the world, an opportunity to humanize itself. Still more is 
that true if the situation is a "limit." Quoting Professor Alvaro 
Vieira Pinto, Freire says: 
The "limit-situations" are not "the impassable boundaries where 
possibilities end, but the real boundaries where all possibilities 
begin"; they are not "the frontier which separates being from 
nothingness, but the frontier which separates being from being 
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17 
more." 
Limit-situations reveal the true nature of reality, whether it 
be economic, social, and political or cultural and educative. Limit-
situations suggest the "places" in which people can act, in which they 
make "limit-acts." Limit-situations are overcome when people act upon 
concrete and historical reality. 
Limit-situations are fetters of freedom, the obstacles which 
freedom has to overcome; they appear as insurmountable barriers which 
freedom has to confront; they are challenges which freedom has to meet. 
However, when limit-situations are overcome, new contradictions of 
epochal themes are shown, contradictions which are limit-situations and 
which have to be overcome again. Thus freedom is a continual process 
of action upon reality in order to overcome the emerging appearances of 
limitations. Freedom is a continual struggle; in one word, freedom is 
liberation. That means that freedom is not static but the act and effect 
of creating freedom. Freire says: "Since I cannot prefigure a historical 
era of absolute freedom, I refer to liberation as a permanent process in 
18 
history." 
But liberation from what? Freire has pointed out three basic 
contradictions which are the limit-situations, generally speaking, of 
the closed society: oppression, dependence, and marginalization. Liber-
17 
Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, p. 89, fn. 15. 
18 
Paulo Freire, "Literacy and the Possible Dream," p. 69 
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ation from oppression appears when the oppressed people discover their 
epochal themes, their historical and concrete limit-situations, and their 
potentialities. No one can understand better the need for liberation 
than the oppressed who suffer the effects of oppression. Howeve~ liber-
ation will begin not by mere luck but by fighting for freedom. Liber-
ation is the action of the exploited, dominated, and repressed to over-
come the various forms of the oppressor-oppressed contradiction. The 
goal is not to be new oppressors or sub-oppressors, l-Thich ,.,auld be the 
simple repetition of the old ideal, but to be free people. The contra-
diction will be resolved when the "new man" arises, when the answer is 
neither the oppressor nor the oppressed but the man in the process of 
being liberated. 
Liberation from dependence appears when the oppressed people act 
as subjects and not merely as objects. People act as subjects when they 
become a "society for itself" and not a society for another society. 
People act as subjects when economically they do not depend on an exter-
nal metropolis, or on internal representatives of that metropolis, for 
their own development. People act as subjects when socially they reject 
being the servile society for another society in the international con-
test or when the lower classes reject being the culture of silence for 
the culture of those who "have a voice" at the national or local level. 
People act as subjects when politically they reject the control of the 
eli~e on political participation in public affairs and deny the repres-
sion which they protest angered because of their lack of participation. 
People act as subjects lvhen historically and concretely they change the 
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reality of oppression. They begin to be subjects when they discover the 
image of the oppressed in their own consciousness and decide to expel it 
from themselves, when they decide not to be another oppressor but to be 
a free human being. People act as subjects when culturally they reject 
the epochal themes of metropolitan societies and acknowledge their limit-
situations as a task of transforming reality. 
Liberation from marginalization appears when oppressed people 
discover themselves not as people outside of the system, but as people 
who are for another. It appears when the marginalized understands that 
he is on the periphery because the center has rejected him, because he 
is a victim of the polymorphous violence of the people of the center •• 
Illiteracy, manipulation, even education are acts of marginalization 
when they alienate people from their reality and make change difficult. 
Liberation from marginalization arises when the oppressed people over-
come these contradictions and act upon reality in order to change it. 
In the light of this analysis, we can see that liberation is a 
revolutionary process which begins in the recognition of epochal themes, 
their contradictions,.and their limit-situations. The crucial limita-
tions of freedom for human beings are the limit-situations, the finite-
ness of being "in" and "with" their world. Limit-situations offer the 
19 
only alternative between being or not being. They are radical and 
ontological limitations which put in danger the humanness of existence. 
When people objectivize limit-situations, they acquire the capacity 
19 
Cf. Paulo Freire, "Cultural Liberty in Latin America," pp. 
3' 4. 
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both to take these problems as objects of observation --as objects of 
"ad-miration," Freire says-- and to act upon reality to change them. 
such limitations are the borders which reality presents to human ac-
tion, but they also show that such borders are not the absolute end of 
human action. Limit-situations, indeed all kinds of limitations, are 
only challenges for new action. Liberated action transcends human 
limitations. 
Liberation is a revolutionary process based on love for the op-
pressed who suffer the effects of oppressive and dehumanized structures. 
Liberation is the struggle for freedom in "pre-revolutionary times~" 
when the system of oppression is still in power. Liberation is the 
characteristic'of a transitional society in which the closed and open 
societies confront each other. The closed society is based on op-
pression, dependence, and marginalization, whereas the open society is 
based on freedom. The closed society defends old values, themes, and 
tasks. Liberation provokes a situation of social change in which the 
closed society is in process of disappearance and the new society is in 
a process of formation. 
However, when the act of liberation begins to be effective, the 
coup d'etat is the typical response of the elite. A coup is the arbi-
trary action of military elites to stop the transition of the entire 
society towards freedom. For the elite, liberation is subversion. 
A coup is the antithesis of the revolutionary process. It is an un-
popular action to return to the same old society by force. The control 
of this retrogression is maintained by repression. But such a step is 
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only a moment of the struggle in which, according to Freire, there is 
"flux and reflux," ebb and flow. The new themes are repressed but they 
do not disappear. They survive underground, waiting for a new opportu-
nity to fight and to provoke new transitions. What is necessary at 
these moments of retreat is to analyze t·he new limit-situations. Freire 
says: "The analysis should focus on the dialectical confrontation be-
20 
tween the revolutionary project .•. and the military forces." 
b) Liberation, a Praxiological Method 
Liberation is an act for freedom, but it is not "activism." 
Liberation is praxis, action and reflection upon the world to transform 
it. Liberation is not action without reflection, which could become 
"libertinism," but an action under a lucid and rigorous rational analysis. 
Liberation also is not pure freedom of consciousness to reflect only in 
an abstract way (subjectivism) but is a historical and concrete necessity. 
Liberation is the dialectical relationship between freedom and 
its social and historical limit-situations. This process is mediated by 
praxis: reflection and action. Reflection objectivizes reality and 
one's own action upon it. Reality, in concrete terms, is a piece of the 
world, suggested by limit-situations found in a historical moment, a 
piece of the world not isolated from the totality but part of the whole. 
Reality is also not static. All limit-situations are fixed in a world 
of continual process. Reflection is thinking upon reality, analyzing it, 
and elaborating strategic plans to act upon it. Action is the human 
20 
Paulo Freire, "A Key Idea of Paulo Freire: Dependence," p. 27. 
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work upon a reality suggested by the limit-situations, a reality which 
is the continual movement. Action is the force that transforms reality, 
a force that creates, and produces new things. 
A dialectical relationship between freedom and its social and 
historical limit-situations, liberation leads from a naive to a crit-
ical consciousness. Liberation is a process of conscientization. Peo-
ple under long-standing oppression, dependence, and marginalization 
are unable "to stand far enough off" to objectivize their own reality. 
They generally are immersed in the reality which is around them and 
cannot perceive their epochal themes, their limit-situations, and 
their necessary tasks. When they do perceive some of these factors, 
they perceive them in a distorted way. The only aspects which they can 
perceive are their lived experience, their basic needs. Freire says 
that these people have a semi-intransitive consciousness. 
However, when people discover in their consciousness the image 
of the oppressors, dominators, and repressors, when they realize that 
such an image is the reflection of economic, social, and political 
structures, and when they identify the external contradictions with 
possibilities of change, liberation begins. Then, the epochal themes 
appear, the real contradictions are no longer tolerable, and the limit-
situations have to be overcome. Freire says that these people have a 
naive transitive consciousness. It is naive because it holds on to the 
problem of the semi-intransitive consciousness but transitive because 
it emerges from the semi-intransitive consciousness. Conscientization 
is the process of liberation. 
Liberation is consciousness-raising, but it is not a "subjec-
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tivism." Freire insists again that liberation is praxis. Liberation 
is not an arbitrary creation of the mind, a subjectivism "which always 
tends toward the extreme of solipsism" without action. Liberation also 
is not an objectivism which always neglects reflection and tends toward 
the extreme of a decisive determination of the object without any 
subjective process. Liberation as consciousness-raising is the dia-
lectical relationship between subjectivity and objectivity, between 
21 
reflection and action. 
Each action of liberation is a transformation of reality, and 
each transformation of reality is a transformation of consciousness. 
Reality changes and consciousness also changes. However, there is no 
change: of social reality without a change of consciousness, and there is 
no change of consciousness without a change of reality. Continual re-
flection produces a continual transformation of reality at the points 
at which ceh~~anized structures show their limit-situations. Continual 
action produces change of the naive-consciousness, making it more lucid 
and critica·l. Continual action and reflection produce effects in two 
directions: in the structure of the society, making political action 
more effective and provoking important changes, and in the collective 
consciousness of people, making them more cohesive, more solidary, and 
more powerful in their action. People of naive-transitive consciousness, 
by increasing their acuity, begin the transition from naive to critical 
21 
Cf. Paulo Freire, "Cultural Action: A Dialectical Analysis," 
PP • 1 Is , 1 I 6 • 
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consciousness, the process of conscientization. 
However, liberation as praxis threatens the economic, social, and 
political structures, and the elite become alarmed. The elite react at 
first in a paternalistic attitude providing some help and developing 
"assistential" programs. When the praxis of liberation increases in 
effectiveness, the elite make superficial changes but "only in order to 
22 
head off any real lessening of their power of control." When the 
elite have a populist tendency, they try to take advantage of the naive 
consciousness of people and manipulate them. What the elite want is to 
strengthen naive attitudes and to abort a fragile and incipient aware-
ness. When critical consciousness increases and the elite cannot mani-
pulate people to their own purposes, the oligarchy calls for a coup 
d'etat, a clear measure of violence, which is generally made by military 
power. As a result, the process of conscientization may be distorted for 
a time and the naive consciousness may be reinforced, but people with 
critical consciousness will remain underground analyzing the new situa-
tion and initiating a new process of praxis which will open a new op-
portunity for transition. 
c) Liberation, a struggle for humanization 
Freire sees liberation as the natural consequence of being human. 
To be human is to be open to relationships, to be "with" and not merely 
"in" the world. These relationships are with the world, with other peo-
ple, and with oneself. When Freire says that a human being is subject, 
22 
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he means that a human being is conscious of himself and of all the world. 
He is integrated with and not adapted to the world. He is able to ob-
jectivize the world and even himself, and to recognize both the place 
he has in the world and his limit-situations. 
However, the real conditions of oppression, dependence; and 
marginalization have distorted this humanness. Such dehumanizing condi-
tions have distorted the ideal of the human being. They have created a 
contradictory human being, and they have inculcated "fear of freedom." 
These are three problems of freedom at the anthropological level. 
The distorted ideal of being human is the ideal of the oppressor 
internalized by the oppressed people, creating in them an "adhesion" to 
the oppressor. The oppressed think wrongly that to be free is to be the 
oppressor. The oppressed people, thinking the oppressors are free, 
believe that the path of freedom is to be another oppressor, without 
overcoming the oppressor-oppressed contradiction and its consequent con-
tradictions. For instance, the oppressed people want reforms because 
they want to improve their place in the social stratification but not 
because they want to be human. What they want to be is another land-
owner like the present landowners, another boss over workers like the 
present bosses or another proprietor and wealthy person like the present 
rich people. The oppressed people cannot perceive themselves as the op-
pressed opposed to the oppressor. They cannot differentiate the ideal 
man of the oppressors and the "new man" who has to be created. They 
cannot see their struggle as a struggle for true freedom. Liberation for 
them is the struggle to be another oppressor and to defend the "order" of 
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oppression in order to make possible the transition from oppressed to 
the oppressor. This "liberation" does not humanize people; it does not 
change reality; it does not further the struggle of freedom. Oppressed 
people think that to be an oppressor is to be human; that to be indi-
vidually free and egoistically human, without responsibility to 
others is to be human; that to be unjust and violent is to be human; 
that to exploit, to dominate, and to marginalize others is to be human. 
This is the distorted ideal of being human. 
Another problem of freedom is the internal contradiction of the 
oppressed people, i.e., the "shadow" of the oppressor in the conscious-
ness of the oppressed. This is a reflection of the historical contradic-
tion. The oppressed people enshrine the image of the oppressor within 
themselves and, at the same time, they are the oppressed. Psycholog-
ically dominated by this Trojan horse, the oppressed participate in the 
process of liberation by fighting against their own freedom. If any 
process of liberation begins, the oppressed people participate in the 
same direction as the oppressors, and they may even give their life for 
the oppressors and deny their own right of freedom. 
The third problem is "fear of freedom." Freire has observed 
"that fear crops up whenever any discussion or even mention of freedom 
23 
makes them feel it as a threat." That happens with oppressed people, 
even "very simple people." Oppression, domination, and marginalization 
are so potent that they produce a fear of freedom. Fear generally leads 
23 
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to the desire to be an oppressor because oppressors provide a guarantee 
of immobility and protection for the oppressed. 
Oppression is their inevitable destiny. The oppressed are 
adapted and resigned to the inevitable. They follow the "freedom" of 
the oppressed; they do not want to take the risk that their own freedom 
requires; they "escape from freedom" as Erich Fromm says. 
However, liberation is the natural consequence of human nature. 
Liberation is not a gift given by the oppressors but an ontological 
imperative of all human beings. Liberation is not an ideal located 
outside of the oppressed, a myth related by the oppressor, but a human 
necessity. Liberation is an arduous struggle because it is a conquest, 
a work of never~ending creation. When oppressed people recognize the 
distorted ideal of the human being created by the oppressor, when they 
recognize the "shadow" of the oppressors in their own consciousness, 
when they are no longer afraid to recognize the causes of their dis-
content, to act then upon that reality and transform it, when they 
create the process of humanization, then the path of liberation begins 
to be a reality for the oppressed. When the oppressed discover that 
without freedom or the struggle for freedom they cannot exist authen-
tically, the whole system of oppression comes to an end and humanization 
is at hand. The real dilemma for the oppressed is thus summarized: 
The conflict lies in the choice between being wholly themselves 
or being divided; between ejecting the oppressor within or not 
ejecting him; between human solidarity or alienation; between 
following prescriptions or having choices; between being specta-
tors or actors; between acting or having the illusion of acting 
through the action of the oppressors; between speaking out or 
being silent, castrated in their power to create and re-create, 
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in their power to transform the world. 
When the oppressed accept their vocation to be human and reject 
oppression, dependence, and marginalization as a human condition, the 
coup d'etat and repression seem to be the only way the oppressors have 
to perpetuate their dehumanized system. The act of force by the op-
pressors consolidates the yearning of the oppressed for freedom and 
confirms the struggle of liberation as the only and effective way to 
recover their lost humanity. 
In summary, liberation is the dialectical method of freedom. It 
is a revolutionary process, the terminus a quo of the dialectical method; 
it is praxiological method, the via ad of the dialectical method; and 
it is an anthropological method, the terminus ad quem of the dialectical 
method. Liberation is the revolutionary process which begins with a 
recognition of the contradictions of oppression, dependence, and 
marginalization at the economic, social and political levels. Lib-
eration begins by as~uming that the contradictions are limit-situations 
of freedom which have to be overcome. It is a permanent process be-
cause at the moment of overcoming the present limitations, new limit-
situations arise, limitations which have to be overcome. Liberation 
is a praxiological method because it is not activism nor verbalism, 
24 
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not objectivism nor subjectivism, but action and reflection dialectically 
related. Liberation is a process in which arises critical consciousness. 
Liberation is conscientization, the permanent consciousness-arising of 
people to transform their reality. It is the natural consequence of 
being human:it overcomes the distorted ideal of humanness created by the 
oppressor; it overcomes the "shadow" of the oppressors in the conscious-
ness of the oppressed; it loses the "fear of freedom" and responds to 
the ontological imperative of all humanity, i.e., to be always human. 
In a few words, liberation is the process of freedom which goes from 
freedom to freedom; it is reflection and action to extend the "space" 
of freedom, a series of concentric circles opening from the center. The 
human vocation is to be always transcending human limitations. 
3. FREEDOM, THE PERMANENT SEARCH 
Paulo Freire's concept of freedom arises in the bosom of a 
revolutionary society --a transitive society-- such as the situation of 
Brazil and, like Brazil, the rest of Latin America. Thus freedom is 
a revolutionary concept, the terminus a quo of freedom as a permanent 
search. Given Freire's concept of revolution, freedom is a continual 
creation which is always incomplete. Thus freedom is a dynamic concept, 
the via ad of freedom as a permanent search. A revolutionary concept 
of freedom cannot be individualistic but a freedom of people as a whole. 
Thus freedom is a political concept, the terminus a quem of freedom as 
a permanent search. 
a) Freedom, a Revolutionary Concept 
Freedom has its roots in the closed society, a society based on 
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conquest and colonization. Conquest was the historical starting-point 
of all Latin American countries. Conquest imposed the objectives of 
the conqueror on the whole life of the conquered. Colonization was the 
consolidation of conquest. Today, Latin American countries have inher-
ited a life-style, characteristic of the old society. About the present 
"necessity of conquest," Freire says: 
The dominant elites of today, like those of any epoch [ancient 
Rome, for instance], continue (in a version of "original sin") 
to need to conquer others --with or without bread and circus. 
The content and methods of conquest vary historically; what does 
not vary (as long as dominant elites exist) is the necrophilic 
passion to oppress.25 
In order to maintain a system of conquerors, the dominant elites 
have mythologized the world. In the following paragraph, Freire cata-
logues the myths which make possible today the preservation of the 
status quo: 
The myth that the oppressive order is a "free society"; the myth 
that all men are free to work where they wish, that if they don't 
like their boss they can leave him and look for another job; the 
myth that this order respects human rights and is therefore worthy 
of esteem; the myth that anyone who is industrious can become an 
entrepreneur --1-mrse yet, the myth that the street vendor is as 
much an entrepreneur as the owner of a large factory; the myth 
of the universal right of education, when of all the Brazilian 
children who enter primary schools only a tiny fraction ever 
reach the university; the myth of the equality of all men, when 
the question: "Do you know who you're talking to?" is still 
current among us; the myth of the heroism of the oppressor classes 
as defenders of "western Christian civilization' against "materialist 
barbarism"; the myth of the charity and generosity of the elites, 
when what they really do as a class is to foster selective "good 
deeds" (subsequently elaborated into the myth of "disinterested 
aid," which on the international level was severely criticized by 
Pope John XXIII); the myth that the dominant elites, "recognizing 
25 
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their duties," promote the advancement of the people, so that the 
people, in a gesture of gratitude, should accept the words of the 
elites and be conformed to them; the myth that rebellion is a sin 
against God; the myth of private property as fundamental to personal 
human development (so long as oppressors are the only true human 
beings); the myth of the industriousness of the oppressors and the 
laziness and dishonesty of the oppressed, as well as the myth of the 
oppressed, as well as the myth of the natural inferiority of the 
latter and the superiority of the former.26 
These myths, and many others, are promoted by well-organized pro-
paganda, slogans, and "advertisements," which are spread through the 
communication media. Their purpose is to maintain the contradictions of 
the closed society. Their policy is to divide in order to exploit, to 
manipulate in order to dominate, and to invade in order to repress. 
These political actions maintain the limit-situations of freedom. 
To divide in order to exploit is. ·one of the basic strategies of 
27 
the oppressors. The unification, organization, and struggle of· the 
oppressed are not tolerated because they endanger the interests of the 
oppressors. What they want is to isolate the oppressed and to create 
deep rifts among them in order to manipulate them. Some subtle actions 
of division are the focalization of problems without aperspective of 
totality, the training of leaders to isolate them from their people, 
promoting some and leaving the rest without training, teaching some how 
to manipulate others, favoring some people and causing jealousy in others, 
reinforcing the "image of the oppressors" in the consciousness of the 
26 
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oppressed. The oppressors are interested in isolating students, workers, 
and peasants. They do not want communication and dialogue. 
To manipulate in order to dominate is the second basic strategy 
28 
of the oppressors. When people are in the process of waking up about 
what is the truth of their reality and are showing the first signs of 
aggressiveness, the oppressors begin to use these situations to their 
own interest. To give the impression of openness and dialogue the op-
pressors promote changes, but basically they are attempting to neutralize 
the popular movements and to promote their own objectives. Oppressors 
support inauthentic organizations; they deceive with promises; they 
stimulate an appetite for personal success, and they "dialogue" but only 
for their own benefit and in their own interest. 
To invade in order to repress is the third basic strategy of the 
oppressors. One society or one social class can invade another. Inva-
sion penetrates the context of another group, has no respect for the 
potentialities of it, and imposes the world-view of the invaders. Inva-
sion is conquest and steering, violence and the necessary "order" to 
maintain a violent status. Invasion is the violent consequence of an 
economic, social, political, and cultural domination. In cultural inva-
sion the invaded people begin to respond positively to the values, 
standards, and objectives of the invaders, to see their reality with the 
mentality of the oppressor, to consider themselves inferior and the 
invaders superior, to love the culture of the invaders and to deny their 
28 
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own culture. Freire says: "Cultural invasion is on the one hand an 
29 
instrument of domination, and on the other, the result of domination." 
Invasion is an act of extension, control, and repression. Oppressors 
do not want communication but communiques; they do not want dialogue 
but antidialogue. 
Thus to divide, to dominate, and to invade are strategic actions 
in a situation of oppression, dependence, and marginalization. Revolu-
tion begins when oppressed people and their leaders assume two basic 
commitments: to denounce this situation at all levels of their contradic-
tions and to announce freedom. That means they have a commitment to 
each other and a commitment to their own freedom. To be with the op-
pressed is the only way to be human, the only way to overcome op-
pression, the struggle for freedom. 
Commitment to the oppressed leads the oppressed and their leaders 
to seek the most efficient tools and the most appropriate actions in 
order to move, in a dialogical and cooperative communion, from praxis 
to new praxis, from limit-situations to other limit-situations, from a 
still naive consciousness to a more critical consciousness, from a ful-
fillment of freedom to another fulfillment of freedom. Freedom is the 
permanent creation which arises in the bosom of the revolutionary strug-
le. Freedom is the flourishing of liberation, revolutionary by nature. 
b) Freedom, a Dynamic Concept 
Immigration of people, suppression of slavery, industrialization, 
30 
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increase in production, new technology, communication media, and many 
other factors opened the horizons of people to new aspirations, con-
cerns, and values. Revolution began when the old and the new came 
into confrontation, when the closed society tried to consolidate its 
forces against change and the open society tried to attack this stabi-
lity. The open society begins when the new factors affect theeconom-
ic, social, and political structures of the closed society, when the 
new factors have real possibilities of eliminating the contradictions of 
oppression, dependence, and marginalization, when the oppressed people 
and their leaders commit themselv.~s to the cause of the oppressed and 
freedom. The dialogical and cooperative action of the oppressed leads 
them to assume power in order to implement their project of freedom. To 
take power is not the last objective of revolution; it is that moment 
of the struggle when the transitional society ends and the open society 
begins. Revolution as liberation is characteristic of the transitional 
society; revolution as freedom is characteristic of the open society; 
but revolution is a characteristic of both of them. Freire says about 
the borders of both societies: 
The newness of the revolution is generated within the old, op-
pressive society; the taking of power constitutes only a decisive 
moment of the continuing revolutionary process. In a dynamic, 
rather than static, view of revolution, there is no absolute 
"before" or "after," with the taking of power as the dividing 
line. 31 
If revolution is characteristic of the transitional society as 
31 
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well as of the open society, change is also characteristic of both so-
cieties. Freire says that there are two factors, simultaneously, in the 
transitional society: the closed and the open society, the old and the 
new. The old is in poYTer and tries to consolidate and the new is in 
subjection trying to change the old. When the oppressed take power, 
two factors are also present in the open society: the old and the new. 
The old does not disappear when the oppressed people and their leaders 
are in power; the process of liberation continues. It is necessary to 
eliminate all remnants of oppression and to liberate all areas of so-
ciety and all aspects of life in the process of liberation. There is 
no freedom if some sectors remain oppressed. Freire says: 
Nobody gives freedom to anyone else, no one frees another, nobody 
even frees himself all alone; men free themselves only in concert, 
in communion, collaborating on something wrong that they want to 
correct.32 
In the open society the old does not govern any longer. What 
governs is the movement inherent in liberation, which is to say, the 
process of change in the direction of freedom. Freedom is always reached 
but, even at that moment, freedom moves away to be reached again. Free-
dom is a dynamic process. 
I am convinced that at the level of history we will be engaged 
constantly in a permanent process of liberation from certain 
achievements which, let us suppose, yesterday could represent 
a very good level of liberation but tomorrow we have to overcome 
32 
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that level. 
This dynamic process has two factors which are part of all social 
structures: the old and the new. The old means stability and the new 
means change. The old is not necessarily an inheritance from the closed 
society, but it can shape a new closed society. Stability is the 
crystallization of a human creation. It conserves the products of human 
work through social institutions. It stops time, avoids change, or is 
against it. Change constantly shatters the inertia of stability brought 
about by human action. Change faces an open future, motivates advanced 
positions, and renews forms of social structures. Stability and change 
are two antagonistic positions. However, change cannot exist if there 
is not something stable and stability cannot exist except in reference 
to change. This dialectical relationship between stability and change 
34 
Freire calls "duration." 
Stability and change are consequences of human action, i.e., of 
human work upon the world. When humans respond to the challenges of 
their world, they act and in acting create their world. However, we 
cannot understand human beings if we cannot see them also in relation to 
stability and change in social structure. The option for stability or 
for change determines the role, which methods, techniques, and profes-
33 
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The term "duration" is used by Henri Bergson. Freire uses 
the same term to characterize the contradiction of stability and change. 
~reire's use has no relation with the intuitionism of Bergson. Cf. 
Paulo Freire, Cambio, pp. 13, 14. 
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sions play at the moment of action. Neutrality is impossible because 
reality has forces of stability which always try to fossilize and dehu-
manize, and forces of change which always try to transform structures 
35 
of oppression and dehumanization and bring about freedom. Stability 
stops transformations, mythifies reality, and promotes a kind of change 
which never changes the total structure. Change is freedom from all 
kinds of myths, fatalisms, and manipulations. 
There are three kinds of change. First, there is a change of 
the closed society which changes the parts without any consequence to 
the total structure. This kind of change never affects the system of 
contradictions. On the contrary, it strengthens and supports the system. 
Second, there is a gradual change in particular areas.which bring about 
a change in the totality. It is the change of one of the structural 
dimensions which will affect the totality. This is the change of lib-
eration~ Third, there is a change which overcomes the total system of 
contradictions by another totality in which all these contradictions 
36 
are overcome through the process of freedom. 
The concept of the human being, who always tries to fulfill his 
ontological vocation, i.e., to be more human, entails that humans are 
the permanent and historical sujects of change. The concept of praxis, 
which is action and reflection to transform the world, asks for reality 
35 
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in permanent transformation. The concept of conscientization, which is 
the effort for a more critical consciousness, asks for more lucid 
stages of the revolutionary process. The permanent and historical sub-
jects of change, the permanent transformation of reality, and the 
increasingly lucid stages of the revolutionary process beget a proc-
ess of permanent change. Freedom is a dynamic process created on the 
"edge" of a permanent and dynamic change. 
c) Freedom, a Political Concept 
Freire supersedes the strategic actions of division, domina-
tion, and invasion, characteristics of conquest and colonization, with 
the strategic actions of unity, organization, and cultural synthesis, 
characteristics of freedom. There are no more oppressor and oppressed, 
that is, there are no more "independent" people when others are depend-
ent, no longer marginalizers and marginalized, no longer exploiters 
and exploited, dominators and dominated, veople of the center and peo-
ple of the periphery. Rather, there is cooperation, the way of freedom. 
Cooperation is the way par excellence to be "with others." There is 
no longer merely being "in" the middle of others. Freire says: 
The antidialogical dominating I transforms the dominated, con-
quered thou into a mere it. The dialogical I, however, knows 
that it is precisely the thou ("Not-!") which has called forth 
his own existence. He also knows that the thou which calls forth 
his own existence in turn constitutes an I which has in his its 
thou. The I and the thou thus become, in the dialectic of these 
relationships, two th~hich become two I's.37 
37 
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Cooperation means a dialogical naming of the world, a dialogical 
action upon the world, and a dialogical "adherence" among people. Coop-
eration is naming the world because all people --i.e, all subjects--
focus their attention in their reality which becomes a common problem to 
be solved. That means a critical analysis of reality. Cooperation in 
action upon reality transforms it because all people are subjects of 
transformation and all can be actors of their own praxis. That means 
that no one can transform reality "for" others, that no one can 
transform reality "without" others, and that reality is transformed 
"with" others. Cooperation in "adherence" is the "free coincidence of 
38 
choices" and not an obligation of the vanquished to the conqueror. 
In every society, people have different levels of functions and 
different kinds of responsibilitities. Revolutionary leadership, which 
is fundamental, is one of these responsibilities. However, leaders must 
not have the right to manipulate people because people cannot be owned 
by leaders. Leaders must not presume to make decisions without taking 
into account the wishes and decisions of their own people because people 
are not merely followers. Leaders must not pretend to be thinkers mean-
while pretending that people are merely "doers" because praxis is the 
right of everyone. Leaders must not think "without" people nor "for" 
people but "with" people. "If they are truly committed to liberation," 
Freire says, "their action and reflection cannot proceed without the 
38 
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action and reflection of others." Leaders never have to dominate 
under the pretext of improving the organization, strengthening them-
selves, acquiring revolutionary power, increasing a unified front, 
or even under the the pretext of freedom. They will never use science 
and technology to dominate. They will never make the revolution for 
people, which is the same as making it without them, because all pea-
ple are the subjects of revolution and history. Freire says: 
The revolution is made neither by the leaders for the people, 
nor by the people for the leaders, but by both acting together 
in unshakable solidarity. 
In this communion both groups grow together, and the leaders, 
instead of being simply self-appointed, are installed or authen-
ticated in their praxis with the praxis of the people.40 
Leaders as well as people are subjects of dialogue, of inter-
communication, and communion. Dialogue is the fundamental relationship 
characteristic of subjects. Dialogue does not impose, manipulate, or 
"sloganize," but communicates. Communication is intersubjectivity, the 
authentic relationship between one subject and another. Communication 
41 
is communion of people with "utopian vision," the deepest relation-
ship mediated by the praxis of freedom. Dialogue, intercommunication, 
and communion are the constitutive elements of cooperation which is 
39 
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Utopia is the denunciation of an unjust reality and the pro-
clamation of freedom. Cf. Paulo Freire, Cultural Action for Freedom, 
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always an act of love, humility, faith, mutual trust, hope, criticality, 
and empathy. They are elements that reflect reality, transform it, and 
make history. These elements make possible cooperation among people 
and between people and their leaders. They make possible the three 
strategical actions of cooperation, i.e., unity, organization and cul-
tural synthesis. 
First, there is unity among people and unity between people and 
their leaders. If oppression is a system of exploitation and exploita-
tion divides in order to rule, unity is a strategical act of freedom. 
Unity cuts the "umbilical cord" of the oppressed from the world of op-
pression, overcomes the individual perspective of oppression, and ac-
quires class consciousness. To be human is not to be oppressed, which 
is an inhuman way of being, but neither does it mean freedom only for 
oneself; on the contrary, to be human is to be "with" others, in commun-
ion with the "neighbor." So, unity is a human vocation mediated by 
praxis for freedom. 
Second, the organization of people is a consequence of unity. 
If dependency is a system of domination and domination manipulates peo-
ple, organization is another strategic act of freedom. Organization 
is possible when the "witness" to the struggle of liberation shows 
"consistency" between words and action, shows "boldness" in the permanent 
risk, "radicalization" in the action (not sectarianism), "courage" in lov-
ing people, and "faith" in their capacity. Witness to the struggle of 
freedom increases critical knowledge of the current historical context, 
extends the vision of the world, and exposes the contradictions of so-
ciety. Organization for freedom means united leadership with people, 
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concrete objectives of freedom, and necessary discipline in the struggle 
for freedom. Authority --not authoritarianism-- and freedom go together. 
Freire says: 
There is no freedom without authority, but there is also no 
authority without freedom. All freedomcontains the possibility ..• 
£to] become authority. Freedom and authority cannot be isolated, 
but must be considered in relationship to each other. 
Authority can avoid conflict with freedom only if it is "freedom-
become- authority." Hypertrophy of the one provokes atrophy of 
the other.42 
Third, there is cultural synthesis of the knowledge of people and 
of their leaders. If marginalization is a system of repression and re-
pression invades the periphery culturally, cultural synthesis is yet 
another strategicact of freedom. People with their leadership create 
together guidelines for their own creations, learn something together 
from their action, solve the contradictions of society, construct a 
common theory of action, and act together upon the social structure, 
always creating stability and always creating change. That is the na-
ture of the social structure that we call freedom: the dialectical re-
lationship between stability and change. It exists because it is 
becoming; its reason for being is becoming. These are the "structures" 
of freedom, the processes of social change. Freire says: 
What makes a structure, a social structure (and thus historical-
cultural), is neither permanence nor change, taken absolutely, 
but the dialectical relations between the two. .In the last 
analysis, what endures in the social structure is neither 
permanence nor change; it is the permanence-change dialectic 
42 
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itself. 
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Thus, cooperation in conforonting common problems in the act of 
transformation of the social world, and in the adherence through dia-
logue, intercommunication, and communication makes possible political 
action for freedom, and this political action is the beginning of real 
freedom. Unity responds to the limit-situation of the division caused 
by the oppressor. Organization responds to the limit-situation of 
manipulation. Cultural synthesis responds to the limit-situation of 
cultural invasion. All three are political actions of political free-
dom. These actions serve no other purpose than political freedom. 
Summarizing the third part of the chapter, freedom is the perma-
nent search which begins in the bosom of a revolutionary society. In 
order to maintain the system of conquest and colonization --which still 
exists today-- the elite implement their strategic action of division, ma-
nipulation, and cultural invasion in different ways. Revolution is the 
revolt against that system, first to take power through the process 
of liberation and, second, once this power is taken, then to implement 
freedom. Before taking power (in the transitional society) freedom is a 
liberation process, and after taking power (in the open society) freedom 
is a revolutionary process. Freedom is a revolutionary concept, the 
terminus a quo of freedom as a permanent search. In the transitional 
43 
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society, revoluton is the struggle between the closed and open socie-
ties, between the old and the new, in order to be free. The type of 
revolutionary struggle also exists in the open society. Given that 
human creation always tries to look for stability, the possibility of 
the presence of the closed and old is permanent; however, given that 
the human creation tries also to look for change, the dialectical rela-
tionship between the closed and open and between the old and new is 
also permanent. Stability and change are two elements of the dynamic 
life of freedom, the via ad of freedom as a permanent search. The open 
society looks toward the overcoming of the strategic actions oLean-
quest and colonization, the actions of division, manipulation, and 
invasion. The strategic actions of freedom are unity, organization, 
and cultural synthesis, actions of a new policy of cooperation through 
dialogue, intercommunication, and communion among people and between 
people and their leaders. Freedom is a political conception, the 
terminus ad quem of freedom as a permanent search. 
Summarizing the whole chapter, I will begin by saying that the 
concept of freedom, the terminus ad quem of the entire system of Freire's 
thought, begins with the recognition of the limit-situations of freedom 
--the terminus a quo of the concept of freedom--, in the confrontation 
of these limitations in a dialectical way --the via ad of the concept 
of freedom--, and in the permanent search and creation of freedom--
the terminus ad quem of the concept of freedom. 
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In the first place, the limit-situations can be found at the 
socio-historical, socio-cultural, and socio-educational levels. The 
socio-historical level is generated by oppression, and it is the 
terminus a quo of the limitations. The socio-cultural level is gen-
erated by dependency, and it is the via ad of the limitations. The 
socio-educational level is generated by marginalization, and it is the 
terminus ad quem of the limitations. 
There are three levels of the socio-historical limitations gen-
erated by oppression: economic, social, and political. In the area of 
economic exploitation, freedom has one of its fundamental limitations: 
the contradictory relationship between exploiter-exploited, a limit-
situation to be overcome. In the social domination, freedom has another 
fundamental limitation: the contradictory relationship between dominator-
dominated, another limit-situations to be overcome. In the political 
level, freedom confronts another fundamental limitation: the contradic-
tory relationship between elite-people, also a limit-situation to be 
overcome. 
There are three levels of socio-cultural limitations generated by 
dependence: economic, social, and political. In the area of economic 
dependency, freedom confronts the contradictions between those who con-
sider themselves "independent" and those who are dependent, a contradic-
tion to be overcome. In the area of social dependence, freedom confronts 
a contradiction between those who "have a voice" and those who have a 
"culture of silence," a contradiction to be overcome. In the dimension 
of political dependence, freedom confronts a contradiction between 
289 
repressor-repressed, a contradiction to be overcome. 
There are three levels of the socio-educative limitations gen-
erated by marginalization: economic, social, and political. In econom-
ic marginalization, freedom confronts a contradiction between the center 
(those who have and can) and the periphery (those who have not and 
cannot), a contradiction to be overcome. In social marginalization, 
freedom ~onfronts the contradiction beteen those who are domesticated 
and improve their lot within the system and those who aredomesticated 
and remain silent and without any participation (for instance the con-
tradiction between the literate and illiterate people). In political 
marginalization, freedom confronts the contradiction between those who 
are the subjects of political decisions and those who are the objects 
of such decisions. 
political violence. 
Marginalization generates economic, social, and 
In the second place, the method of freedom is liberation. There 
are three principal meanings of liberation: liberation as revolutionary 
process, the terminus a quo of the dialectical method of freedom, lib-
eration as praxis, the via ad of the dialectical method of freedom, and 
liberation as humanization, the terminus ad quem of the dialectical 
method of freedom. 
The central and derived contradictions of oppression, dependence, 
and marginalization are expressed in epochal themes which require tasks, 
at the infrastructural levels --economic, social, and political-- and 
at the superstructural level --cultural and educational. Epochal themes 
are contradictions which Freire calls limit-situations. These limita-
tions reveal the true nature of reality and the "place" of possible 
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action. Freedom is action to overcome limit-situations which, once 
they are overcome, allow new limit-situations to appear. Thus, freedom 
is continual reflection and action upon limit-situations and continual 
struggle against the different ways in which the contradictions of op-
pression, dependence, and marginalization appear. The struggle of free-
dom is liberation. Freedom is not an absolute concept defined once 
and for all rather it is an act and effect followed by a new act which 
will cause other new effects in the continual creation of freedom. Lib-
eration from oppression arises when the oppressed, discovering the 
epochal themes, refuse to become other oppressors and fight to overcome 
the contradicti01r of exploiter-exploited. Liberation from dependence 
appears when the oppressed become subjects, and not mere objects, of 
their society. Liberation from marginalization appears when the op-
pressed people discover themselves as people who are for another, not 
isolated outside of the system. The objective is to change the dehu-
44 
manized situation, "the goal is liberation," a revolutionary process. 
Liberation is neither "activism" nor verbalism" but praxis, 
the dialectical relationship between action and reflection upon the 
world to transform it. Likewise, the dialectical relationship between 
humans and their historical limitations is mediated by praxis. In 
these dialectical processes, consciousness goes from naive consciousness 
to critical consciousness. Liberation is the process of consciousness-
44 
Anon. "The Goal is Liberation," in Conscientization; CCPD 
Documents, World Council of Churches, 1975. Unpublished (Found in 
Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, AR-AZ. EN22). 
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raising, i.e., of conscientization. Conscientization involves trans-
formation of reality which, in turn, creates more lucid consciousness. 
That is, by praxis reality changes and consciousness changes at the same 
time. Praxis is the method which generates change in the economic, 
social, and political structures. Liberation is praxiological method. 
Liberation is the natural consequence of Freire's anthropology. 
Oppression has distorted the ideal of human being. The oppressed people 
lodge the "shadow" of the oppressor in their consciousness. This 
shadow produces a contradiction between being the oppressed and desiring 
to be the oppressor. The oppressed people have also a fear of freedom. 
They prefer to be adopted and resigned to the "freedom" of the op-
pressors rather than to take the risk of following their own freedom. 
But liberation is an ontological imperative for every human being. It 
is not the distorted mythical freedom of the oppressors but human 
necessity, a process of humanization. Liberation is the process of 
freedom which goes from freedom to freedom, which extends the "space" 
of freedom, which fulfills the human vocation to be always more human, 
transcending always human limitations. 
In the third place, freedom is a permanent search which arises 
in the bosom of a revolutionary society. Freedom is a revolutionary 
concept, the terminus a quo of freedom as a permanent search. Given 
Freire's concept of revolution, freedom is a dynamic concept, the 
via ad of freedom as a permanent search. The revolutionary and dynamic 
concept provides an understanding of freedom as a collective concept 
rather than freedom as a mere individual act. The political concept 
of freedom is the terminus ad quem of freedom as a permanent search. 
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The starting-point of Latin American history is conquest and 
colonization. Conquest imposed the objectives of the conqueror on the 
whole life of the conquered. Colonization consolidated the.rules of 
conquest. Oppression, dependency, and marginalization are the ways 
in which the "necessity" of conquest and colonizat-ion are expressed 
today. In order to maintain this system, the dominant elite has 
mythologized the world and has promoted such myths through the commu-
nication media. They used the following strategy. They divide be-
cause dividing the oppressed makes exploitation much easier. Then, 
they manipulate because by taking advantage of the situation of the op-
pressed the oppressors create changes that neutralize popular movements 
and promote their own objectives. They invade by imposing their world 
view, values, standards, and objectives. The center not only extends 
its power but controls and represses. When people announce freedom and 
denounce the strategic action of the elite, revolution for freedom is 
at hand. When people are committed to the oppressed, then they have 
begun the struggle to overcome the contradiction. It is at this point 
where liberation becomes militant, that freedom becomes a revolutionary 
concept. 
In the process of a revolutionary struggle, characteristic of 
transitional society, liberation is the same as the revolutionary con-
cept of freedom. In that Freirean process which is revolutionary 
government, characteristic of the open society, freedom is a project 
dynamically implemented. That is, revolution is not only characteristic 
of the transitional society, but it is also characteristic of the 
open society. To seize power is not the last objective of the 
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revolution; it is only the moment in which transitional society ends and 
open society begins. In the transitional society the revolution tries 
to overthrow the power of the old in order to be open to the new. In 
the open society the revolution tries to implement the power of the new, 
i.e., freedom, but without the disappearance of the old. In fact, stab-
ility and change are created by human action and always are present in 
the social structures. Stability and change, dialectically related, 
are the fundamental factors in the dynamic nature of freedom. Stability 
is the final product of human action and change is the permanent move-
ment toward the new and more advanced positions. Stability cannot exist 
without change, and change cannot exist without stability. Freedom 
arises on the "edge" of this permanent and dynamic relationship. 
The implementation of freedom supersedes the strategic action 
of division, manipulation, and invasion, strategies of conquest> .. and col-
onization, needs of oppression, dependence, and marginalization. Free-
dom proposes the strategic action of unity, organization, and cultural 
synthesis, strategies of cooperation and dialogue. There is cooperation 
in the confrontation with the world, in acting upon it, and in the 
"adherence" among people. This cooperation is made possible through 
dialogue, intercommunication, and communion. Cooperation overcomes the 
forces of division, manipulation, and cultural invasion. Cooperation 
starts when it unifies its forces against exploitation, when it organizes 
a systematic struggle against domination, and when cultural synthesis is 
the strategical action against political control. Dialogue, inter-
communication, and communion make possible a cultural synthesis of the 
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action and reflection of leaders and the people. Unity, organization 
and cultural synthesis are the strategic action of freedom, the polit-
ical concept of freedom. 
PART THREE 
POLITICAL FREEDOM 
This part includes the conclusions of the previous analysis. 
According to the method applied, the sixth chapter is the terminus ad 
quem of the work as a whole. 
The conclusions are discussed critically in three principal 
contexts: the Latin American reality of oppression, the European 
philosophical influences (personalism, Hegelianism, existentialism, 
and Marxism), the social philosophy of education related to Latin 
American needs. Freire's philosophy of praxis and his philosophy 
of education result in a philosophy of freedom. One of the practical 
implications of these principles is an education for freedom. 
Freire's thought crystallizes into a philosophy for political 
freedom which emerges under conditions of oppression. Freire proposes 
a dynamic struggle of liberation which, even in its success, is an 
ongoing creation of a political mode of life. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CRITICAL EVALUATION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Indeed I tremble for my country when 
I reflect that God is just, that his 
justice cannot sleep forever. Com-
merce between master and slave is 
despotism. Nothing is more certanly 
written in the book of fate than that 
these people are to be free. Estab-
lish the law for educating the common 
people. This it is the business of 
the state to effect and on a general 
plan.l Thomas Jefferson 
At this point, after a careful analysis of the accessible ma-
terials, in one sense my study of Freire's thought has just begun. For 
my analysis has focused only on points related to the general theme of 
freedom. This chapter summarizes my analysis in its principal points. 
Then what I will attempt to do is to make a critical evaluation of 
Freire's thought on Freedom. Finally, I will give my personal conclu-
sions about freedom. 
Following my method, I will divide this chapter in three prin-
cipal sections. First, Freire's thought represents a Latin American 
philosophical synthesis. Second, Freire's thought expresses a social 
philosophy of-education. Then, my third section will include my gen-
eral and final conclusions. 
1 
Quoted from the Thomas Jefferson Memorial, Washington, D.C. 
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1. A PHILOSOPHY FROM LATIN AMERICA 
Freire's thought is a global synthesis of three principal fac-
tors: first, the Latin American reality and concretely the reality of 
Brazil, the terminus a quo of my evaluation of Freire as a Latin Ameri-
can philosopher. Second, the different philosophical branches which 
influence Freire's thought, the via ad of my evaluation. Third, Freire's 
relevance for the philosophical thought, the terminus ad quem of my 
evaluation. 
a) The Latin American Reality 
Freire's historical, socioeconomic, cultural, and political back-
ground are present in all his philosophical elaborations. He thinks, 
writes, and talks as a part of the Latin American reality, the peripheral 
side of the so-called First World, the center. That is the reason that 
Freire is a Latin American philosopher who proposes a Latin American 
philosophy. Let me review how the Latin American background determines 
Freire's thought. 
Historically, the Latin American countries are a result of 
European expansion. Europe, the international center of the 16th cen-
tury, discovered, conquered, and colonized the Latin American territo-
ries. Exploitation, dependence, and marginalization --expressions of 
Freire-- were three aspects of the mercantile policy of Europe sup-
ported by the economic, social, political, juridical, educational, re-
ligious, and military institutions. The struggles of independence of 
the 19th century resulted not from the aspirations of the lib-
eral movements of Latin America but from the crisis of the mercantile 
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system confronted by industrial capitalism during the Spanish and Por-
tuguese decline and the rise of the economic and political hegemony 
of England. Later, France and Germany became important. Thus, the 
struggles for independence in Latin America were a part of the struggle 
of England against Spain and Portugal. England stimulated, and even 
supported, the struggles for liberty which made possible political in-
dependence but not economic independence. Latin American economy was 
determined by the world market controlled by England. The expansion 
of the United States coincided with the incorporation of Texas in 1845 
and the decline of English, French, and German presence in Latin Amer-
2 
ica. Although the exploitation of natural resources, the domination 
of the whole area, and the control of the political situation by the 
center have been crucial factors in the history of each country of 
Latin America, this exploitation has been particularly apparent in the 
history of Brazil and has had a most important impact on Freire's 
thought. Portuguese exploitation affected the production of sugar and 
the mining of gold in the early years of colonization and the produc-
tion of sugar, rubber, and coffee in later years. The Portuguese 
exploited the work of Indians and slaves, including the peasants of 
Pernambuco, where Freire was born, grew, and began his educational work. 
From Freire's point of view, the conquest practiced by the Portuguese 
in the past has simply become a "need of conquest" which is maintained 
2 
Cf. Octavio Ianni, Imperialismo y Cultura de la Violencia en 
Am~rica Latina, (Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, S.A., 1970), pp. 
15-20. 
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by the oppressor in Latin America today. 
From the socio-economic point of view, the rate of economic de-
velopment has not corresponded to the rate of demographic growth of 
Latin America. The reason for such a situation lies, according to 
Freire, in the system of exploitation, domination, and control which 
has been in force at both the international and national levels. At 
the international level, there is the contradiction of oppression 
between the center of wealthy countries and the periphery of poor 
countries. This contradiction is also at the national level between 
the center of wealthy people and the periphery of poor people. 
Employees and the rural workers are the poorest people of Latin 
America today, the peripheral society. According to many sociologists 
from Latin America, the rural workers as well as the urban proletariat 
are the lower classes which oppose the bourgeoisie. The concept of 
the bourgeosie here involves landowners, the oligarchy and, of course, 
the social classes whose income comes from the profits of commercial 
and industrial enterprises. Talking about the Latin American prole-
tariat (urban and rur.al workers), Josue de Castro says that two-thirds 
of the Latin American population are starving. The international cen-
ter, with the collaboration of the national center, has created many ways 
to solve those problems through policies such as the "Good Neighbor 
Policy," "Alliance for Progress," and "Hemispheric Security," but none 
of these solutions has created the expected "national capitalism" or 
the "associated capitalism" among nations. Since 1930, the manufac-
turing industrialists, tradesmen, professionals, and the state bureauc-
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racy have improved; however, they have not questioned the system of ex-
ploitation and dependence and they have only improved their place in 
the social structure for their own progress. Thus, international and 
national exploitation, domination, and control were implemented in 
3 
favor of the international corporations and the national bourgeoisie. 
The plan to solve the basic problems only benefited them. 
Freire has understood the presence of these two poles: hour-
geoisie and proletariat. What he points out is that this contradic-
tion of oppressor-oppressed is anthropological. Freire received his 
professional experience in the Northeast region of Brazil, an area 
basically rural and characterized by a high level of necessity and a 
low level of production, by monocultivation which functions to meet 
international demand and pays no attention to the local needs. His 
explanation of the social structure came as a direct result of ob-
serving this reality. 
From the educational point of view, educational institutions 
have served the economic and political systems in which they have 
exist-ed. Colonial education served the colonial elite, functionaries 
of the Spanish and Portuguese crown, priests, and professionals. 
Schools and universities were ideological institutions that maintained 
the situation of conquest and colonization. Since independence, the 
national states used the educational institutions to "integrate" people 
3 
Cf. Xavier Gorostiaga, Los Banqueros del Imperio. 
Financieros Internacionales en los Pa{ses Subdesarrollados. 
Rica: EDUCA, 1978). 
Los Centros 
(Costa 
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into "civilization" --to the culture of the center-- to establish the 
national bourgeoisie in the center as a dependent society and to ex-
tend the values, normas, and beliefs which justified exploitation, 
domination and repression. Since 1930, educational institutions have 
served to produce the social mobility necessary to allow students to 
ascend the "pyramidal" social structure. Thus such education has 
existed to incorporate the national bourgeoisie into the system of the 
center by giving less or no importance to the educational needs to the 
urban and rural proletariat. This was the reason why, while governments 
were speaking about "education for everyone,'' they were creating condi-
tions for a high percentage of drop-outs. 
When Freire talks about education, he relates the educational 
process to the economic, s,ocial, and political structures. Freire was 
impressed by the high investment of money in public education, the 
relatively few people who were benefited, the cost of education for 
each student, the quality of the education --structure, objectives, 
4 
methods, content, and results--, and the high drop-out rate. When 
Freire thinks about the practice of education, whether formal or non-
formal, he cannot separate the economic, social, and political reality 
from the role which was played by traditional education. Such educa-
tion strengthened the structures of a society which exploits, dominates, 
and represses; it was an education of domination and therefore needed 
4 
Paulo Freire, "Escola Primaria para o Brasil," Revista Bra-
sileira de Estudios Pedagogicos (1960): 15-33. 
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to be reconceptualized. 
From an ideological point of view, it is usual to talk about 
conservative and liberal ideologies in Latin America. However there 
are new elements which lead beyond these traditional positions: the 
influence of European socialism, the Mexican Revolution (1910), and the 
the "Aprista" movement in Peru. Actually, these new elements coincide 
with the "surviving ideologies," i.e., conservative and liberal 
ideologies. So, Latin America has had authoritarianism in a conserva-
tive or liberal style. Reformism has been the more liberal and progres-
sive ideology. However, the rising of a revolutionary ideology over-
comes the traditional positions, generates an anticolonialism and anti-
imperialism, and provides a Marxist analysis. Freire was influenced 
by ideologies' influences: the conservatism of the Brazilian landowners, 
the liberalism of the authoritarian Getulio Vargas (1930), and the 
reformism of Joao Goulart. However, Freire does not enforce any of 
these ideologies. He is a revolutionary philosopher and educator. 
The philosophical and educational propositions of Freire reflect 
at least four factors present in the Latin American reality. First, 
Latin America is an area which has suffered earlier by the expansion 
of Europe, and later by the expansion of the United States. Such ex-
pansion has maintained a situation of conquest and neo-colonialism in 
spite of the Latin American struggles for liberation. Since the coming 
of Christopher Columbus, Latin America has not had economic independ~ 
ence. Second, Latin America maintains an economic, social and polit-
ical system of deep contradictions. Such contradictions are based, 
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in general terms, in the contradictionof center-periphery, i.e., bour-
geoisie-proletariat. Third, Latin America creates an education that 
supports domination and strengthens exploitation, dependence, 
and marginalization. That is, only a few people are maintained 
in power and likewise only a few are allowed to rise from one social 
stratum to another. Fourth, Latin America is confronting revolution-
ary times. The traditional ideologies have not had the capacity to 
solve the acute problems of the majority of people. These characteris-
tics constitute the Latin American reality, and concretely, the reality 
of Brazil, the terminus a quo of Freire's thought. As we have seen, 
Freire has given a revolutionary answer to this situation, the answer 
of the struggle for freedom. 
b) The Philosophical Influences 
In addition to the powerful influence of the Brazilian and Latin 
American reality, Freire has been influenced by diverse and varied 
thinkers from the center. A careful analysis of his thought leads us to 
find some of these philosophical, psychological, sociological, educa-
tional, and theological influences. Since it is impossible to make neat 
lines of demarcation among those influences without oversimplification, 
what I will attempt to do is to point out the most obvious influences 
from a philosophical perspective. In general terms, Freire has had 
four major influences: Personalism, Hegelianism, Existentialism, and 
Marxism. 
Through European personalism Freire has had contact with two 
basic branches of philosophical thought: Greek philosophy and Christian 
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thought. From the philosophical point of view, Freire's concept of 
change calls to mind Heraclitus of Ephesus (536-470 B.C.); his dialogical 
method, Socrates (469-399 B.C.); and his epistemology, Aristotle 
(384-322 B.C.). From the Biblical point of view, Freire's concepts of 
Easter, liberation, and freedom echo Exodus; his concept of utopia, 
the prophets of the Old Testament; his concept of faith, hope, and love, 
the epistles of Saint Paul; and his concepts of new birth, new human 
being, and new society, the Gospels. Freire has been an assiduous 
reader of Jacques Maritain, Etienne Henri Gilson, Emmanuel Meunier, and 
Georges Bernanos from Europe as well as Tristao de Athayde and Leonel 
Franca from Brazil. These are some of the more representative figures 
of the philosophy of personalism. Freire has also been in dynamic 
dialogue with theologians of different tendencies, such as Metz and 
Moltmann from Europe, James Cone and Richard Shaull from the United 
States, and Hugo Assmann, Rubem Alvez, Gustavo Gutierrez, and Jose Miguez 
Bonino from Latin America. As a direct influence from personalism, 
Freire has insisted on the unity of consciousness and reality, the con-
cept of the human being as a person, the primacy and indubitability of 
the human experience, and the understanding of society as reality. The 
influence of Christian faith on Freire is of crucial importance. In 
fact, he has written short theological essays such as Education, Lib-
eration and the Church, Letter to a Young Theology Student, The Third 
5 
World and Theology, and Teolog!a Negra y Teologia de la Liberacion. 
5 
English version: Black Theology and Theology of Liberation. 
305 
The powerful influence of Hegel, especially the Hegel of the 
Phenomenology, is clear. Freire's concept of the human being as 
subject recalls Hegel's concept of subject as reason in "self-conscious-
ness." Freire's concept of the human being intentionally projected on 
the world recalls the "consciousness" of Hegel who maintains that there 
is no complete possession of oneself unless consciousness projects to-
ward the objective world and takes the risk of being alienated. Freire's 
concept of "reflection upon" reality recalls Hegel's explanation that 
once consciousness is "out of itself," it returns to itself and "re-
fleets." Freire's concept of oppression also brings to mind Hegel's 
concept of "lordship and bondage" in which the consciousness of slave 
has its achievements only in the satisfaction of being for "another 
self-consciousness." Freire's concept of freedom as a way of over-
coming contradiction recalls the expression of Hegel "I am free because 
I am not in an other." Freire sees as imperative the creation of the 
human being in all the areas of human life, the process of conscienti-
zation to a more critical consciousness, and the dialectical relation-
ship between the human being and his world. These imperatives echo the 
6 
whole process of the Phenomenology of Spirit of Hegel. 
Another powerful influence upon Freire is European existential-
ism. When Freire insists on the concrete existence of human beings 
(fundamental ontology), their existence in the world of space and time, 
we are reminded of Martin Heidegger; when Freire insists on the place of 
6 
Cf. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, pp. 217-267. 
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the human being in the world, we are reminded of Max Scheler; when 
Freire talks about intentionality as a fundamental characteristic of 
human beings, we are reminded of Edmund Husserl; when Freire talks 
about limit-situation and transcendence, we are reminded of Karl 
Jaspers. When Freire defines human beings as being not only "in" 
the world but also essentially "with" the world, we are reminded 
Martin Buber. The concept of freedom conceived as freedom in con-
crete existence is a direct influence of existential philosophy. 
Freire has been an enthusiastic reader of Max Scheler, Martin Buber, 
Maurice Merleau Ponty, Jean Paul Sartre, Albert Camus, Karl Jaspers, 
and Gabriel Marcel. 
The last influence which I want to point out is European Marx-
ism. Some important themes of Freire's philosophy show how deep the 
influence of Marx is in his thought. Themes, such as economic condi-
tions as the origin of the social classes, the contradiction of op-
pressor-oppressed, the concept of praxis, the importance of having a 
synthetic view of history, society, and culture, the necessity of revo-
lution, and the concept of freedom as political liberation, are all in-
spired by Marxist philosophy. The concept of cultural revolution reminds 
us also of the cultural revolution of Mao Tse-tung. It is significant 
that one of the first Spanish editions of his Pedagogy of the Oppressed 
quoted in the Preface some paragraphs of the Poverty of Philosophy by 
7 
Marx. 
7 
This publication was made in Bogota, D.E., Colombia, by Edicio-
nes "CAMILO, '1 under the title: Conciencia Cr:!tica y Liberacion, Pedago-
g!a del Oprimido, 1967. 
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From my point of view, these are the principal influences upon 
Freire. It is obvious that he has been exposed to many other influences 
of the First World, but they are closely related to the above branches. 
I refer to the influence of Nee-Scholasticism which I include as part of 
personalism, the influence of the Jesuit evolutionist Pierre Teilhard 
de Chardin, or the influence of the humanists Herbert Marcuse and Erich 
Fromm. However, Freire is not a personalist, Hegelian, existentialist, 
Marxist, or eclectic; he is not an European philosopher, a philosopher 
of those who "have a voice" in behalf of those who are silent. Freire 
is a Latin American philosopher. What Freire does is to use all the 
European philosophy as a way, the via ad, to discover the philosophical 
perspective of those who have the "culture of silence." 
c) The Philosophy from The Periphery 
According to Jose Ortega y Gasset, a Spanish philosopher, phil-
osophy can be done only from a specific point of view, that point of 
8 
view of one's own circumstance. This affirmation is true if and only 
if the philosopher is able to recognize his own reality, has conscious-
ness about the particularity of it, and locates himself in it. In other 
words, one does philosophy from one's own circumstance, i.e., when one 
does not think from another's perspective other than one's own, when 
one is not alienated, and when one is free. But, what does it mean to 
be in one's own circumstance, in one's own reality? 
8 
This position is called "perspectivism." Cf. Gonzalo Fernan-
dez de la Mora, Ortega y el 98 (Madrid: Ediciones Rialp, S.A., 1979), 
pp. 197-212. 
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Leopolda Zea points out six basic points which will help us to 
answer this question. In order to have a philosophy arise from the 
Latin American reality, Latin American philosophers have confronted the 
following characteristics: 1. Philosophers have to pronounce their own 
"word," to locate themselves in their own world, to differentiate them-
selves from other voices, and to create their own order. 2. Philoso-
phers have to be original, which means to confront the human problems 
in the "here" and "now," not ignoring the philosophy of the center but 
going beyond it and overcoming it. 3. Philosophers have to be scienti-
fic, i.e., they have to use a rigorous and precise logic but without 
neglecting the ideological use of philosophy and the ethical implica-
tions of it. 4. Philosophers have to make constant reference to their 
own history in order to have an authentic universality. 5. Philoso-
phers must not neglect, as the Europeans and North Americans have done, 
the origin of all philosophy, i.e., the human being. They should 
strive for disalienation, humanization, and freedom. 6. Philosophers 
have to construct a philosophy for change, for the overcoming of human 
alienation, for a just and peaceful society. 
Enrique Dussel, who is more systematic in his presentation, 
points out five characteristics of the Latin American philosophy which 
also help us to answer our question about the role of a philosophy from 
the Latin America perspective. The characteristics are: 1. Latin Ameri-
can philosophy is a philosophy of history, a philosophy which is inter-
preted from two perspectives: the center and the periphery. Geographi-
cally speaking, the center is the countries which have dominated other 
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countries; the periphery is the countries which have been dominated. 
Philosophically, the center is the ontological philosophy which is 
considered absolute, unique, and total and which is imposed upon others; 
the periphery is the philosophy generated from the experiences of 
ordinary life outside of the center, from the people who suffer domina-
tion of the center and look for liberation. 2. Latin American philos-
ophy is a metaphysics of the other, a "metaphysics of alterity." The 
other is those who are outside the center. The option to begin a 
philosophy from the other is an ethical decision. Thus, a metaphysics 
of alterity begins from an ethical starting-point in opposition to the 
traditional understanding of philosophy. 3. Latin American philosophy 
is a "praxis of alterity," i.e., a praxis from the other who is beyond 
the center. It is a praxis which starts from the periphery, beyond 
the absolute, unique, and "total" ontology. Praxis refers to human 
relations: erotic relationships (male-female), pedagogical relationships 
(parent-child), political relationships (brother-brother), and "arche-
ological" relationship (man-absolute). 4. Latin American philosophy is 
a "poiesis C?f alterity," the relationship between humans and nature. 
5. Latin American philosophy has an "analectic" method which begins 
from the Logos of the other, beyond the comprehension of the center. 
Freire is different from Leopoldo Zea and Enrique Dussel. All 
three of them are different from each other. However, they coincide in 
their concern to make a critical analysis of their own social reality. 
Zea made his analysis in the social reality of Mexico. Dussel made his 
analysis within the social reality of Argentina, and Freire carried out 
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his analysis within the social reality of Brazil. From different real-
ities, different methods, and different approaches, they are agreed in 
their conclusions about the nature of philosophy in Latin America. To 
do philosophy in Latin America is not to repeat the philosophy of the 
center, neither the European nor the North American philosophy, be-
cause those philosophies of the center are tools of domination. While 
Freire talks about the social reality of Latin America, the contradic-
tory reality of the transitional society, Zea calls the attention to 
the here and now of the human problem and Dussel talks about the pe-
riphery which becomes the victim of domination by the center. These 
three philosophers are referring to the reality of Latin American 
countries as well as the reality of their own countries. While Freire 
talks about action and reflection as the way in which the oppressed 
becomes free, Zea talks about the philosophy of change to create a 
more human society and Dussel talks about the "praxis of alterity," 
i.e., the praxis of the other who has always been invaded and dominated. 
These three men are referring to a Latin American method that provides 
for understanding rea~ity --the peripheral reality and its relationship 
with the center-- in order to explain it and to change it. While Freire 
says that the struggle of the oppressed is the way to overcome the con-
tradiction of oppressor-oppressed, Zea says that the strangers, Indians, 
ignorants, half-breeds, and underdeveloped have the primary task to 
look for their own humanization, and Dussel talks about the metaphysics 
of the other, the meta-ontology, which is the philosophy of the periph-
ery. All three of them are referring to a terminus a quo which is the 
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reality of Latin America. However, the three of them differ in the 
terminus ad quem. While Freire arrives at Freedom, Zea arrives at 
the characterization of Latin American philosophy, and Dussel arrives 
at a Latin American philosophical method. As we can see, Latin 
America is a common reality of oppression and domination, of extreme 
human problems. It is a reality to be understood and changed (Zea); 
it requires a method for thinking and acting (Dussel); it needs a 
method to satisfy the necessity of humanization and freedom (Freire). 
For this reason we have affirmed that Freire is a Latin American 
philosopher and that Freire has elaborated a philosophy from Latin 
America. 
In summary, Freire has located in the Latin American context: 
historically, economically, socially, educationally, and politically, 
the terminus a quo of the Latin American philosophers. To be located 
in Latin America is to be on the periphery of international relation-
ships as well as on the periphery of national relationships. However, 
Freire has not rejected the contribution of the center, he has not 
inverted the terms, thinking that the Latin American philosophy has 
to be imposed on other people; on the contrary, the philosophy of the 
center is a tool, i.e., the method, the via ad of the Latin American 
philosophers, to locate themselves beyond the philosophy of the center. 
What Freire proposes is a philosophy of praxis, a social philosophy of 
praxis for freedom. 
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2. A SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 
Freire's thought begins with an analysis of his own reality, 
with a concept of praxis, and with the search of human nature. This 
analysis, concept, and search I have called the Philosophy of Praxis, 
the terminus a quo of Freire's thought as a whole. But Freire is 
especially interested in education as a method to overcome the contra-
dietary social reality and the dehumanization of human beings. This 
method --education for freedom-- is the via ad of Freire's thought as a 
whole. But freedom has its limitations, the contradictions of reality 
which are necessary to overcome. Such cortradictions are overcome by 
liberation, the struggle for freedom, the terminus ad quem of Freire's 
thought as a whole. 
a) A Philosophy of Praxis 
Freire's world-view is the social universe, the order of human 
relations. Freire differentiates three kinds of societies: the closed, 
the transitional, and the open society. These categories have been 
used by Henry Bergson, Karl Popper, Eric Voegelin, and many others who 
9 
have been working in a political philosophy of history. However, the 
unique characteristic of Freire's differentiations is his understanding 
that he was living in Brazil in an "epoch" of transitional society up 
to the time of the coup d'etat against Joao Goulart in 1964. He also 
9 
Cf. Dante Germino and Klaus von Beyne, The Open Society in 
Theory and Practice (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Mijhoff, 1974); 
Henry Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, trans. R.A. 
Audra and C. Brereton (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 
1956); and Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies 2 vols. 
(New Jersey: Princenton University Press, 1963). 
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generalizes his social interpretation to other situations, specifically 
to the Third World countries. For in the Third World there are examples 
of all three kinds of societies: closed, transitional, and open. This 
interpretation applied to the Latin American countries makes Freire's 
explanation crucial for the understanding of the convulsive situations 
of these countries today. Some examples of closed societies are Haiti 
with Duvalier and Paraguay with Strassner. Some examples of transition-
al societies are Guatemala up to the coup against Jacobo Arbenz Guzman 
in 1954, Argentina up to the time of the coup against Juan Domingo Peron 
in 1955, Bolivia up to the time of the coup against Victor Paz Estensoro 
in 1964, Peru up to the time of the coup against Fernando Balaunde Terry 
in 1968, and Chile up to the time of the coup against Salvador Allende 
10 
in 1973. And Freire would say that some examples of the open society 
would be the Cuba of Fidel Castro, the Nicaragua of the Sandinista 
11 
Revolution and the Grenada of Maurice Bishop. However, the importance 
of Freire's contribution, at the level of philosophy of society, rests 
in the explanation of the contradictory society in which the open and 
the closed societies coincide at the same time, i.e., the explanation of 
10 
Cf. Octavia Ianni, Imperialismo y Cultura de la Violencia en 
America Latina, pp. 3-49. 
11 
Cf. Paulo Freire, Preface to Children of the Revolution, 
A Yankee Teacher in the Cuban Schools, by Jonathan Kozol (New York: 
A Delta Book, 1978), pp. XIII-XV; Paulo Freire et al "Cristianos Ni-
caraguenses: Experiencia y Reflexion" in Reflexion Cristiana y Revolu-
ci6n Sandinista (Lima: CELADEC, 1979), pp. 7-42; "Louison for Education," 
Westindian Digest 63 (March 1980): 62, 63. 
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the transitional society. The coups d'etat have not help the desired 
stability of Latin America countries. There are countries, such as 
Guatemala and El Salvador, which have had coups, which are controlled 
by military forces, and in which such situations have generated organ-
ized guerrillas. There are countries, such as Chile, Argentina, Peru, 
Bolivia, and Uruguay, which have had coups, which are controlled by 
military forces, and in which all kinds of violent resistance have 
been eliminated and strong polarizations has been created. There are 
countries such as Venezuela and Colombia, which have not had coups in 
recent decades, but tpe __ repressive governments have created guerrillas. 
There are countries, such as Mexico and Costa Rica, which have had 
neither coups nor guerrilas but in which polarization is increasing. 
Freire would say that Latin American countries are living in the "flux 
and reflux" of the transitional society, a society in which the closed 
society is in decline and the open society is emerging, the society of 
freedom. 
On the basis of this social understanding, Freire has built his 
philosophical principles: the contradiction of oppressor-oppressed, the 
dialectical method to overcome such contradiction, and the overcoming 
of the contradiction. The contradiction between the oppressors and the 
oppressed has been clearly pointed out by other people from Europe and 
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12 
the Third World, such as Marx, Engels, Fanon, and Maromi. This contra-
diction has different expressions at the economic, social, political, 
psychological, cultural, and educational levels. However, the economic 
distribution is that which gives rise to social stratification. As 
Davis and Moore say: "The [economic] rewards and their distribution be-
come a part of the social order and thus give rise to stratification. 
The rewards which give more "inducement" are: "the things that contrib-
ute to sustenance and comfort," "the things that contribute to humor 
and diversion," and "the things that contribute to self respect and 
13 
ego expansion." According to Freire, economic status gives prestige 
and power and determines the contradictions on all levels: the upper 
class (and its elite) become the oppressor and the lov1er class the 
oppressed; each pole exists in function of the other; each of them is 
the antithesis of the other, and both relate dialectically. 
Praxis is the method best suited to change the social con-
tradiction. The concept of praxis is used by Hegel, Feuerbach, and 
12 
Cf. Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy. Answer to the 
Philosophy of Poverty by M. Proudhon in Collected Horks v. 6, pp. 
105-212; Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Hanifesto of the Conmmnist 
farty in_Collected Works, v.6, pp. 477-519; Albert Mammi, The 
Colonizer and the Colonized (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967); and Franz 
Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1968). 
13 
Kingsley Davis and Wilbert E. Moore, "Some Principles of 
Stratification," American Sociological Revie\v 10 (April 1945): 243. 
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Marx. 14 According to Freire, praxis is reflection and action upon the 
world --the social world-- to transform it. Action without reflection 
is activism and reflection without action is verbalism. Praxis is 
activity but not all activity is praxis, and praxis is theory but not 
all theory is praxis. For instance, philosophical activity as such is 
not praxis, even if it has practical implications; also, a philosophical 
interpretation of reality as such is not praxis, even if it is a theory 
of a practical activity. Praxis is for Freire reflection and action 
dialectically related, but --and here is the crucial point-- in order 
to make a historical transformation of the world, a transformation 
towards freedom, the overcoming of the contradiction. The philosoph-
ical task is not only to analyze and explain reality but also to trans-
form it. The philosophical task is not solely a transformation in 
itself but a transformation to satisfy practical human needs, that is 
freedom in Latin America. Philosophy is to serve the human needs of 
transformation and freedom. 
The overcoming of contradiction comes when praxis is used by 
the oppressed. They are the only ones who can break the contradiction 
and liberate themselves as well as the oppressors. The social contra-
diction is a violent situation of exploitation, domination, and repres-
14 
Cf. G. W. F. He gel, The Phenomenology of Mind; Ludwig. 
Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, trans. George Eliot (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1962) ; Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach" in 
Collected Works, v. 5, pp. 3-8; Karl Marx and Fricderick Engels, The 
German Ideology in Collected Works, v. 5, pp. 19-93; Adolfo Sanchez-
Vasquez, Filosofia de la Praxis. 
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sian which, in order to satisfy the anxiety of having more, converts 
humans into objects (necrophilia), denies elemental human rights, and 
obstructs the human vocation which is to become always more human. 
The oppressed revolt against this situation in order to stop their 
exploitation, domination, and repression and to create a more ration-
al, just, and peaceful order. One of the important contributions of 
Freire is that he sees the necessity of overcoming social contradiction 
on several levels. His dialectical conception of the relationship be-
tween objective and subjective dimension leads him to see the his-
torical contradiction (economjc .. so.cial, and political level) refJ_ected 
in human consciousness. Thus, historical praxis is also a psycholog-
ical one in order to discover in the oppressed the "image" of the 
social contradictions and in the oppressors their deformation in 
spite of their good will. There are present in this situation the 
15 
concepts of necrophilia and the fear of freedom of Erich Fromm. 
Freire analyzes contradiction and its overcoming from a psycho-social 
perspective. 
However, Freire goes beyond an individual and collective view of 
contradiction. Contradiction is psychological and social because it is 
anthropological. Freire's anthropology is the keystone to his philos-
ophy as a whole. Kant also considered anthropology as the fundamental 
15 
Cf. Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom. 
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16 
philosophical science, but he could not formulate his anthropology. 
Buber ask the anthropological question of Kant --"What is man?"-- and 
Buber answers it on the basis of the wholeness of its essential rela-
17 
tions." Freire responds to this question by saying: to be human is 
to be "in" the world but above all to be "with" the world. The 
world may be physical, social or cultural but above all it is social. 
To be "with" is to be with other persons, a political relation. Thus, 
18 
man is not only in the "cosmos" of Scheler nor is he only in the 
"blank solitude" of Buber, instead, he is immersed "in" the world from 
which he emerges. As to the question "where is man?" Freire responds: 
man is a subject being "with" the world. But what is the essential 
task of man in the world? Freire says: to think upon and to act upon 
the world in order to transform it. To be human is to be praxis. In 
this sense, Freire's thinking coincides with Marx who said, "The 
16 
Martin Buber says that in Kant's Handbook of his lectures 
on logic, which have not been published authentically, Kant recognizes 
four questions of the entire philosophy. Buber quotes Kant as follows: 
"1. What can I know? 2. Hhat ought I to do? 3. What may I hope? 4. Hhat 
is man? Metaphysics answers the first question, ethics the second, 
religion the third and anthropology the fourth." "Fundamentally all 
this could be reckoned as anthropology, since the first three questions 
are related to the last." Martin Buber, Between Han and Man, trans. 
Ronald Gregor Smith (Boston: Beacon Press, 1947), p. 119. 
17 
Cf. Martin Buber, Between Man and Man, pp. 118-295; Martin 
Buber, The Knowledge of Man, A Philosophy of the Interhuman, trans. 
Maurice Friedman and Ronald Gregor Smith (Evanston: Harper & Row, 
Publishers,· 1966), pp.559-71. 
18 
Max Scheler, El Puesto del Hombre en el Cosmos, trans. 
Jose Graos (Buenos A~res: Editorial Losada, S.A., 1971). 
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philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, 
19 
however, is to change it. From my point of view, this anthropology 
has three conceptual nuclei: man as historical, cultural, and political. 
Freire emphasizes a political anthropology in which humans assume all 
their historical conditions and all their cultural potentialities, in 
which humans as individuals as well as social beings create a world 
of freedom. 
b) A Philosophy of Education 
The Latin American reality does not permit Freire to be engaged 
only in pure philosophy. Conscious philosophers, who see the present 
situation of Latin American, cannot think with responsibility unless 
they are committed to some specific areas of action •. For this reason, 
Freire makes his commitment first and his philosophical reflection 
20 
follows it. For him philosophy is the "second step." Enrique 
Dussel is correct when he affirms that, for Latin American philoso-
phers, ethics comes first and the other philosophical disciplines follow 
it. Freire's philosophy of praxis is a social ethic, the terminus a 
quo of his thought as a whole; and his concrete area of action is 
education, the via ad of this commitment to the oppressed. 
the same 
lows it. 
ology of 
Culture reflects the anthropological contradiction. When Freire 
19 
Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," in Collected Works, v.S, p. 8. 
20 
Gustavo Gutierrez, a theologian from Latin America, affirms 
related to theology. He says: Praxis is first, theology fol-
Theology is the second step. Cf. Gustavo Gutierrez, A The-
Liberation (New York: Orbis Books, 1973), p. 11. 
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talks about those who "have a voice" and those who have a "culture of 
silence," he describes the Latin American situation today. Two situ-
ations can illustrate this affirmation. First, the Fifth Regional 
Conference of Secretaries of Education of Latin America and the 
Caribbean area (December 4-13,1979) expressed its concern about the 
high percentage of children who never go to school and the high per-
centage of children who drop out from primary school. Second, Jose 
Subirats says that Latin American countries had, up to 1980, 159 
million people over 15 years of age, 44 million of whom were illiter-
21 
ates (28%). What we nE;.ed, Freire says, is a "Cultural Action for 
Freedom," action which necessarily will lead to a "cultural revolu-
tion." This revolution reminds us of the Cultural Revolution of 
Mao Tse-tung (1966-69). This kind of cultural action is the reason 
why the elite react viol~ntly when the culture of silence emerges. 
The alternatives for educators --or for any kind of professionals--
are to be "with" the oppressed or to be against them. Freire opted 
for the oppressed. 
The method of cultural action is conscientization. Many mis-
takes have been made in the interpretation of this word. That is the 
reason why Freire wants to demythologize the concept of conscientization. 
Conscientization tries to avoid two philosophical mistakes: idealism 
and mechanism. Idealism interprets objective reality as a creation of 
21 
Cf. Jose Subirats, "La Educacion en America Latina como Reto 
para las Iglesias Cristianas," (Mimeographed), pp. 13,14. This is a 
paper presented in the Consulta de Instituciones Educativas Metodistas 
en America Latina, which took place in Cochabamba, Bolivia, in June,1980. 
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conscience. Mechanism interprets conscience as a reflection of objective 
reality. Freire does not explain reality idealistically as did Plato, 
Kant, or Hegel. Freire also does not explain reality mechanistically as 
did Descartes, Spinoza, or Leibniz. For Freire, conscientization is 
praxis, the dialectical method between humans and their reality. The 
transition from naive to critical consciousness is not possible without 
a concrete commitment to the objective reality. Change of reality is 
not possible without a progressive transformation to critical conscious-
ness. Freedom does not mean freedom of the subjective spirit. Neither 
does it mean objective freedom without freedom of spirit. Freedom is 
created in the dialectical process between subjective and objective re-
li . 22 a t1.es. 
The anthropological contradiction of society and culture 
generates the contradiction of educatiou as· banking. Such education 
describes the situation of Latin American education today. The above-
mentioned Fifth Regional Conference of Secretaries of Education of 
Latin America pointed out, in---!979, five major problems in Latin 
22 
Cf. Paulo Freire, "Concientizar para Liberar" and "Desmitifi-
cacio'n de la Conscientizacion" in La Praxis Educativa de Paulo Freire, 
ed. by Carlos Alberto Torres Novoa, pp. 107-137; Paulo Freire, "To 
Know and to Be. A Dialogue with Paulo Freire;" Paulo Freire, 
"Conscientizing As a \.Jay of Liberating," in Paulo Freire, Conscientiza-
cion y Liberacion, una Conversaci6n con Paulo Freire, (Rosario, Argen-
tina: Editorial Axis, 1975); Anon., "Conscientization not Magic, Warns 
Paulo Freire" (Mimeographed); Peter L. Berger, "The False Consciousness 
of 'Consciousness Raising,'" Horldview (January 1975): 33-38; Thomas G. 
Sanders, "The Paulo Freire Method --Literacy Training and Conscientiza-
tion." Dialogue 7, 1. (April 1973): 19-31. 
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23 
American education. First, high rate of illiteracy. Freire's theory 
arises precisely at his point. Second, inequality in educational op-
portunity. For Freire, inequality is a contradiction by the social 
system. John W. Gardner confirms this clearly when he talks about the 
problem of the United States: "In the breast of every American are the 
devotion to equalitarianism and the attachment to individual achieve-
24 
ment." Equalitarianism conduces to democracy, and individualism to 
egoism. Thus the open and the closed reside in the breast of ev~ry 
American, Freire would say. This is the anthropological contradiction 
which also inspires educational practice in Latin America. Third, the 
decontextualizacion of the educational content. Freire would say that 
decontextualization alienates students from their own reality because 
education has a wrong epistemological foundation. Fourth, problems of 
planning and administration. Of course, Freire would say, that all 
plans and all administrative work also serve the elite. The ministers 
of education are asking for "decentralization" of education. Fifth, 
the limitations imposed by the economic and social factors. The prob-
lems of education are ·the problems of society, Freire maintains. 
llow is the educational contradiction overcome? In other words, 
how does education change in a society that uses it to perpetuate the 
23 
Cf. Jose Sibirats, "La Educacion en America Latina como Reto 
para las Iglesias Cristianas," pp. 29-31. 
24 
John W. Gardner, Excellence, Can We Be Equal and Excellent 
too? (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1961), p. 3. Cf. Part 
One, Chapter I-III, pp. 3-39. 
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social order? Philosophers of education know that the social system 
uses education as a means of consolidation and expansion. For instance, 
Havighurst says: "The present state and structure of the society is 
mirrored in its schools and reflected through the schools into the lives 
of its children." He goes on to say that "a society which is under-
going internal changes uses education as a means of facilitating these 
changes."25 These affirmations show that education cannot be changed 
unless society is changed. Havighurst sees two types of social change. 
First, the "change within a society whose general pattern does not 
change." This is a change in order to not change. That has been the 
major emphasis on the part of educators in Latin America. In this sense, 
we may say with Havighurst that "Education .•. prepares people for up-
ward group mobility •.. and higher standard of living even though they 
stay in the social classes of their fathers." "Upward mobi.lity" and 
"higher standard" of living are expressions of a society,which is not 
changing. Second, Havighurst talks also about another type of change, 
that "which affects the society as a whole --its political institutions, 
its system of economic production, or the major elements of its social 
26 
structure." Freire discusses education in the context of this second 
kind of education. 
25 
Robert J. Havighurst, "Social Class and Education," Sixtieth 
Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, Part II 
(1961): 122. 
26 
Ibid., p. 350. 
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The overcoming of social, cultural, and educational contradic-
tion is possible through praxis. On the educational level, praxis is 
27 
a dialogical method. That means breaking the vertical relationships 
between the two contradictory poles (teacher-student) and the estab-
lishment of a horizontal relationships (teacher-student-teacher). The 
dialogical education is, according to Freire, education for change, 
i.e., an education for freedom. Freedom here is a political concept. 
Thus, problem-posing education is an education for freedom be-
cause it responds to the needs of the oppressed, because it enables 
the student --and teachers as well-- to understand the economic, social 
and political reality, and because not only does it explain this real-
ity but it enables us to transform it. Problem-posing education is, 
before taking power, an education for freedom like the education done 
28 
by Freire in Brazil or Chile. After taking power, problem-posing ed-
ucation is power and education of free people; it is revolutionary ed-
ucation. Such is the education carried on by Freire in Guinea-Bissau 
29 
or Grenada. 
27 
Cf. Anon. "Una Educacion a Traves del Dialogo." Bolet{n 
HOAC, 592-593 (Mayo 1972): 1-5. 
28 
Cf. Paulo Freire, La Educacion como Practica de la Libertad; 
John L. Elias "Adult Literacy Education in Brazil, 1961-1964, Metodo 
Paulo Freire," (Mimeographed). 
29 
Cf. Paulo Freire, Pedagogy in Process, The Letters to Guinea-
Bissau; Rosita Darcy de Oliveira, Guinea-Bissau: Reinventing Education 
(Geneva: IDAC, 1976). 
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c) A Philosophy of Freedom 
Latin American countries have in common two principal aspects: 
they have a Christian-tradition and they have a common history of eco-
nomic, social, and political oppression. The last aspect is common to 
the countries of whole the so-called Third World countries. The strug-
gles of independence have given to Latin America a freedom in the 
"liberal" sense. Liberalism permits "limit-situations" which, in 
general terms, are economic exploitation, social domination, and polit-
itical control. These are the contradictions of freedom. 
This political liberalism understands freedom as "an endowment 
from the Creator of every individual man and woman upon which no power, 
whether economic or political, can-encroach, and that not even the 
30 
government may deny." "An endowment from the Creator" means that 
31 
"All men were created free and equal." Freedom is a principle of 
creation. As John Dewey says, talking about liberalism, "the rights of 
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" are the "natural rights" 
of all humanity. "Life, liberty and property," John Locke would say, 
32 
are the "native tendency in every individual." We can find the same 
30 
Herbert Hoover, The Challenge to Liberty (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1934), p. 3. 
31 
Max Eastman, "Political Liberty," in Freedom in the Modern 
World, ed. by Horace M. Kallen (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1928), 
p. 159. 
32 
Cf. -Jdhri Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action (New York: 
G. P. Putnam 1 s Sons, 1935), pp. 1-27. 
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"naturalism" in Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, and John Stuart Mill, the 
fathers of political liberalism. Most progressive liberalism is 
embedded in the same naturalism which calls to mind the naturalistic 
33 
interpretation of society by Herbert Spencer. If I were to inter-
pret liberalism in a dialectical way, I would say: freedomis a 
"natural" gift, the terminus a quo of liberalism; i.e., all individ-
uals are "now liberated after centuries of repression, class rule, and 
34 
heredity privilege." So, all peoples are ready to improve and 
progress in an evolutionary way, the via ad of liberalism. As Carlos 
35 
Lleras Restrepo said, "we are evolutionists." That which people want 
to pursue is happiness, the terminus ad quem of liberalism. 
Freire's concept of freedom is completely contrary to the 
liberal interpretation mentioned above. The terminus a quo of the 
concept of freedom is the contradiction between an ideal concept of 
freedom and the "natural" determinism which justifies property, ine-
quality , class rule, and the privileges of the few. The naturalism 
which justifies freedom justifies also the condition of oppression, 
dependence, and marginalization. It is not true that Latin America is 
33 
Cf. Andreas M. Kazamias, Herbert Spencer on Education, (New 
York: Teachers College Press, 1966). 
34 
D. A. Hamer, Liberalism and the Origin of Modern Politics 
(Wellington: The Victoria University, 1971), p. 7. 
35 
"Somos evolucionistas." Cf. Carlos Lleras Restrepo, El 
Liberalismo Colombiano (Bogota: Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1973), pp. 
66, 67. 
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already liberated, even if the governments are called democratic and 
have elections every presidential term. It is not true that Latin 
American countries are free of repression, class rule, and "hereditary 
privilege." The challenge and the priority for Latin Americans today 
are liberation, the struggle of freedom, the via ad of Freire's concept 
of freedom. Liberation is not an evolutionary concept, it is not a 
"natural" process; liberation is a revolutionary concept, a social proc-
ess. Freire makes a clear distinction between "natural" process and 
social process. The necessity of freedom is to overcome economic, 
social, and political limit-situations. The terminus ad quem is 
freedom, the "eternal creation" and not the "eternal vigilance" of 
liberalism. 36 Freedom is the dynamic process of a permanent search on 
a political level. 
3. CRITICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
It is necessary to include two last points before finishing this 
work. On the one hand, it is important to discuss some critical consid~ 
erations which I had begun in the previous parts. These considerations 
have proposed questions for future research, On the other hand, my 
conclusions are the natural consequences of the above discussion. 
a) Critical Considerations 
Freire has not attempted to build a philosophical system, a 
pure philosophy. The conditions under which Latin America lives today 
36 
Herbert Hoover, The Challenge to Liberty, p. 205. 
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do not permit such luxury. A systematic philosophy will arise only as 
a "second moment." However, this part is that which people of the 
First World, in their critiques of Freire and other philosophers of the 
Third World, cannot understand. They misunderstand the situation in 
which Latin American philosophers are living, the methods which they are 
using, and the purpose for which they are reflecting. Many of the 
unfounded critiques against Freire have arisen from these misunderstand-
ings. Nevertheless, that does not mean that Freire may not be vulnera-
able to some critiques. At this point, I will point out my most impor-
tant critiques of Freire's work which I have analyzed. 
First of all, there are many elements in Freire's work: social, 
political, ethical, psychological, historical, physical, and meta-
physical, but he never develops a philosophical discussion about such 
areas of knowledge. So, the accusation of superficiality is justifiable. 
He is a thinker --not a philosopher-- who sees the world "right or 
wrong." For instance, Freire uses physical, metaphysical and logical 
categories, but he has never written a treatise on physics, metaphysics, 
or logic. Such explanations are supposed and therefore are in need 
of future philosophical analysis. The same thing happens with social, 
political, ethical, historical, psychological, scientific categories. 
Another example of this problem comes from the way in which Freire di-
vides the Brazilean society as oppressor-oppressed. He does not ex-
plain his criteria for judging the objective exploitation. A third 
example comes from his anthropology. He defines human being as praxis, 
as a being of relations, of creations. However, he does not take into 
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account the emotive, passional, and moral dimensions of human being. 
Second, philosophy of education is the central theme of 
Freire's thought. His principal interest is to rest his pedagogical 
method on his philosophical foundations. But even here, Freire's 
Vulnerability lies in his lack of an adequate philosoph1cal explana-
tion. For instance, his concept of conscientization tries to avoid the 
extremes of materialism and idealism. Conscientization --as well as 
praxis and knowledge-- is the dialectical relationship between objec-
tive and subjective realities. But what does that reality mean? 
Freire's explanation of social reality is not thorough enough to allow 
us to understand its dynamic. His explanation of human commitment to 
one's own reality is not very clear. People can confuse conscientiza-
tion with manipulation. This danger is more important in a "cultural 
38 
circle" where there is involved a political and social purpose. 
Third, the same objections can be made against Freire's con-
cept of revolution. There is an excessive confidence in dialogue without 
an explanation of its limitations. There is an excessive confidence in 
37 
Cf. John L. El:(as, "The Paulo Freire Literacy Method: A 
Critical Evaluation," (Mimeographed). Francisco Gutierrez, another 
educator of Latin America, points out the important aspects of human 
education. Cf. Francisco Gutidrrez. Metodo Practico de Educacion 
Liberadora. (Madrid: Editorial Marsiega, 1978). 
38 
Cf. Peter L. Berger, "The False Consciousness of 'Conscious-
ness }1aising"'; Erwin H. Epstein, "Blessed Be the Oppressed--And Those 
Who can Identify Them: A Critique of Paulo Freire's Conscientizacao" 
Lecture presented at the American Educational Studies Association 
Meeting, Chicago. (February 1972). (Mimeographed). 
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human cooperation, the possibility of unity, organization, and cultural 
synthesis without a serious discussion of the problem of revolution. 
For instance, an exaggeration between human beings and nature could lead 
to a simplistic and optimistic view of the social change without taking 
into consideration the real problems of such change. In this sense, 
Freire could be accused of being an idealist. 
However, Freire may be accused of superficiality but not of 
inconsistency. As I have affirmed at the beginning of my analysis of 
Freire's thought, he does not do a pure philosophy, and he is not 
interested in a subjective philosophy which will discuss irrelevant 
aspects. What he constructs is only a shell, a philosophical scheme 
which has to be taken as an agenda to be elaborated. 
b) Final Conclusions 
Given the nature of my analysis and method applied to Freire's 
thought, I have concluded that the contribution of Freire to the Latin 
American expectations of freedom can be summarized in the following 
points: 
First, freedom is the human vocation of people who live under 
oppression. Oppression is an economic, social and political order 
from which freedom arises. If each of these areas is not affected, 
freedom is not yet at hand. Freedom is a political concept which 
affects the infrastructural and superstructural dimensions of human 
life. 
Second, freedom is the human struggle of people who, bringing 
to light their own dehumanization, commit themselves to their own 
liberation. Freedom and humanization coincide; freedom is an essential 
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part of the human creation. Freedom is neither the "free competition" 
among people, a "natural selection" in social terms, nor the struggle 
between oppressor-oppressed, the "class struggle," but it is the 
struggle of all people to overcome human limitations. 
Third, freedom is the permanent human creation of people who, 
in liberating themselves with other people, make freedom a permanent 
mode of life through cooperation. Cooperation for Freire means a 
system of unity, or organization, and of cultural synthesis, the first 
principles of any political system of freedom. 
In a few words, freedom is the vocation of the oppressed for 
their own humanization. Freedom is the struggle of all people. No 
one is liberated alone; no one liberates others; people liberate 
together. Freedom is the continuous creation of a political mode of 
life. 
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